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1419 
“Useful Arts” in the Information Age 
Alan L. Durham* 
The computer is a powerful symbol of technological pro-
gress. Once a prohibitively expensive and specialized piece of 
equipment, the computer has become a tool of nearly universal 
application, transforming such diverse fields as engineering, 
communications, entertainment, medicine, business, education, 
mathematics, and science.1 The computer defines our techno-
logical era as the steam engine defined the early years of the 
industrial revolution;2 indeed, the term used to characterize 
our modern times is no longer “the space age,” but “the infor-
mation age.” The most direct contribution of the law to techno-
logical advancement rests in the grant of economic incentives 
to inventors via the patent system. Article I, Section 8 of the 
United States Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to 
grant exclusive rights to inventors in order to “promote the 
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 1. For a rather critical account of the computer’s increasing impact on society, 
see BENJAMIN B. WELLS, THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1997). 
 2. See J. DAVID BOLTER, TURING’S MAN: WESTERN CULTURE IN THE COMPUTER 
AGE 40 (1984) (“The computer is succeeding the clock and the steam engine as the de-
fining technology and the principal technological metaphor of our time, chiefly because 
it can reflect the versatility of the human mind as no previous mechanism could do.”); 
Yoneji Masuda, Computopia, in THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 621 
(Tom Forrester ed., 1985). 
The prime innovative technology at the core of development in industrial society 
was the steam engine, and its major function was to substitute for and amplify the 
physical labor of man. In the information society, ‘computer technology’ will be the 
innovational technology that will constitute the developmental core, and its fun-
damental function will be to substitute for and amplify the mental labor of man. 
Id. 
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Progress of . . . [the] useful Arts,”3 commonly defined as the 
“technological arts.”4 No one questions the importance or tech-
nological credentials of the computer revolution, yet, until re-
cently, many advancements in computing were coldly received 
in the courts and administrative bodies that apply the patent 
laws. Such advancements, when reduced to the fundamental 
operations of calculating numbers and manipulating data, were 
often viewed as fatally close to mathematics, principles of na-
ture, or “abstract ideas,” none of which are subjects of exclusive 
rights under the patent laws.5 
With the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Diehr,6 
and even more decisively with the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
In re Alappat,7 the tide of judicial opinion has turned. Now a 
broad range of computer-related inventions are considered pat-
entable, at least so long as the invention is claimed as a tangi-
ble apparatus (i.e., a programmed computer) or in connection 
with a specific and concrete application. The rules of the Patent 
Office have reflected this change.8 Yet the new liberality brings 
into prominence another dilemma, whose origins rest in the 
very ubiquity, or universality, of computers. While the proper 
subject matter of patents has been loosely described as “any-
thing under the sun that is made by man,”9 there may be some 
innovations, however ingenious, that lie beyond the technologi-
cal “useful arts” and, hence, outside the patent system. Ad-
vancements in business, the fine arts, and the social sciences 
have been so described. The dilemma is this: If an advance-
ment in a non-technological field is claimed, not as the ad-
vancement per se, but in terms of the computer system by 
which such advancements increasingly are realized, is such ad-
vancement sufficiently brought within the “technological arts” 
 
 3. “The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This 
provision is the source of both patent and copyright law in the United States. See infra 
notes 19-21. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text. 
 7. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). See infra notes 337-57 and accompa-
nying text. 
 8. See infra notes 369-375 and accompanying text. 
 9. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). See infra note 172 and accompa-
nying text. 
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to be patentable? More broadly, when is computer program-
ming a “useful art”? And how must patent applicants charac-
terize their programming advancements in order to gain the 
benefits of the patent laws? These are the issues that I address 
in this article. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Financial Group10 illustrates the issues at 
stake. The patent litigated in State Street uses a “Hub and 
Spoke” configuration to describe a new way to administer a 
family of mutual funds. Each mutual fund (or “Spoke”) invests 
in a common portfolio (or “Hub”). The latter, organized as a 
partnership, provides management services for the “Spoke” 
funds. This arrangement is said to provide both economies of 
scale and beneficial tax consequences.11 While it was appar-
ently the “Hub and Spoke” organizational scheme that was new 
and that was, in some sense, the applicant’s invention, the pat-
ent claims12 read in terms of the “data processing system” that 
performs the necessary calculations. There is nothing new 
about the computer system per se, and, in fact, it is described so 
generally that the claims could be met by virtually any com-
puter system managing a “Hub and Spoke” portfolio of mutual 
funds. 
Although one can applaud the business sense, or accounting 
acumen, that led to the invention of the “Hub and Spoke” ar-
rangement, one has to ask whether such an arrangement is an 
advancement in the “useful” or “technological” arts. If not, does 
it matter that the computer system inevitably used to imple-
ment the arrangement is claimed as the patentable invention? 
Although the Federal Circuit upheld the validity of the State 
Street patent, it addressed neither of these issues. The court 
merely characterized the manipulation of data representing 
dollar amounts as a “practical application of . . . a mathemati-
cal algorithm, . . . because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and 
tangible result.’ ”13 Whether the Federal Circuit reached the 
 
 10. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 851 
(1999); see infra Part IV.B. 
 11. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371. 
 12. Patent claims are the numbered paragraphs that formally describe the appli-
cant’s invention and define the scope of the patent. Section 112 of the Patent Act re-
quires that a patent application “conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
 13. 149 F.3d at 1373. 
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right result is debatable, but the analysis in State Street is se-
riously deficient because the court failed to address, in any ex-
plicit or coherent fashion, the central problem of defining the 
“technological arts.” 
After the State Street decision, we can expect to see further 
patents and patent applications reflecting “non-technological” 
innovations claimed in terms of the computers used to imple-
ment them. Indeed, a patent has already been issued for a 
scheme of rewarding those who view on-line advertisements.14 
Another patent claims a system for funding an education by 
promising “investors” shares of a student’s future earnings.15 
Before we stray too far into this brave new world, we should 
consider how best to define the “technological” or “useful arts” 
in an era when so much is accomplished merely through the 
manipulation of data. Is an innovation realized through the use 
of a computer inherently “technological?” Is the programmer’s 
art a “useful art?” Must we entirely redefine the “useful arts” to 
reflect the genius of our postindustrial information age? I do 
not suggest that there are simple answers to these questions, 
but they are matters of consequence, and computers have be-
come so pervasive in so many fields of endeavor that no one is 
unaffected. 
In Part I of this article, I consider the meaning of the term 
“useful arts” in light of the scant historical evidence, court deci-
sions equating “useful arts” with “technological arts,” and defi-
nitions of “technology” offered by philosophers, historians, and 
others. I also discuss the computer programmer’s art and 
whether programming should be considered a “useful art.” In 
Parts II and III, I review the two threads of patent jurispru-
dence that converged in the State Street case. The first, ad-
dressed in Part II, is the protracted struggle of the courts to de-
cide when a software-related invention should be held 
unpatentable because it is nothing more than a “mathematical 
algorithm.” The second thread, addressed in Part III, concerns 
the tradition long recognized in treatises but “la[id] . . . to rest” 
in the State Street opinion16 that “methods of doing business” 
are not patentable subject matter. These subjects have been 
treated exhaustively by others;17 I review them here with a 
 
 14. See U.S. Patent No. 5,794,210. 
 15. See U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484; infra note 442 and accompanying text. 
 16. 149 F.3d at 1375. 
 17. Useful reviews of the “mathematical algorithm” problem can be found in 
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particular emphasis on the problem of separating a “techno-
logical” application from a “non-technological” insight when the 
invention involves aspects of both. 
In Part IV, I review the cases, culminating in State Street, 
where technological and non-technological ideas intersect in 
the realm of computer programming. I also review some alter-
natives for deciding whether such cross-disciplinary inventions 
should be awarded a patent. One alternative is to treat all 
computer-implemented inventions as patentable subject mat-
ter.18 It is a simple solution, but an uncomfortable one when 
the invention reflects an essentially non-technological idea. 
Another alternative is to focus exclusively on the tangible, 
technological nature of the computer hardware, or the physical 
medium on which the program is stored, in cases where the in-
vention is claimed in those terms. The Federal Circuit and the 
Patent Office are headed in that direction and perhaps have al-
ready gone that far. This is another simple solution, but it 
seems to place undue emphasis on form, not to mention the 
tricks of the claim-drafter’s art. My own proposal is to recog-
nize that the programmer’s art is the art of converting an often 
non-technological plan (such as a particular scheme for manag-
ing a family of mutual funds) into the kind of logical structure 
executed by a computer. Fashioning a logical structure is, like 
fashioning a physical structure, a “technological” endeavor, at 
least when the purpose is to produce a useful computer pro-
gram. As long as the claimed invention reflects specific aspects 
of the technological endeavor (specifics that reflect the pro-
grammer’s art and not, for example, the accountant’s art), then 
the invention should be considered within the realm of the 
“useful arts” and, hence, patentable subject matter. The dis-
tinction is a difficult one, but some guidance can be found in 
 
David S. Benyacar, Mathematical Algorithm Patentability: Understanding the Confu-
sion, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 129 (1993) and Alan D. Minsk, The Pat-
entability of Algorithms: A Review and Critical Analysis of the Current Doctrine, 8 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251 (1992). Examinations of the “methods 
of doing business” exception include George E. Tew, Method of Doing Business, 16 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607 (1934) and, more recently, Rinaldo del Gallo, Are ‘Methods of Do-
ing Business’ Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection? 38 IDEA 403 (1998). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 defines patentable subject matter as “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof.” Although § 101 is broadly worded, and deliberately so, it is subject 
to any limitations imposed by the constitutional reference to “the progress of . . . [the] 
useful Arts.” See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
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the “levels of abstraction” analysis applied in the copyright con-
text as well as in the typical process of software design. This is 
not a simple solution, but I believe it is the only one that prop-
erly situates the programmer’s skills, which are so important 
in today’s technological environment, within the larger context 
of the “useful arts.” 
Some of the questions I address in this article are so subtle, 
even metaphysical, that no answers can be expressed with 
complete certainty. Yet we must address these questions seri-
ously and soon. If we are too narrow in defining what is a pat-
entable software invention, we unwisely withhold the benefits 
of the patent system from a field of increasing technological 
and economic importance. On the other hand, if we err too far 
in the other direction, we will open a Pandora’s Box of future 
patents for which even the most progressive citizens of the “in-
formation age” may be unprepared. 
I. DEFINING THE “USEFUL ARTS” 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution includes what is of-
ten called the “intellectual property clause.”19 It states that 
Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.20” This clause is the source of congressional 
authority to establish both copyright and patent laws. The in-
tellectual property clause is unusually specific in the direction 
it provides to Congress. Not only does it detail the kind of pro-
tection that Congress may legislate (“exclusive right[s]” for 
“limited Times”), it also spells out the goal of such protection: to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”21 
The common meanings of the terms “science” and “art” have 
 
 19. This term is something of an anachronism since the phrase “intellectual 
property” was unknown to the Framers. Walterscheid suggests “the Science and useful 
Arts clause” as a more historically correct description. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO 
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 24 n.2 (1998). The clause might also be called the “pat-
ents and copyrights clause” since these appear to be the only forms of intellectual prop-
erty the Framers had in mind. However, since “intellectual property clause” is the term 
most often used, it is the term I adopt throughout my article. 
  20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 21. See In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (“It is interest-
ing to note that this particular grant is the only one of the several powers conferred 
upon the Congress which is accompanied by a specific statement of the reason for it.”). 
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changed in the intervening years. Today the term “science” re-
fers to the investigation of the natural world through observa-
tion, experimentation, and application of the “scientific 
method.” In the eighteenth century, what we call “science” 
would have been called “natural philosophy.”22 The Framers 
understood the term “science” as something broader, which to-
day we might call “knowledge” or “learning.”23 The term “art,” 
on the other hand, was less identified with the fine arts than it 
is today. “Art” meant something closer to the terms “technique” 
or “craft.”24 Many patented inventions reflect an application of 
scientific principles or discoveries, using “science” in the mod-
ern sense. Hence, some have explained the patent system as a 
vehicle for promoting “Science and useful Arts.”25 However, 
scholars now regard the intellectual property clause as an ex-
ample of a “balanced sentence,” a common stylistic device of 
 
 22. See Anthony William Deller, An Inquiry Into the Uncertainties of Patentable 
Invention and Suggested Remedies, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 152, 161-62 (1956); Giles S. 
Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1960) (“A refer-
ence to Dr. Johnson’s definition of ‘scientifick’ will show . . . that the natural science 
which the present connotation of the word calls to mind was, in the days when the 
Constitution was written, referred to as ‘natural philosophy.’ ”). 
 23. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1948) (“The word ‘science,’ which 
comes from the Latin, scire, ‘to know,’ at the writing of the Constitution meant learning 
in general.”); Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 11 (1966). 
 24. “Art” can also be synonymous with “method” or “process,” particularly when 
applied in the context of an industry. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). 
The Patent Act of 1790 included “art” with manufacture, engine, machine, and device 
as the classes of invention that are potentially patentable. The general recodification of 
the patent laws in 1952 replaced the term “art” with “process,” apparently without any 
intention of changing the scope of patentable subject matter. See Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981). The current Patent Act still defines “process,” with strik-
ing circularity, as a “process, art or method.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994). Something like 
the original meaning of “art” survives in usages such as “the art of baseball,” yet now 
such “arts” are often contrasted with “science.” 
 25. The most infamous example is found in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Douglas in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 
147, 154-58 (1950). Emphasizing the constitutional reference to “science,” Justice 
Douglas argued that a patentable invention must “make a distinctive contribution to 
scientific knowledge” sufficient to “push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and 
the like.” Id. at 154. He concluded that “[t]he Constitution never sanctioned the patent-
ing of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of science.” Id. at 155. 
Justice Douglas’ fixation on “science” led him to an exaggerated view of the goals of the 
patent system. It is actually very common for “gadgets” to be patented—gadgets that 
do little if anything to advance scientific knowledge, but which are nevertheless “use-
ful.” 
DUR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:27 AM 
1426 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
eighteenth-century prose.26 In this balanced sentence, “science” 
is logically related to “authors” and “writings”; “useful arts” is 
related, in a parallel fashion, to “inventors” and “discoveries.”27 
The goal of “promoting” by a grant of exclusive rights for lim-
ited times is the same in both cases, but rights are granted to 
authors to promote the progress of “science” and to inventors to 
promote the progress of the “useful arts.” The former is the 
source of copyright law, and the latter the source of patent 
law.28 
Even with the “balanced sentence” literary device sorted 
out, one may ask how the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts” is of any significance in apply-
ing the patent laws. It is significant in two respects. First, it 
may limit the power of Congress to enact legislation such that 
any patent law that does not “promote the Progress of . . . 
[the]useful Arts” (or, at least, any patent law that hinders the 
progress of the useful arts) is unconstitutional. Second, even if 
it does not limit Congress’s power, the “Progress of . . . useful 
Arts” may be viewed as the preeminent guide to the interpreta-
tion of the patent laws. 
In Graham v. John Deere Co.,29 the Supreme Court adopted 
the strict view that the intellectual property clause of the Con-
stitution actually limits Congress’s power, at least to the extent 
of denying Congress the power to grant a monopoly on matters 
that are not sufficiently inventive: 
 At the outset it must be remembered that the federal pat-
ent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which 
authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . use-
ful Arts . . . .” The clause is both a grant of power and a limi-
tation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often exer-
 
 26. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 60-61; Robert I. Coulter, The Field of 
the Statutory Useful Arts (pt. 2), 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 487, 491 (1952) [hereinafter 
Coulter (pt. 2)]. 
 27. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 51. 
 28. As the Court elaborated in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 
(1974), 
The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited 
period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of 
time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have 
a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes 
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased em-
ployment and better lives for our citizens. 
Id. at 480. 
 29. 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). 
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cised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Eng-
lish Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the 
“useful arts.” . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent 
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.30 
For example, Congress could not authorize a patent that 
would withdraw access to information already in the public 
domain because the effects of such a patent would be contrary 
to the constitutional mandate. As the Court explained, “Inno-
vation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of use-
ful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which 
by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . 
useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution 
and it may not be ignored.”31 
Certainly Congress’s other sources of power give it author-
ity to impose laws that do nothing to promote the progress (and 
some laws that actually hinder the progress) of the useful arts. 
For example, Congress may pass legislation to preserve the se-
crecy of information on weaponry even if such secrecy hinders 
the progress of such useful arts as nuclear engineering and la-
sers. What Congress may not do, according to John Deere, is to 
establish patent laws under the authority of the intellectual 
property clause that are contrary to the stated purpose of that 
clause. The rhetoric of John Deere further suggests that Con-
gress may not enact patent laws exceeding the constitutional 
objective even if they are not contrary to that objective. In 
other words, Congress may not “overreach the restraints im-
posed by the stated constitutional purpose” by awarding pat-
ents that promote only the progress of “non-useful” arts.32 
While this was not the situation presented in John Deere, it is 
 
 30. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas expressed a similar view in his 
dissenting opinion in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380-84 (1944), in 
which Justices Black and Murphy joined. According to Douglas, “[t]he purpose ‘to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts’ . . . provides the standards for the exercise 
of the power [of Congress] and sets the limits beyond which it may not go. That purpose 
also provides the guide for the interpretation of patent laws enacted pursuant to that 
power.” Id. at 381-82. 
 31. John Deere, 383 U.S. at 6. The Court did recognize, however, that “[w]ithin 
the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may . . . implement the stated pur-
pose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the 
constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I 
power.” Id. 
 32. Id. 
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an important issue that will be discussed in due course.33 
While John Deere treats the promotion of the “useful arts” 
as a limitation on Congress’s power, the constitutional provi-
sion is more often employed as a tool for interpreting the pat-
ent statutes and divining congressional intent. Indeed, the 
“useful arts” goal may be considered a part of the legislative 
history of the Patent Act of 1952.34 House and Senate commit-
tee reports35 that accompanied the bill referred to the constitu-
tional language and adopted the “balanced sentence” interpre-
tation, which, as previously discussed, singles out promotion of 
the “useful arts” as the objective of the patent laws. Earlier 
versions of the Patent Act even included the constitutional lan-
guage in their titles, as in the case of the first Patent Act called 
“An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts.”36 Hence, 
courts interpreting fundamental concepts of patent law have 
sought guidance in the ultimate purpose of the law as stated in 
the text of the Constitution and as reaffirmed by Congress. 
Specifically, the “Progress of . . . useful Arts” has been un-
derstood as the bedrock of Section 101 of the Patent Act,37 enti-
tled “Inventions patentable.” Section 101 states that “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.”38 No patent may 
be obtained for any discovery, “however useful, novel, and 
nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the enumerated cate-
gories.”39 The most difficult of these categories to define has 
been “process.” Any activity may be considered, in a broad 
sense, a “process,” yet some activities—the solving of a mathe-
matical formula, the composition of a piece of music, the opera-
tion of a business—may be incompatible with the common idea 
of a patentable invention. When such conflicts arise, the consti-
tutional reference to the “useful arts” provides an interpretive 
 
 33. See infra Parts I.D, III. 
 34. See Rich, supra note 22, at 397. The Patent Act of 1952 was the last general 
revision of the patent laws. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)). 
 35. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952). 
 36. The Act was passed on April 10, 1790. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 53. 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). 
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touchstone. For example, in In re Musgrave,40 the court consid-
ered whether a method involving human thought would meet 
the definition of “process.”41 The court concluded that it would 
so long as the method fell within the “useful arts.” “All that is 
necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps 
a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the 
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the constitu-
tional purpose to promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’ ”42 
Most of the debate over the patentability of computer-
related inventions (particularly those inventions embodied in 
computer software) has focused on whether the invention falls 
within one of the § 101 categories. If the invention is only a 
“mathematical algorithm” or an “abstract idea,” it fails the sub-
ject matter test, but if the invention is a “process” or “machine,” 
it may be patented.43 The “promot[ing] . . . [of the] useful Arts” 
objective has played, and continues to play, an important role 
in these definitional questions. Yet, in many of the cases liti-
gated so far, the computer-related invention addressed a tech-
nological or industrial goal. In Parker v. Flook,44 for example, 
the invention concerned an improved system for curing rubber 
implemented with a programmed computer. Applications such 
as rubber curing meet anyone’s definition of a “useful art,” so, 
in principle, patenting such inventions would seem consistent 
with the constitutional objective of the patent laws. As more 
patents of the State Street variety appear—i.e., patents describ-
ing computer implementations of non-technological ideas—we 
must pay even closer attention to the meaning of “useful arts,” 
both in construing § 101 and in applying the patent laws as the 
Framers intended. Unfortunately, “useful arts” is not a term 
that is easily defined. 
A. The Historical Perspective 
There is little “legislative history” to assist in interpreting 
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution. The Ameri-
 
 40. 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 41. See infra notes 113-119 and accompanying text. 
 42. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893. See also In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 
(C.C.P.A. 1971). The use of “technological arts” as a synonym for “useful arts” is dis-
cussed infra at Part I.B. 
 43. This is assuming that it meets the other patentability requirements such as 
novelty and non-obviousness. 
 44. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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can patent system was, to a large degree, a continuation of the 
British tradition embodied in the Statute of Monopolies of 
1623.45 Britain and other European nations awarded patents to 
persons who introduced new industries to the national econ-
omy, either through invention or through importing the knowl-
edge from abroad.46 Thomas Jefferson, who is sometimes called 
the first administrator of the United States patent system,47 is 
well known for expressing doubts as to whether such a system 
should be emulated in the United States. In 1788 he wrote to 
James Madison expressing his general satisfaction with the 
newly ratified Constitution but suggesting that monopolies 
were so objectionable that they should not be granted even as 
an encouragement to inventors. He proposed an antimonopoly 
provision for the Bill of Rights, and although he recognized 
that a monopoly for a limited time might be an “incitement[] to 
ingenuity,” he concluded that “the benefit even of limited mo-
nopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general 
suppression.”48 However, notwithstanding Jefferson’s hesita-
tion, the intellectual property clause did appear in the Consti-
tution, and it was adopted, according to Madison’s notes, ne-
 
 45. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jam., ch. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 8 (1999). See George Ramsey, The Historical Back-
ground of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 6 (1936); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Pro-
mote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12-
13, 33-36 (1994). 
 46. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 26 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944) (discussing the history of patents, particularly in Venice 
and France, prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution); Edward C. Wal-
terscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 706 (1994). 
 47. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). The first Patent Act 
provided for examination of patent applications by a commission of three individuals: 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General. See, Edward C. 
Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 
279 (1995). Jefferson served as Secretary of State, and, perhaps because of his personal 
interest in inventions, he is thought to have taken a leading role in the interpretation 
and administration of the first Patent Act of 1790. See id. at 279-80. However, Walter-
scheid argues that Jefferson’s reputation as the founder of the patent system has been 
exaggerated. See id. at 311-14. 
 48. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), quoted in 
Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 274. Jefferson’s views were, however, equivocal. In 
1807 he wrote to Oliver Evans, saying, “Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a 
right to the benefit of his invention for a certain time . . . . Nobody wishes more than I 
do that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.” Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to Oliver Evans (May 1807), quoted in John Deere, 383 U.S at 8. 
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mine contradicente—“no one dissenting.”49 
The patent aspects of the intellectual property clause arose 
from a suggestion made by Charles Pinckney to the Constitu-
tional Convention’s Committee of Detail on August 18, 1787, 
and possibly from a similar suggestion made at the same time 
by Madison.50 According to Madison’s published notes, Pinck-
ney proposed that Congress have the power “[t]o grant patents 
for useful inventions.”51 Madison himself proposed that Con-
gress have the power “[t]o encourage by premiums & provi-
sions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”52 
Each of these proposals includes the word “useful” in describing 
the subject matter to be encouraged although neither includes 
the precise phrase “useful arts.” How these proposals were 
transformed into the ultimate language of the intellectual 
property clause is unknown.53 In any event, the modified lan-
guage was proposed by the Committee on September 5, 1787, 
and was approved unanimously by the Constitutional Conven-
tion on the same day.54 
What did the Framers mean by the phrase “useful arts”? 
The first clue comes from the language of the intellectual prop-
erty clause itself. The “balanced sentence” in which that clause 
is phrased distinguishes the “useful arts” from “science” and 
makes only the former the province of the patent laws. There-
fore, if “science” means knowledge in general, “useful arts” 
must mean something different, or at least narrower. Further, 
the substance of the “useful arts” must be the “discoveries” of 
“inventors,” as opposed to the “writings” of “authors.” Yet none 
of this gets us very far if the question is as subtle as whether, 
for example, law or business could be considered a “useful art.” 
As United States patent law is to some extent a continua-
tion of European practices, it is relevant to examine the kinds 
 
 49. Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 26. 
 50. See id. at 43-47. 
 51. Id. at 45. 
 52. Id. Madison’s unedited, contemporaneous notes indicate that he proposed to 
give Congress the power “to secure to the inventors of useful machines and implements 
the benefits thereof for a limited time.” Id. at 46. The omission of this from Madison’s 
edited notes has not been explained. See id. at 46-47. 
 53. See id. at 51. The Federalist has little to say about the intellectual property 
clause, other than that “[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned,” and 
“[t]he right to useful inventions seems . . . to belong to the inventors.” THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 54. See Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 50-51. 
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of “arts” those countries encouraged by issuing patents. Venice 
issued one of the earliest known examples of a patent in 1469 
to one John of Speyer, who is said to have introduced the art of 
printing to that nation.55 The patent “decreed that for five 
years next following there should be nobody whosoever who 
would, could, might or dare exercise said art of bookprinting in 
Venice and its territories, except master John himself.”56 Inter-
estingly, the patent referred to the reservation of exclusive 
rights “[i]n the same manner as usual in other useful arts.”57 
Later patents concerned specific innovations in printing and 
new developments in the important Venetian art of glass mak-
ing.58 In sixteenth-century France, patents served as an ele-
ment of the “mercantile system” designed to encourage manu-
factures and export.59 In 1536 France granted a patent-like 
“privilege” to Etienne Turquetti for the introduction of a silk-
making industry.60 France awarded its first genuine monopoly 
patent to an Italian, Theses Mutio, who in 1551 introduced the 
art of making glassware in the Venetian manner.61 Examples 
such as these suggest a time-honored European tradition of 
awarding patents for industrial developments considered im-
portant to the nation.62 
Like its continental counterparts, Britain issued patents to 
foster the introduction of new industries.63 In 1561, for exam-
ple, Britain issued patents for the milling of soap and the 
 
 55. See Prager, supra note 46, at 715. 
 56. Id. at 750. 
 57. At least in the translation that appears in Prager’s account. See id. 
 58. See id. at 716. 
 59. Id. at 721. 
 60. Id. at 722. 
 61. See id. at 723; see also Walterscheid, supra note 46, at 711. 
 62. The “mercantilist” view is reflected in a Connecticut statute of 1672, which 
states that “There shall be no monopolies granted or allowed amongst us but of such 
new inventions as shall be judged profitable for the country . . . .” Prager, supra note 
46, at 758. 
 63. The defendant in the so-called “Case of Monopolies,” decided in 1603, offered 
a classic expression of the underlying principle: 
[W]hen any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit and invention 
doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance 
of a trade that never was used before; and that for the good of the realm;—in such 
cases the king may grant to him a monopoly-patent for some reasonable time, until 
the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by 
his invention to the commonwealth . . . . 
Quoted in P. J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
292, 301 (1929). 
DUR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:27 AM 
1419] “USEFUL ARTS” IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1433 
manufacture of saltpeter.64 Other patents covered specific in-
ventions better characterized as advancements in existing in-
dustries. These included patents issued in the 1560s and 1570s 
on such things as an improvement in knife handles, a grinding 
mill, dredging machines, ovens and furnaces, and a knapsack.65 
The Crown also granted monopolies on already existing com-
modities, such as salt and paper, not to encourage the devel-
opment of new industries, but for other ends, such as reward-
ing favored subjects.66 Popular resentment of such oppressive 
and “illegal” monopolies led to the Statute of Monopolies in 
1623. The Statute is primarily directed to the prohibition of 
monopolies, but it is most significant in the study of patent law 
for the exception it provides for inventions. The prohibition 
does not extend to “grants of privilege for the term of fourteen 
years or under . . . of the sole working or making of any manner 
of new manufactures within this realm . . . to the first and true 
inventor . . . and inventors of such manufactures.”67 
By the late eighteenth century, patent applications for spe-
cific improvements, as opposed to general industries, had be-
come the norm—perhaps a sign of Britain’s industrial matur-
ity.68 At the same time, the number of patents issued increased 
significantly.69 Although the American colonies were far less 
industrialized than England, there were instances in which in-
dividual colonies granted exclusive rights for the purpose of in-
troducing new industries.70 As in England, colonial monopolies 
included broader industries as well as specific mechanical in-
ventions.71 Examples include salt, pitch and turpentine produc-
tion, paper and glass manufacturing, water-powered mills, a 
surveying instrument, and an improved scythe.72 
 
 64. See id. at 296. 
 65. See id. at 297. 
 66. See id. at 299. 
 67. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in CHISUM, supra note 45, at app. 8. 
 68. See 11 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 427-29 
(1938). 
 69. More patents were issued in Britain between 1760 and 1785 than in the pre-
ceding 140 years. See id. at 426 n.1. The increase may have been due to the advancing 
industrialization of the British economy. See id. at 425-26. 
 70. See P.J. Federico, Colonial Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 358 
(1929). These efforts primarily focused on the introduction of new industries by impor-
tation, as opposed to invention. See id. 
 71. See id. at 359-64. 
 72. See id. at 360-62. 
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Clearly, patents were closely associated with industry and 
mechanical innovation. Yet it is difficult to reduce this associa-
tion to any sharply defined rule or custom regarding the sub-
ject matter of patents, or to argue that the Framers consciously 
intended to embody such a rule in the phrase “useful arts.” 
Moreover, the Framers did not adopt the phrase “manufac-
tures” to describe the subject matter of patents, as they might 
have done had they used the Statute of Monopolies as a more 
explicit model. Hence, it is conceivable (though there is no real 
evidence for this) that the Framers intended “useful arts” to 
suggest a broader subject matter for patents than had been 
customary in Britain.73 
“Useful arts” is not a term unique to the Constitution, so a 
better understanding of the phrase can be sought in other, 
roughly contemporaneous usages.74 One example is particularly 
interesting because it occurred as the Constitutional Conven-
tion was underway and, perhaps, with the intention of influ-
encing the proceedings. This was the address of Tench Coxe to 
an assembly of the Friends of American Manufactures. Coxe 
delivered the address on August 9, 1787, (only nine days before 
the suggestions of Pinckney and Madison to the Committee of 
 
 73. Lutz speculates that the Framers chose “useful arts” instead of “manufac-
tures” because the latter seems to exclude processes. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 53-54. 
Even in Britain, some patents were granted for innovations that were neither indus-
trial nor mechanical. For example, as long ago as the sixteenth century, Britain 
granted a patent on a system of shorthand. See Federico, supra note 63, at 297. It also 
issued patents on insurance schemes—one of them in 1778. See 11 HOLDSWORTH, su-
pra note 68, at 427 n.7. These are precisely the kinds of patents that muddy the con-
cept of “useful arts” today. 
 74. Seidel turned to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language for 
the meaning of the individual words “useful” and “art.” See Seidel, supra note 23, at 10 
n.11. The 1755 edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, no doubt the leading dictionary of the 
day, broadly defines “useful” as “Convenient; profitable to any end; conducive or helpful 
to any purpose.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Times 
Books Ltd. 1983) (1755). Johnson assigns “Art” a number of meanings, the most rele-
vant of which are: “1. The power of doing something not taught by nature and instinct; 
as, to walk is natural, to dance is an art. . . . 2. A science; as, the liberal arts. . . . 3. A 
trade.” Id. The example for the third definition is from Boyle: “This observation is af-
forded us by the art of making sugar.” Id. Seidel concludes that “useful arts” refers to 
the “helpful trades.” Seidel, supra note 23, at 10; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 
19, at 52 (“In 1787 ‘useful arts’ meant basically helpful or valuable trades.”). This may 
be true in a general sense, but it does not answer the hard questions. For example, are 
accounting, law, education, and advertising “useful arts” because they are “helpful 
trades?” Or did the compound term “useful arts” (which does not appear in Johnson’s 
Dictionary) have a narrower meaning specifically limited to the industrial or manufac-
turing arts? 
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Detail) at the University of Pennsylvania, on the occasion of 
the establishment of a Society for the Encouragement of Manu-
factures and the Useful Arts.75 Coxe did not offer a definition of 
“useful arts” per se, but the tenor of his address suggests that 
they are intimately related to industry and the production of 
goods. The following passage, which applauds the progress 
America had already made in the production of manufactured 
goods, suggests Coxe’s understanding of the phrase: 
 Under all the disadvantages which have attended manu-
factures and the useful arts, it must afford the most comfort-
able reflection to every patriotic mind to observe their pro-
gress in the United States and particularly in Pennsylvania. 
For a long time after our forefathers sought an establishment 
in this place, then a dreary wilderness, every thing necessary 
for their simple wants was the work of European hands. How 
great—how happy is the change. The list of articles we now 
make ourselves, if particularly enumerated would fatigue the 
ear, and waste your valuable time. Permit me however to 
mention them under their general heads: meal of all kinds, 
ships and boats, malt and distilled liquors, potash, gunpow-
der, cordage, loaf-sugar, pasteboard, cards and paper of every 
kind, books in various languages, snuff, tobacco, starch, can-
non, musquets [sic], anchors, nails, and very many other arti-
cles of iron, bricks, tiles, potters ware, mill-stones, and other 
stone work, cabinet work, trunks and Windsor chairs, car-
riages and harness [sic] of all kinds, corn-fans, ploughs and 
many other implements of husbandry, sadlery [sic] and 
whips, shoes and boots, leather of various kinds, hosiery, hats 
and gloves, wearing apparel, coarse linens, and woolens, and 
 
 75. TENCH COXE, AN ADDRESS TO AN ASSEMBLY OF THE FRIENDS OF AMERICAN 
MANUFACTURES: CONVENED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A SOCIETY FOR THE 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF MANUFACTURES AND THE USEFUL ARTS, READ IN THE UNIVERSITY 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, ON THURSDAY THE 9TH OF AUGUST 1787 (Philadelphia, R. Aitkin & 
Son 1787). The announced objectives of the Society, published as Plan of the Pennsyl-
vania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, 2 AM. 
MUSEUM 167, 167 (AMS Press 1965) (1787), reinforces the idea that “useful arts” 
means industrial arts: 
  Our distance from the nations of Europe,—our possessing within ourselves 
the materials of the useful arts, and articles of consumption and commerce,—the 
profusion of wood and water, (those powerful and necessary agents in all arts and 
manufactures)—the variety of natural productions with which this extensive coun-
try abounds and the number of people in our towns, and most ancient settlements, 
whose education has qualified them for employments of this nature,—all concur to 
point out the necessity of promoting and establishing manufactures among our-
selves. 
Id. 
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some cotton goods, linseed and fish oil, wares of gold, silver, 
tin, pewter, lead, brass and copper, clocks and watches, wool 
and cotton cards, printing types, glass and stone ware, can-
dles, soap and several other valuable articles with which 
memory cannot furnish us at once.76 
If Coxe understood “useful arts” to encompass anything 
other than techniques for the furtherance of industry, the pro-
duction of goods, and the satisfaction of material needs, there is 
no suggestion of it in this encyclopedic list or anywhere else in 
his address. Similar associations are apparent in a pamphlet 
written by Joseph Barnes in 1792, complaining of the inade-
quacies of the early patent system. His work, entitled Treatise 
on the Justice, Policy, and Utility of Establishing an Effectual 
System for Promoting the Progress of Useful Arts,77 distin-
guishes between real property and intellectual property, which 
he refers to as “mental” property.78 “[B]y the latter, is under-
stood the products of genius, which consists in discoveries in 
science,79 and in the useful arts; by means of which agriculture, 
navigation, manufactures, and manual labor are, not only fa-
cilitated, but much promoted; and, indeed, to these they owe 
their present state of perfection.”80 Again, “useful arts” seems 
to refer to practical knowledge applied in labor, production and 
industry.81 
 
 76. COXE, supra note 75, at 17-19. 
 77. JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF 
ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM FOR PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS 
(Philadelphia, Francis Bailey 1792). 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. It is unclear whether Barnes is using “science” in the modern sense, or to re-
fer to learning in general. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 80. BARNES, supra note 77, at 4. 
 81. “Useful arts” continued to be used in the nineteenth century to refer to the 
“arts” employed in industry and the production of goods. For example, a periodical es-
tablished in 1821 to circulate information about patented inventions associates the 
“useful arts” with “mechanics and manufactures”: 
We might now sum up, in saying, that as the present is as much an age of discov-
ery as of enterprise, this work may be a means of originating further inventions 
and improvements, and of bringing them to bear upon the useful arts. Chemistry, 
which has made greater advances in the last half century, than perhaps all the 
other sciences taken together, is still unfolding new elements of nature, and giving 
new principles, applicable both to mechanics and manufactures. In both, it is 
highly desirable to connect, as fast as possible, these discoveries with our work 
shops and factories. 
AM. J. IMPROVEMENTS USEFUL ARTS & MIRROR PAT. OFF. U.S., Jan.-Mar. 1828 at 16 
(Washington, William Greer). Similar usages, though again without any attempt to 
define the phrase “useful arts,” can be found in the preface of J. Leander Bishop’s A 
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In the end, however, such historical information takes us 
only so far. It is clear enough that the phrase “useful arts” in-
cludes machines, manufactures, and the physical techniques of 
industry. Ships and shoes and sealing wax, and the techniques 
for producing those things, are “useful arts.” But it cannot be 
said with equal certainty that an accounting method, or a 
teaching technique, or an election strategy are not “useful 
arts.” Perhaps the Framers would have thought this obvious, 
but, as Prager says of the intellectual property clause, “It is 
unknown what the authors of our organic law intended, subjec-
tively.”82 
B. “Useful Arts” As “Technological Arts” 
In more recent times, courts and scholars have suggested 
“technological arts” as the modern-day equivalent of the term 
“useful arts.” Patent attorney Robert I. Coulter, writing in 
1952, the year of the last comprehensive revision of the United 
States patent code, may have been the first. Coulter’s attempt 
to define “useful arts” is still the most exhaustive and deeply 
considered.83 Coulter’s ultimate concern is whether patent 
method claims involving “mental steps,” such as calculating, 
comparing, and observing, should be considered outside the 
scope of patentable subject matter (particularly in terms of the 
pre-1952 statute, in which the categories of patentable subject 
matter included “useful art” rather than “process”).84 He con-
cludes that such “mental steps” claims should be considered 
patentable subject matter so long as they fall within the “useful 
arts” as the phrase is used in the Constitution.85 
 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO 1860, EXHIBITING THE ORIGIN 
AND GROWTH OF THE PRINCIPLE MECHANIC ARTS AND MANUFACTURES, FROM THE 
EARLIEST COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION; AND COMPRISING 
THE ANNALS OF THE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES IN MACHINERY, MANUFACTURES 
AND USEFUL ARTS (Philadelphia, Edward Young & Co. 1868). Some of the “useful arts” 
or “mechanic arts” discussed by Leander, such as brewing and wine making, are per-
haps matters more of technique than of machinery, but all of them are industrial. 
 82. Prager, supra note 46, at 746; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 59 & 
n.12 (noting the absence of any historical record commenting on the meaning of the 
intellectual property clause as it was understood by the Framers). 
 83. Coulter’s work on this issue appeared as a three part series. See Robert I. 
Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts (pts. 1 & 3), 34 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 417, 718 
(1952) [hereinafter Coulter (pt. 1) and Coulter (pt. 3), respectively]; Coulter (pt. 2), su-
pra note 26. 
 84. See Coulter (pt.1), supra note 83, at 417. 
 85. See Coulter (pt. 3), supra note 83, at 731-33. 
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According to Coulter, “[i]t seems clear that ‘useful arts’ (as a 
unitary technical term) embraced the so-called industrial, me-
chanical and manual arts of the 18th century.”86 Indeed, that 
much does seem clear, but how much more than these specific 
“arts” might the term encompass?87 Coulter approaches that 
question by “generalizing outward” from the characteristics of 
the eighteenth-century industrial and mechanical trades and, 
in particular, from the kinds of people who practiced those 
trades.88 They were, writes Coulter, manual laborers of limited 
education and intellectual ambitions.89 Such people, according 
to Coulter, “had no need of liberal arts colleges, universities, or 
of schools of fine arts.”90 Instead, their province was “to do 
practical things in practical ways to satisfy the physical needs 
of mankind.”91 Coulter distinguishes between “useful arts” 
practiced by the tradesmen and “cultural arts” practiced at the 
universities and in some professions.92 The latter included the 
seven “liberal arts” of grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, ge-
ometry, music, and astronomy.93 “Cultural arts” also included 
the “fine arts,” such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and 
drama.94 Other arts, such the arts of business, teaching, and 
politics apparently fell in neither category.95 
To further define the “useful arts” and to distinguish them 
from the other “arts” Coulter appeals to traditions as old as an-
tiquity. More than once he refers to the pantheon of Greek and 
Roman gods and to the conceptual division of “arts” suggested 
by the patronage of one god or another. He identifies Athena 
and Hephaestus as the overseers of the “useful arts.”96 Athena 
 
 86. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 496. 
 87. Coulter believes that the phrase “useful arts” was deliberately broad and that 
the Framers did not intend to limit it to the particular “useful arts” practiced at the 
time. See id. at 496, 499. For a summary of historical perspectives on the term “useful 
arts,” see supra Part I.A. 
 88. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 496. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 494. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Coulter (pt. 1), supra note 83, at 418. Coulter admits that “many of the 
cultural arts are useful in a broad sense, and certainly the arts of business are useful.” 
Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 495-96. See infra Part III for further discussion on the 
classification of the “art” of business. 
 96. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 497. 
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patronized such practical arts as shipbuilding, shoemaking, 
spinning, and weaving.97 Hephaestus patronized artisans gen-
erally and, specifically, the art of metalworking.98 Medicine, 
Coulter reasons, is not a “useful art” as a matter of tradition, 
but rather one of those uncategorizable arts. Its Greek practi-
tioners looked to Aesculapius for patronage, not to the deities of 
the manual trades.99 Moreover, medicine involves ethical issues 
and a doctor-patient relationship that “requires more than 
technical skill and learning.”100 
Coulter’s observations are valuable, but unfortunately his 
appeals to history and tradition are made with little reference 
to historical evidence, particularly in support of his contention 
that the classically-educated Framers would have understood 
that “useful arts” excludes “other disparate arts . . . such as the 
arts of teaching, politics, war, [and] business.”101 Moreover, 
Coulter’s “blue collar” distinction seems better suited to identi-
fying the “useful arts” of the eighteenth century than “expand-
ing outward” to identify the “useful arts” of today. Coulter ad-
mits that “[t]he practitioners of the useful arts are no longer 
merely mechanics, artisans, craftsmen and the like; but include 
highly educated technologists, engineers, chemists and applied 
 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. Hephaestus’s “chief characteristic was usefulness.” Id. 
 99. See Coulter (pt. 3), supra note 83, at 724-25. 
 100. Id. at 724. 
 101. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 494. Coulter writes: 
  The founding fathers were well-read in the classics . . . . They were well-
aware of the general nature of the occupational activities to which the “useful 
Arts” relate. They knew that there were a variety of “arts” and that from the days 
of classical antiquity there were certain arts, originated by inventions, and per-
formed by artisans and the like, which were useful in putting the elementary 
forces and materials of nature to work for the material welfare of mankind . . . . 
They well-knew the basic differences between these practical arts and the cultural 
arts and sciences, recognized from antiquity, and that there were other disparate 
arts such as those of business, teaching, politics, medicine, etc. 
Coulter (pt. 3), supra note 83, at 731-32. In general terms, Coulter must be right; any-
one can perceive differences between the industrial or mechanical arts and the other 
“arts” to which he refers. Yet Coulter’s implication that the Framers consciously distin-
guished between these arts and that such a distinction is embodied in their choice of 
the phrase “useful arts” may be overconfident, at least in the absence of more specific 
historical evidence. On the other hand, Coulter’s ultimate point is that “useful arts” 
refers to certain fields of activity; that is, it is not a term embodying metaphysical con-
cepts of corporeality that might disqualify a process involving “mental steps.” Id. at 
732. Whatever specific disciplines may be included within the “useful arts,” the conclu-
sion that the term refers to certain fields of endeavor seems correct. 
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scientists.”102 As for Coulter’s reliance on the ancient pantheon, 
he notes that Athena was “the special patroness of the philoso-
phers and of all the liberal arts, sciences, and learning in gen-
eral.”103 Such lack of specialization among the Greek deities 
places in doubt the significance of their patronage as an indica-
tion of divisions among the arts, even if it could be shown that 
the Framers thought in such terms. On the other hand, Coulter 
offers a key definition of the “useful arts” as seen through the 
lens of antiquity: 
 It is said that Athena was the first to tame the horse and 
to bridle and yoke it to the chariot. In this we see the real key 
to the most fundamental attribute of the useful arts, espe-
cially as to procedures. They all relate to controlling the forces 
and materials of nature and putting them to work in a practi-
cal way for utilitarian ends serving mankind’s physical wel-
fare. 
 Probably the best word in common usage today that ex-
presses this idea is “technology.” The technological arts are the 
“useful arts.”104 
Some of the first judicial decisions to define “useful arts” 
came from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the 
“CCPA”).105 Whether through Coulter’s influence or otherwise, 
 
 102. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 499. 
 103. Id. at 498. 
 104. Id.; see also Lutz, supra note 23, at 54 (“The term ‘useful arts,’ as used in the 
Constitution . . . is best represented in modern language by the word ‘technology.’ ” ). 
 105. Prior decisions had broken some ground in defining “useful arts” but primar-
ily through distinguishing a specific “art” (i.e. patentable process) from an intangible 
concept or principle of nature. Examples include Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 
(1877), often cited for its definition of “process,” and the “Telephone Cases,” 126 U.S. 1, 
532-33 (1887), which discuss the difference between the unpatentable natural phe-
nomenon of electromagnetism and the potentially patentable application of that phe-
nomenon in telephony. See also O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 100-01 (1853). Other 
cases discuss the distinction between the subject matter of patents and the subject 
matter of copyrights and, thus, may be relevant to the distinction between the “useful 
arts” and what Coulter calls the “cultural arts.” See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 
102-05 (1879) (holding that a copyright on a book describing an art, system, or manu-
facture conveys no exclusive right to the art, system, or manufacture itself; such rights 
can be secured, if at all, only by patent); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 
910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (“Articles intended for practical use in cooperation with a ma-
chine are not copyrightable. Both law and policy forbid monopolizing a machine except 
within the comparatively narrow limits of the patent system.”) (citation omitted); Tay-
lor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99-101 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding 
that subject matters of patent and copyright do not overlap; a mechanical device be-
longs exclusively in the domain of patents). However, the CCPA cases seem to be the 
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they adopted his definition of “useful arts” as “technological 
arts.”106 Not coincidentally, all of these cases involved inven-
tions implemented through computers. 
The first of these cases, the so-called “first Prater opin-
ion,”107 raised the kinds of “mental step” issues that concerned 
Coulter. Prater had invented a method and machine (which 
could be either an analog or a digital computer) for determining 
the proportions of gases in a mixture from the data generated 
by spectrographic analysis. The inventive aspect consisted of a 
method of identifying a particular set of equations that would 
produce the most accurate results from a given set of data.108 
According to the patent examiner, whose decision was affirmed 
by the PTO Board, the method claims were beyond the scope of 
patentable subject matter because the novel aspect of the 
method could be performed in someone’s head.109 The examiner 
and the Board held the apparatus claims, in so far as they in-
cluded a programmed digital computer, to be unpatentably ob-
vious if one disregarded the novelty of the mathematical prin-
ciples involved.110 The CCPA reversed, rejecting, as Coulter did, 
the argument that “mental steps” claims are inherently unpat-
entable.111 The only issue, the court held, was whether the in-
vention fell within the “useful arts”: 
[O]ur present holding . . . is that patent protection for a proc-
ess disclosed as being a sequence or combination of steps, ca-
pable of performance without human intervention and di-
rected to an industrial technology—a “useful art” within the 
intendment of the Constitution—is not precluded by the mere 
fact that the process could alternatively be carried out by 
 
first to address directly the scope of the “useful arts” as opposed to other “arts.” 
 106. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), one of the first and most often 
cited of these cases, includes a reference to Coulter’s writings, but not on the specific 
point of defining “useful arts” as “technological arts.”  See id. at 889-90. 
 107. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superceded, 415 F.2d 1393 
(C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 108. See id. at 1378-79. 
 109. See id. at 1381-82. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Over a forceful objection by Judges Rich and Almond, see id. at 1390, the 
court granted the Patent Office a rehearing. The product of that rehearing is the “sec-
ond Prater opinion,” In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1393. In that opinion, the court affirmed 
the rejection of the method claims, but on grounds of indefiniteness rather than unpat-
entable subject matter. See id. at 1404-05. As to the apparatus claims, the court per-
sisted in its reversal of the Patent Office rejection. See id. at 1405-06. 
DUR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:27 AM 
1442 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
mental steps.112 
In In re Musgrave,113 the CCPA adopted a definition of “use-
ful arts” even closer to Coulter’s definition. Musgrave was an-
other “mental steps” case, this time involving a method of cor-
recting seismographic data revealing the structure of 
underground rock formations.114 The PTO Board ruled the 
claims unpatentable because the only novelty lay in steps that 
could be performed by the human mind.115 Once again the 
CCPA reversed, in language similar to that found in the first 
Prater opinion: 
 We cannot agree with the board that these claims (all the 
steps of which can be carried out by the disclosed apparatus) 
are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some 
or all of the steps therein can also be carried out in or with 
the aid of the human mind or because it may be necessary for 
one performing the processes to think. All that is necessary, 
in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statu-
tory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the techno-
logical arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional 
purpose to promote the progress of “useful arts.”116 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Baldwin complained that to 
define a statutory “process” only in terms of the “technological 
arts” was to create both a new principle of law117 and a new di-
lemma: 
 First and foremost will be the problem of interpreting the 
meaning of “technological arts”: Is this term intended to be 
synonymous with the ‘industrial technology’—mentioned by 
Judge Smith [in the first Prater opinion]? It sounds broader to 
me. Necessarily, this will have to be considered a question of 
law and decided on a case-by-case basis. Promulgation of any 
all-encompassing definition has to be impossible. This task is 
now before us.118 
 
 112. Id. at 1389 (emphasis added). 
 113. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 114. See id. at 883-86. 
 115. See id. at 885-86. 
 116. Id. at 893 (emphasis added). 
 117. See id. at 894. 
 118. Id. at 895. Judge Baldwin also raised another concern: 
[S]uppose a claim happens to contain a sequence of operational steps which can 
reasonably be read to cover a process performable both within and without the 
technological arts? This is not too far fetched. Would such a claim be statutory? 
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Judge Baldwin argued that the case could have been de-
cided on narrower grounds and that the “academic” problem 
addressed by resort to the “technological arts” could have been 
left where it belongs—in the hands of law professors.119 
Musgrave cites no authority for the proposition that “tech-
nological arts” and “useful arts” are the same; however, Mus-
grave itself is cited as authority in subsequent opinions. For 
example, in In re Foster,120 the CCPA addressed another com-
puter-implemented system for improving the analysis of seis-
mographic data, and again it held, quoting Musgrave, that the 
only requirement of a statutory “process” is that it “be in the 
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitu-
tional purpose to promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’ ”121 In In 
re Waldbaum, the CCPA expressed the Musgrave formulation 
in even stronger terms, eliminating the vague reference to 
“consonance” in favor of a stricter equivalence between “useful 
arts” and “technological arts”: 
 With regard to the “mental steps” rejection, whether appel-
lant’s process is a “statutory” invention [in terms of § 101 pat-
entable subject matter] depends on whether it is within the 
“technological arts.” The phrase “technological arts,” as we 
have used it, is synonymous with the phrase “useful arts” as it 
appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.122 
The Waldbaum court may have gone further than Musgrave 
in another sense. In Musgrave, the invention concerned seis-
mographic analysis, which can be considered a subset of the 
technological field of oil and mineral prospecting. In Wald-
baum, the applicant claimed a more efficient computing algo-
rithm to be used in determining the number of “ones” in certain 
data sets.123 Although the invention had “real world” applica-
tions, such as in analyzing the traffic on telephone lines,124 the 
 
Would it comply with section 112 [regarding the definiteness of claims]? We will 
have to face these problems some day. 
Id. 
 119. Id. at 894. 
 120. 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 
(C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), re-
considered, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 121. Foster, 438 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893). 
 122. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (emphasis added). 
 123. See id. at 998; see also In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771 n.12 (C.C.P.A. 1974), 
rev’d sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). 
 124. See Waldbaum, 457 F.2d at 998. 
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“field of the invention” in this case was best described as “com-
puting,” and it was that “technological art” on which the court 
relied in overturning the § 101 rejection. Without much discus-
sion, the court stated, “It is clear that appellant’s process, 
which is useful in the internal operation of computer systems, 
is within the ‘useful arts.’ ”125 The same thought is expressed, 
with greater elaboration, in In re Benson,126 where the appli-
cant invented a method for computers to convert binary-coded-
decimal (BCD) numbers into ordinary binary numbers. The 
court observed that, unlike previous computer software cases 
where “some subsidiary or additional art was involved,” in the 
present case “[t]he claims . . . are directed solely to the art of 
data-processing itself.”127 Yet, said the court, 
[i]t seems beyond question that the machines—the com-
puters—are in a technological field, are a part of one of our 
best-known technologies, and are in the ‘useful arts’ rather 
than the ‘liberal arts,’ as are all other types of ‘business ma-
chines,’ regardless of the uses to which their users may put 
them. How can it be said that a process having no practical 
value other than enhancing the internal operation of those 
machines is not likewise in the technological or useful arts?128 
Whether computers and computer programs are themselves 
within the “technological arts” is discussed infra Part IV. One 
must first consider the more fundamental question posed by 
Judge Baldwin in his Musgrave concurrence: If it is settled that 
“useful arts” means “technological arts,” what does “technologi-
cal arts” mean? 
C. What Is “Technology?” 
Waldbaum refers to “technological arts” as though “technol-
ogy” is a term so clear and familiar as to need no elaboration. 
Yet the more one looks at how “technology” has been defined by 
scholars, the less one is sure what it means. This is particularly 
true when the question is whether such problematic “arts” as 
business and education are “technological.” 
 
 125. Id. at 1003. 
 126. 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev’d sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63 (1972). The Benson case is discussed in greater detail infra notes 264-82 and accom-
panying text. 
 127. 441 F.2d at 686. 
 128. Id. at 688; see also In re De Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1241 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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The word “technology” derives from the Greek τεχνη 
(techne), meaning “skill” or “art.”129 Narrower definitions of 
“technology” encompass systematic techniques, particularly in 
an industrial context, used to create physical things or to shape 
the physical environment for the satisfaction of mankind’s 
practical needs. Some of the most restrictive definitions em-
phasize the “applied science” aspect of technology. For example, 
Chambers’ Science and Technology Dictionary defines “technol-
ogy” as “[t]he practice, description and terminology of any or all 
of the applied sciences which have practical value and/or indus-
trial use.”130 Yet it is incorrect, at least in an historical sense, to 
limit “technology” to the products of a rigorous scientific 
method. The tools developed by primitive peoples are as likely 
to be the product of magic131 as of what we would call science, 
yet such tools are undoubtedly “technology.”132 Even today, 
many useful things are devised without any understanding or 
application of science. As one writer puts it, “[I]t would be ri-
diculous to suppose that invention has to wait humbly, cap in 
hand, for science to open the door before it can proceed. Tech-
nology is purposive and it tends . . . to be positivist. The crite-
rion is simply, does it work?”133 Perhaps a field of endeavor 
 
 129. L. Ttondl, On the Concepts of “Technology” and “Technological Sciences,” in 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 1, 4 (Friedrich Rapp ed., 1974). 
 130. CHAMBERS’ SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DICTIONARY 888 (1988). 
 131. Some argue that magic may be considered a primitive “technology” “for with 
it primitive man attempted to control or at least influence his environment . . . . If we 
now feel that our ancestors used their magic without much success, let us not fall into 
the error of equating technology only with successful technology.” Melvin Kranzberg & 
Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., The Importance of Technology in Human Affairs, in 1 
TECHNOLOGY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 5 (Melvin Kranzberg & Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. 
eds., 1967). 
 132. “Sometimes technology is defined as applied science. . . . But technology for 
much of its history had little relation with science, for men could and did make ma-
chines and devices without understanding why they worked or why they turned out as 
they did.” Id. at 5-6. It was only in the nineteenth century that technology came to be 
associated with applied science. Charles Singer et al., Preface to 1 A HISTORY OF 
TECHNOLOGY vii (Charles Singer et al. eds., 1954). 
 133. DONALD CARDWELL, THE NORTON HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 492-93 (1995). In 
fact, this is exactly the position taken by the patent laws. They require that an inven-
tion have utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (patentable inventions must be “useful”), and 
they require that the patent disclosure enable persons skilled in the art to practice the 
invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1994), but they do not require that the inventor cor-
rectly understand the scientific principles that make the invention work. See Newman 
v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir.) (“[I]t is not a requirement of patentability 
that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or why the invention works.”) 
(citation omitted), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Invention without under-
standing is still a contribution to the “useful arts.” 
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cannot be considered “technological” if it is not systematic, but 
few would argue that it must be, in a strict sense, scientific.134 
Other definitions of “technology” emphasize its role in pro-
ducing whatever is “practical” or “useful.”135 Such definitions 
are of limited value because they merely substitute one difficult 
concept for another. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle ob-
serves that all human endeavors aim at some ultimate good.136 
To the extent that they succeed in their goals, all “arts,” includ-
ing those of business, education, politics, and law, are “useful” 
and “practical” in the broadest sense, as are literature, music, 
and painting. They all satisfy some human need. Yet it is ap-
parent from the structure of the intellectual property clause 
 
 134. As Cardwell points out, definitions of “technology” that rely upon “science” 
leave open the question of what is meant by “science.” If one defines “science,” not as a 
strict application of the scientific method, but in a broader sense, perhaps even in the 
eighteenth-century sense of “knowledge in general,” see supra notes 22-23 and accom-
panying text, then “science” may be an aspect of all “technology.” Yet the broader the 
concept of “science,” the less it adds to our understanding of “technology.” See 
CARDWELL, supra note 133, at 485-86. 
 135. For example, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1971) defines “technology” with reference to applied science and 
practicality: “2a: the science of the application of knowledge to practical purposes: ap-
plied science . . . . b (1): the application of scientific knowledge to practical purposes in 
a particular field . . . . (2): a technical method of achieving a practical purpose.” Id. at 
2348. The definition of “practical” brings one full circle back to “useful”: “3: available, 
usable, or valuable in practice or action: capable of being turned to use or account: use-
ful. Id. at 1780. See also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 12 
(2d. rev. ed. 1971) (“Technology means the systematic application of scientific or other 
organized knowledge to practical tasks.”); CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH 
TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 151 (1994) (“Tech-
nologies are bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using and doing 
useful things.”) (quoting Robert S. Merrill, The Study of Technology, in 15 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576-77 (1968)); ARNOLD 
PACEY, THE CULTURE OF TECHNOLOGY 6 (1983) (defining “technological practice” as 
“the application of scientific and other knowledge to practical tasks by ordered systems 
that involve people and organizations, living things and machines”). 
 136. Actions that differ in their immediate goals are often unified in a broader 
goal, and broader goals similarly unified at an even more general level. Aristotle 
writes: 
[A]s there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end 
of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, 
that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bri-
dle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under 
the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same 
way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are 
to be preferred to the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the 
latter are pursued. 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1 (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1966). 
At the end of this progression is the ultimate goal of “happiness.” See id. at 11-12. 
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that the Framers regarded at least the fine arts as distinct 
from the “useful” arts.137 One could adopt the opposite extreme 
and define as “useful” or “practical” only those things that sat-
isfy mankind’s most basic physical needs, but this would pro-
duce too narrow a definition of “technology.” “Technology” in-
cludes many things that, at best, contribute to the satisfaction 
of mankind’s desires. As Kranzberg and Pursell write: 
 [Man] cultivates a taste for more exotic foods than those 
necessary to still the pangs of hunger. He yearns to achieve 
faster and more lasting communications with others. He 
wants to travel abroad and be entertained, and to fill his 
house and his life with beauty as he sees it.138 
Thus, Rolex watches are the stuff of technology, as are 
roller coasters and ice cream, even if in many senses these are 
neither “practical” nor “useful.” 
Another approach to “technology” is to emphasize the mak-
ing of physical artifacts and the physical alteration of the envi-
ronment. “Technology should mean the study of those activi-
ties, directed to the satisfaction of human needs, which produce 
alterations in the material world.”139 If, like Coulter, one be-
lieves that “arts” such as law, education, and politics differ 
fundamentally from those properly regarded as “technologi-
 
 137. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
 138. The problem of defining “useful” also arises in the context of separating an 
unpatentable “disembodied concept” from a patentable application of that concept that, 
in the phrase adopted by the Federal Circuit, produces “a useful, concrete and tangible 
result.” Kranzberg & Pursell, supra note 131, at 6; see infra Part II.A. 
 139. V. Gordon Childe, Early Forms of Society, in 1 A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 132, at 38. A similar, but somewhat more vague definition of “technology” is 
“the totality of artifacts and methods humankind has created to shape our relations to 
the world that surrounds us, modifying it into something that can be used and manipu-
lated to submit to our needs and desires.” DAVID ROTHENBERG, HAND’S END: 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIMITS OF NATURE xii (1993); see also MITCHAM, supra note 135, 
at 152 (noting the difficulty of defining “technology,” but remarking on the “primacy of 
reference to the making of material artifacts, especially since this making has been 
modified and influenced by modern science”); Viscounte Caldecote, Technology, Master 
or Servant?, in MAN AND TECHNOLOGY: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGE OF 
MODERN TECHNOLOGY 14 (Bruce M. Adkins ed., 1983) (“Technology is concerned with 
the application of scientific knowledge to the creation of useful things, processes and 
services;” technology creates “real wealth” when “we add value by brain and muscle 
power, and through machines, to the raw materials found in nature.”). Interestingly, in 
his nineteenth-century treatise on patent law, Robinson argued that a process having 
no physical effects could not be patented, “however greatly it may promote the comfort 
or the welfare of mankind,” because it “lies outside the domain of the industrial arts.” 
WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 166, at 250 
(Sage Hill Publishers 1971) (1890) (emphasis added). 
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cal,”140 the distinction between the physical and the abstract is 
a promising path of analysis. Yet even here the boundaries are 
elusive. The most abstract of “arts” have their physical mani-
festations and effects on the material world. The field of law, 
for example, produces contracts and statutes written on pa-
per,141 and it alters conditions and conduct in the “real world.” 
At the same time, other activities that seem “technological” 
have little tangible impact. A scientist who analyzes neutrino 
emissions from the sun seems involved in a “technological” 
pursuit, yet his actions have little effect on the neutrinos, and 
no effect on the sun. 
In answer to the last example, one could say that the “tech-
nology” lies, not in the analysis, but in the physical techniques 
and equipment that the scientist employs. One could say that 
“technology” is, in fact, the endeavor of making and using 
tools.142 This also holds promise, but definitions of “tool” can dif-
fer. The word calls to mind tangible instruments, such as chis-
els and spectrometers, yet Peter F. Drucker, who has written 
extensively on the subject of technology and business, argues 
that “tools” and “technology” are not limited to physical arti-
facts. 
Language, too, is a tool, and so are all abstract concepts. . . . 
According to the technologist’s definition of ‘tool,” the abacus 
and the geometer’s compass are normally considered technol-
ogy, but the multiplication table or table of logarithms is not. 
Yet this arbitrary division makes all but impossible the un-
derstanding of so important a subject as the development of 
the technology of mathematics.143 
Drucker defines “technology” in terms of “human work,”144 
 
 140. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
 141. The idea of a writing as a physical artifact may seem trivial. However, a 
number of “method of doing business” cases involving printed coupons and tickets show 
that the issue is not as simple as it may seem. See infra notes 376-93 and accompany-
ing text. 
 142. See MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 406 (1997) 
(“Engineering is the application of objective knowledge to the creation of plans, designs, 
and means for achieving desired objectives. Technology deals with the tools and tech-
niques for carrying out the plans.”). 
 143. PETER F. DRUCKER, TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND SOCIETY 43-44 (1970). 
 144. Id. at 45-46. 
[T]echnology is not about things: tools, processes, and products. It is about work: 
the specifically human activity by means of which man pushes back the limitations 
of the iron biological law which condemns all other animals to devote all of their 
time and energy to keeping themselves alive for the next day, if not for the next 
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implying that such things as law, education, and politics might 
be considered “technological” activities. Many broad definitions 
of “technology”—as in the case of Singer’s definition of technol-
ogy as “the systematic treatment of any thing or subject”145 or 
as “the field of how things are commonly done or made”146—
invite this conclusion.147 Kranzberg and Pursell object to 
Singer’s definition precisely because “[it] is so broad and loose 
that it encompasses many items that scarcely can be consid-
ered as technology. For example, the passage of laws is some-
thing which is ‘done,’ but the history of law is certainly not the 
history of technology.”148 On the other hand, some scholars em-
brace the broad definition, and with it the conclusion that vir-
tually everything we do is “technology.” An example of this ex-
treme approach can be found in the writings of Joseph Agassi: 
 Usually the word ‘technology’ is applied to physical engi-
neering, at times to biological technology, especially medicine 
and agriculture, hardly ever to other fields such as education 
or psychoanalysis or behavior therapy. Yet there is no reason 
for this other than certain Baconian prejudices . . . . And if we 
ever agree to include under the heading of technology any 
kind of human technique, educational, organizational, or psy-
chological, then we shall have to include Yoga exercises too.149 
In fact, Agassi argues that “[w]hat we call the arts, or the 
fine arts—painting and sculpture and music—plus the applied 
arts—whether carpentry or advertisement—are all technol-
 
hour. 
Id. at 45. 
 145. Singer et al., supra note 132, at vii. Singer offers this as the proper etymo-
logical meaning of “technology.” 
 146. Id. 
 147. See also ALBERT BORGMAN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHARACTER OF 
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 14 (1984) (“[I]n one sense technology is nothing but the system-
atic effort to get everything under control.”). Even no-nonsense scientific dictionaries 
contain surprisingly broad definitions of “technology”—e.g., “Systematic knowledge and 
action, usually of industrial processes but applicable to any recurrent activity.” 
MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 142, at 406 
(emphasis added). 
 148. Kranzberg & Pursell, supra note 131, at 5. Mitcham, whose conception of 
“technology” emphasizes material things, agrees: “[T]echnology can be described as the 
making and using of artifacts. Human making, in turn, can be broadly distinguished 
from human doing—for example, political, moral, religious, and related activities.” 
MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 153. 
 149. JOSEPH AGASSI, TECHNOLOGY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 90 
(1985). 
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ogy.”150 
The extremes to which one could take this view of “technol-
ogy” are suggested in Jaques Ellul’s The Technological Soci-
ety,151 in which he writes of the systematizing of all aspects of 
modern life and culture. Ellul refers to this systematizing force 
as “technique,” which he defines as the “totality of methods ra-
tionally arrived at and having [as its goal] absolute efficiency 
(for a given stage of development) in every field of human activ-
ity.”152 This “technique” is something broader than Ellul’s own 
understanding of machine-oriented “technology,”153 but every-
thing it embraces takes on some of the characteristics of a ma-
chine: 
 From another point of view . . . the machine is deeply 
symptomatic: it represents the ideal toward which technique 
strives. The machine is solely, exclusively, technique; it is 
pure technique, one might say. For, whenever a technical fac-
tor exists, it results, almost inevitably, in mechanization: 
technique transforms everything it touches into a machine.154 
“Technique” means a coldly rational, analytical, and sys-
tematic approach to any human endeavor. The “technical op-
eration” includes “every operation carried out in accordance 
with a certain method in order to obtain a particular end.”155 It 
can extend to such things as economic and managerial organi-
zation,156 psychoanalysis,157 sociology,158 and propaganda.159 It 
 
 150. Id. at 49. See also MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 150 (“[T]echnology has some-
times been defined so as to include even the making of nonmaterial things such as laws 
and languages—although the implications of such definitions have not been widely 
thought through or adopted.”). 
 151. JAQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., Alfred 
A. Knopf 1964). 
 152. Id. at xxv. Regarding Wilkinson’s translation, see MITCHAM, supra note 135, 
at 57 & n.21. 
 153. See ELLUL, supra note 151, at xxv, where he states, “The term technique, as I 
use it, does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an 
end.” Elsewhere he writes that “technique is applied outside industrial life” and “[t]he 
growth of its power today has no relation to the growing use of the machine.” Id. at 4. 
In fact, “[t]echnique has now become almost completely independent of the machine.” 
Id. 
 154. Id. at 4. 
 155. Id. at 19. 
 156. See id. at 11-12. “An economic plan is purely an intellectual operation, which 
nevertheless is a technique” even though “no physical act is involved.” Id. at 13. “The 
accountant is no longer a mere agent for registering the movements of funds in an en-
terprise . . . . [h]e has become a veritable ‘profits engineer.’ ” Id. at 166. 
 157. See id. at 14. 
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would include even “a technique of mastication based on the 
science of nutrition, or techniques of sport, as in the Boy Scout 
movement.”160 Indeed, “[t]oday no human activity escapes [the] 
technical imperative. There is a technique of organization . . . 
just as there is a technique of friendship and a technique of 
swimming.”161 It was not Ellul’s intention to comment on the 
meaning of “technology,” much less on what advancements 
should be considered patentable. However, his vision of logic 
and system applied to all facets of human activity suggests the 
potential scope of a broadly defined “technology,” as well as the 
potential scope of patentable subject matter. 
There is simply no single, generally accepted definition of 
“technology.” “ ‘[T]echnology’ is not a universal term; it does not 
mean exactly the same thing in all contexts. It is often, and in 
significant ways, context dependent—both in speech and in the 
world.”162 It is “used loosely in different contexts and it is not at 
all clear how it may be understood in general.”163 Certain 
things, such as industrial processes and physical artifacts, 
meet any definition of “technology” and might be considered its 
conceptual core. The courts that have used “technological arts” 
as a substitute for “useful arts” probably had these things in 
mind. Judge Rich said as much in his Waldbaum concurrence. 
Referring to the majority’s statement that “useful arts” means 
“technological arts,” Judge Rich wrote: 
 As the originator of that “test” in In re Musgrave, I hereby 
express my agreement with the above-quoted statement. The 
phrase “useful arts” which was written into the Constitution 
conjures up images of the Franklin stove, horse collars, and 
buggy whips. The term “technological arts” was selected in 
Musgrave as probably having a connotation in these times 
 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 14-15. “Here the operation is of a moral, psychic and spiritual char-
acter. However, that does not prevent it from being a technique. But what we are talk-
ing about is a world once given over to the pragmatic approach and now being taken 
over by a method.” Id. at 15. Propaganda is a form of what Ellul calls “human tech-
nique.” “Human technique takes on various forms, ranging all the way from medicine 
and genetics to propaganda (pedagogical techniques, vocational guidance, publicity, 
etc.). Here man himself becomes the object of technique.” Id. at 22. 
 160. Id. at 15. 
 161. Id. at 21-22. 
 162. MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 152. 
 163. AGASSI, supra note 149, at 21; see also Kranzberg & Pursell, supra note 131, 
at 4 (“While the influence of technology is both widespread and fundamental, the term 
cannot be defined with precision.”). 
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roughly equivalent to that which ‘useful arts’ had in the 
eighteenth century. No new legal concept was intended.164 
Yet the concern raised by Judge Baldwin in Musgrave165 is a 
genuine concern. How can a court proceed when the invention 
at issue is not a Franklin stove, horse collar, or buggy whip, but 
rather an insurance scheme or a pedagogical technique? Are 
these things “technology?” Judge Baldwin doubted that any 
“all-encompassing definition” could be found,166 and certainly 
no court has addressed the definitional problems discussed 
here. Judge Baldwin believed that the issue would have to be 
“decided on a case-by-case basis,”167 yet such an approach 
would inevitably be arbitrary and ad hoc without the applica-
tion of some guiding standards. In fact, the failings of the 
“enumerationist” approach to defining “technology”—i.e., defi-
nition by listing examples of “technology”—have already been 
noted by scholars.168 
D. A Provisional Definition of “Useful Arts” 
There is something to be said for adopting a broad defini-
tion of the “useful arts” corresponding to a broad definition of 
“technology.” Mirroring Ellul’s conception of “technique,” one 
could define “useful art” as any field of endeavor in which 
knowledge is applied systematically toward the achievement of 
definite goals. Business, politics, pedagogy, and law (at least 
the practice of law) might qualify as “useful arts” under that 
definition.169 Such “useful arts” would have many things in 
common with the industrial and mechanical arts that have 
traditionally been the subject of patents, including the applica-
tion of reason to achieve a goal, the possibility of improvement, 
the potential to benefit society by introducing such improve-
 
 164. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
 165. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. 
 166. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 895 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 167. Id. at 894. 
 168. “It is evident that this enumerationist approach is only an auxiliary means 
for explaining the concept of technology and can be neither complete nor exhaustive.” 
Ttondl, supra note 129, at 3. 
 169. The fine arts might not qualify, either because they are not systematic or be-
cause they lack definable goals, but this is a difficult question. At least some branches 
of the fine arts are highly systematic (certain kinds or music and poetry, for example), 
and they strive for aesthetic goals, even if the relevance of those goals, or the success of 
a work of art in achieving them, might be the subject of disagreement. 
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ments, and the applicability of most, if not all, of the standards 
now used to evaluate whether an invention is otherwise pat-
entable—e.g., utility,170 novelty, non-obviousness, enablement, 
and definiteness.171 Support for such a broad vision of pat-
entable subject matter can also be found in the legislative his-
tory of the 1952 Patent Act. As quoted with approval by the 
Supreme Court, patentable subject matter “include[s] anything 
under the sun that is made by man.”172 
Whether such an approach should be adopted comes down 
to two questions, one a matter of history and the other a matter 
of policy. The historical question—What did the Framers in-
tend by the phrase “useful arts?”—has already been discussed. 
As we have seen, the historical record provides no definitive 
answers. Still, Coulter’s view that the Framers intended “use-
ful arts” to refer only to material goods and industrial proc-
esses seems more likely true than not. Americans of the late 
eighteenth century were much concerned with the nation’s in-
dustrial development, particularly in relation to the European 
nations from which the colonies had imported so much of their 
raw materials and manufactured goods. The existence of socie-
ties like the Friends of American Manufactures and the Society 
for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts173 
 
 170. The standard of utility involves its own concept of “usefulness.” See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (1994) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”) (empha-
sis added). However, that standard is generously applied, and any invention that 
serves its intended purpose is unlikely to be denied a patent for lack of utility. See Tol-
O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft M.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“All that the law requires is that the invention should not be frivolous, 
or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of society. The word useful 
therefore is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”) 
(citation omitted). Such things as toys, games, and novelties are patented routinely 
whether or not they are “useful” in the strictest sense. Hence, if inventions such as ad-
vertising techniques pass the constitutional test of “useful arts,” they should not be 
held to lack utility under § 101. 
 171. Some of these standards would create practical problems for the Patent Of-
fice. Whenever it is decided that a type of invention previously treated as categorically 
unpatentable may indeed be patented, the Patent Office faces a shortage of prior art 
patents with which to test the novelty and non-obviousness of the claimed invention. 
This has happened before with software, and it could happen again with “method of 
doing business” patents. See infra Part III. 
 172. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Committee Re-
ports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act: S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. 
NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Chakrabarty held that genetically engineered bacteria qual-
ify as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See id.  
 173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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(together with Tench Coxe’s remarks174 on the founding of the 
latter) are evidence of that concern. In 1790, the House of Rep-
resentatives directed Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton 
to prepare a Report on Manufactures,175 including “the means 
of promoting such as will tend to render the United States, in-
dependent on foreign nations for military and other essential 
supplies.”176 In that Report, Hamilton observes that “[t]he ex-
pediency of encouraging manufactures in the United States, 
which was not long since deemed very questionable, appears at 
this time to be pretty generally admitted.”177 A healthy manu-
facturing industry at home would contribute to national secu-
rity and keep the profits of agricultural surpluses from being 
transferred abroad.178 
Hamilton lists the encouragement of new inventions and 
the introduction of inventions from other countries, “particu-
larly those [inventions] which relate to machinery,” as “among 
the most useful and unexceptionable of the aids, which can be 
given to manufactures.”179 “The usual means of that encour-
agement,” writes Hamilton, “are pecuniary rewards, and, for a 
time, exclusive privileges. . . . For the last, so far as respects 
‘authors and inventors,’ provision has been made by Law.”180 
Hamilton refers, of course, to the patent system.181 As Hamilton 
observes, the grant of exclusive rights by patent was a “usual” 
means of encouraging industry and “manufactures,” as shown 
by European and colonial practices.182 It is reasonable to con-
clude that industry is what the Framers intended to encourage 
by exclusive rights and that industry is what they meant by the 
“useful arts.”183 
 
 174. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 175. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufacturers (Dec. 5, 1791), in THE 
REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 115 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1964). 
 176. Id. at 115. 
 177. Id. at 115-16. 
 178. See id. at 116. 
 179. Id. at 175. 
 180. Id. at 175-76. 
 181. And perhaps, by his reference to “authors,” to the copyright system as well, 
though this system has little obvious relationship to the encouragement of “manufac-
tures.” 
 182. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text. 
 183. According to Coulter, “[t]here can be no doubt that the promotion of the ‘use-
ful Arts’ in America was regarded by the founding fathers as a matter of life-and-death 
importance to the prosperity of the new nation.” Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 489. 
If “useful arts” means industry, then Coulter is probably  right. 
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There is no corresponding evidence that the Framers in-
tended to encourage developments in business methods, politi-
cal strategies, pedagogical techniques, or similar undertakings. 
In fact, there is no evidence that they viewed such endeavors as 
subject to improvement by “inventors.” In all likelihood, it did 
not occur to the Framers to include such things in the patent 
system. If the Framers had entertained such unconventional 
thoughts (unconventional in light of the kinds of invention 
usually rewarded with patents), one might expect some explicit 
statement to that effect either in the Constitution or in the 
early patent acts.184 It is also wise to remember the Framers’ 
general antipathy to monopolies,185 seen most vividly in the ini-
tial reluctance of Thomas Jefferson to endorse any patent sys-
tem at all.186 If there is any question as to whether “useful arts” 
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly, the narrow inter-
pretation, with its correspondingly narrower scope of monopoly, 
seems most in keeping with the likely intentions of the Fram-
ers. It is one thing to extend patent protection to new indus-
tries (“anything under the sun that is made by man”187); it is 
something else to extend protection to fields that are not indus-
trial at all. The “burden of persuasion,” at least, should be on 
those who argue for the broader interpretation of “useful arts.” 
The policy question is whether the benefits of granting ex-
clusive rights to advancements in such fields as education, 
business, and advertising outweigh the costs. Is the nation ac-
 
 184. Business methods, political strategies, pedagogical techniques, and so forth, 
existed in the eighteenth century, so they do not stand on the same footing as new 
technologies, which the Framers could neither have foreseen nor commented upon. 
 185. See Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 55-56. The patent laws have been called 
an “attempt to reconcile this Nation’s deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the 
need to encourage progress.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 
530-31 (1972); see also In re Shoa Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951). Inclu-
sion in the Constitution of a reason for patent law 
doubtlessly was due to the fact that those who formulated the Constitution were 
familiar with the long struggle over monopolies so prominent in English history, 
where exclusive rights to engage in ordinary business activities were granted so 
frequently by the Crown for the financial benefits accruing to the Crown only. It 
was desired that in this country any Government grant of a monopoly for even a 
limited time should be limited to those things which serve in the promotion of sci-
ence and the useful arts. 
Id. 
 186. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
 187. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. 
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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tually benefited by “progress” in such fields? In the case of edu-
cation, one would guess so. In the case of business, and particu-
larly advertising, one cannot be sure.188 If such “progress” is de-
sirable, how much would it be encouraged by the grant of 
exclusive rights? How much would be lost by denying ad-
vancements in these fields to the general public even if only for 
a limited time? These questions might be dismissed as irrele-
vant by a constitutional literalist, but, in the absence of defini-
tive historical information, they are worth considering. They 
might even provide some insight into the thoughts and inten-
tions of the Framers. However, no one has marshaled evidence 
that sheds light on these issues, and it may be that no such 
evidence can be marshaled. Even if we could agree on what we 
mean by “progress” in these arts, it is difficult to imagine by 
what experiment it could be measured. Moreover, these arts 
differ sufficiently from the industrial arts that it seems rash to 
infer that what encourages progress in the latter must also en-
courage progress in the former. 
Until there is historical or policy-oriented evidence to the 
contrary, it seems best to adopt a conservative definition of the 
“useful arts”—perhaps defining them as the products, proc-
esses, and tools of industry or as “industrial technology” in the 
language of the first Prater opinion.189 As Judge Baldwin 
warned in Musgrave, a perfect and all-encompassing definition 
may be impossible, given the inherent imprecision of lan-
guage.190 But it should be possible to extend the field of the 
“useful arts” to new technologies by analogy to the “Franklin 
stoves, horse collars, and buggy whips”191 at its traditional core 
and to exclude certain arts, such as law, business, politics, and 
pedagogy, which are fields of human behavior—what Mitcham 
refers to as “human doing” as opposed to “human making.”192 
This conservative approach also seems consistent with the in-
tentions of the courts in defining “useful arts” as “technological 
arts.” However, even if we decide that “useful arts” has this 
narrower meaning, the twentieth century “art” of computer 
 
 188. See generally Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1948). 
 189. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. One could, for example, 
quibble over what is meant by “industry.” 
 191. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
 192. MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 153. 
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programming presents special difficulties. Before examining 
those difficulties in detail, it is worth reviewing briefly the 
characteristics of that “art.” 
E. The “Art” of Computer Programming 
The fundamental operations of a computer are extremely 
simple logical and arithmetical operations which, when com-
bined in great numbers and in the right sequence, can accom-
plish complex tasks like word processing, web browsing, and 
graphics rendering.193 Computers are tools of great flexibility, 
but they do only what they are instructed to do by a computer 
program.194 In order to be processed by a computer, the instruc-
tions of which a program consists must be expressed in binary 
code—strings of ones and zeros. Computer programs can be 
written at this “machine language” level, but it is impractical 
to do so. Instead, programs are written in “higher level” pro-
gramming languages such as PASCAL or C. Because these 
languages are more like human languages, they allow pro-
grams to be more easily written, read, and understood by hu-
mans.195 Before they can be used by a computer, higher level 
programs must be converted by a “compiler” into corresponding 
strings of binary digits.196 
The process of writing down program instructions is known 
as “coding.”197 However, programming does not begin with cod-
 
 193. See NICLAUS WIRTH, SYSTEMATIC PROGRAMMING: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1973). 
 194. “A computer program is defined as a series of instructions or statements, in a 
form acceptable to a computer, designed to cause the computer to execute an operation 
or series of operations.” PHILLIP BRUCE & SAM M. PEDERSON, THE SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 7 (1982). Computer hardware components (microprocessors, 
storage devices, input devices, displays, and so forth) easily qualify as patentable sub-
ject matter. An engineer who designs a new disk drive is unquestionably practicing a 
technological “useful art.” See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“It 
seems beyond question that the machines—the computers—are in a technological field, 
are a part of one of our best-known technologies, and are in the ‘useful arts’ rather than 
the ‘liberal arts’ . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Only 
when the invention is embodied in computer software or when the invention generally 
lies in a new use for existing hardware, do questions of patentable subject matter arise. 
 195. See WIRTH, supra note 193, at 12-13. 
 196. See J.D. ARON, THE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 6-7 (1974). A program 
in its intelligible, programming-language state is known as “source program;” in the 
form in which it can be executed by a computer, it is known as “object program.” See id. 
at 34. 
 197. See RAY TURNER, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY 103 (1984) (“Cod-
ing is the process of translating the design of a program, module by module, into a form 
that can be read by a computer and converted by it into an object code which can be 
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ing any more than house building begins with nailing boards 
together. In either case, the construction phase is preceded by a 
planning stage.198 The planning stage of programming, some-
times referred to as “software design,”199 is a process of moving 
from the general to the specific.200 It begins with the identifica-
tion of a problem to be solved or a function to be performed by 
the program.201 For example, one might begin with the idea of a 
program for indexing a collection of baseball cards. During the 
“concept phase” of development,202 the initial rough idea is re-
fined into a specific plan for what the program will accomplish. 
Software designers typically prepare a document called a 
“functional specification,”203 detailing their specific ideas about 
 
executed.”). 
 198. See id. at 5 (“Software design is not just ‘programming a computer’ any more 
than hardware design is ‘hooking up some IC’s [Integrated Circuits].’ If we characterize 
the activities in software design and development in a general way, it is clear that pro-
gramming is only a part of the total process.”) For Turner’s definition of “program-
ming,” see infra note 199. 
 199. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 5-6. Turner limits the term “programming” to 
the implementation stage, rather than applying it as well to the design stage, see id. at 
5, but it is often used in a sense that includes both. See, e.g., ARON, supra note 196, at 
55 (“Programming is a comprehensive term. It includes the activities of analysis, plan-
ning, design, etc., as well as coding and debugging.”). As the software business has be-
come more complex, the tasks of design and coding have become more distinct; now the 
person who designs software may do little, if any, of the actual coding. See SUSAN 
LAMMERS, PROGRAMMERS AT WORK 3 (1986). 
 200.  
[D]esign has to be broken down into chunks that are amenable to human compre-
hension. This is generally accomplished by attacking the problem at an abstract 
level and then proceeding to more detailed levels of design. . . . The whole process 
of development of programs can be viewed as moving from an abstract statement 
of the problem to a concrete representation of the solution in code that can be exe-
cuted on the target machine. 
Judith C. Enos & R.L. Van Tilburg, Software Design, in SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 71 
(Randall W. Jensen & Charles C. Tonies eds., 1979). “Beginning with a high-level de-
sign and proceeding to lower and lower levels of detail is only a natural way of intellec-
tually tackling a large, complex problem. The generic term ‘top-down design’ has been 
applied to this process, and all followers of design methodologies profess to follow this 
general approach . . . .” Id. at 72. See also ARON, supra note 196, at 97 (“The important 
facet of top-down design is that it establishes the logical structure of the solution before 
it decides on the detailed elements of the solution.”). 
 201. “Programs are written to solve problems. The programmer’s first act is to ob-
tain a good definition of the problem.” ARON, supra note 196, at 55. The problem-
solving idea may be in response to customer demands, competitive pressures, or simply 
a design for “a better mousetrap.” See TURNER, supra note 197, at 21. 
 202. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 10. This stage of problem analysis is also 
known as the “requirements definition phase.” Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 65. 
 203. TURNER, supra note 197, at 10, 13. 
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what the program is to do.204 A functional specification for the 
baseball card program would spell out its various functions: 
sorting and display of card information alphabetically by 
player, alphabetically by team, by year issued, by date pur-
chased, by price paid, and so forth. It might specify features 
like the display of scanned images of individual cards and a 
link to an Internet site supplying up-to-date price information. 
It would likely describe elements of the “user interface,” such 
as how the screens should look and the kinds of commands 
available to the user. It might also cover certain technical re-
quirements, such as whether the program will run on all Win-
dows PCs and whether it will fit on a single CD-ROM.205 The 
details of the functional specification reflect the programmer’s 
ambitions, marketing requirements, hardware limitations, and 
many other considerations. 
When the functional specification is complete, the design 
process enters what has been called the “implementation 
phase,”206 or “software design phase.”207 In this phase, the ques-
tion is not so much what the software will do, but how it will do 
it.208 Here the programmer determines the high-level structure 
of the program, eventually recorded in a document called a “de-
sign specification.”209 A program is a sequence of operations 
that, in the design phase, are often represented graphically by 
 
 204. See id. at 22 (“The output of the Concept Phase is the functional specification 
(sometimes called a problem specification) which defines, in detail, what the product 
does and how it interacts with the user, the hardware, and other software.”). 
 205. See id. at 13. In chapter five of his book, Turner discusses in some detail the 
kinds of information likely to be included in a functional specification. See id. at 43-54. 
 206. See id. at 14. Issues that arise in the implementation phase may cause the 
programmer to rethink the functional specification. Hence, there may be some interac-
tion between the processes of design and implementation. See ARON, supra note 196, at 
83. 
 207. Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 66. 
 208. See id. at 69. Turner refers to a “definition phase” preceding actual coding. 
“The definition phase converts the what must be done from the functional specification 
into the how it will be done of the design specification.” TURNER, supra note 197, at 22. 
 209.  
  The purpose of the design specification is to define an implementation ap-
proach for the software product. It defines a system architecture, data structures, 
and the high-level structure of the program itself (not necessarily the entire pro-
gram structure). It explains design decisions made and justifies them against the 
requirements of the functional specification. 
TURNER, supra note 197, at 14-15. The design specification is also referred to as a 
“Functional Design Document.” See BRUCE & PEDERSON, supra note 194, at 75. 
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“flow charts.”210 A flow chart is a diagram showing the order of 
events and any “branches” that occur when decisions are made. 
Labeled boxes in a flowchart represent distinct functions, such 
as “sort cards alphabetically by name of player.” The program-
mer may have to reduce such functions into their own subsidi-
ary components, represented in additional flowcharts.211 In the 
example, a subsidiary flowchart might represent the steps nec-
essary to perform the alphabetizing—i.e., locate the memory 
array in which the names of players are stored, isolate the first 
letter of each player’s last name, convert those letters into nu-
merical equivalents based on the order of the alphabet, use a 
mathematical operation to sort the names, and so on. A com-
plex program may require several layers of structure to de-
scribe its detailed operation.212 
During the software design phase, the programmer defines 
the program “modules” that perform the various operations re-
quired by the overall design213 and the program structure, or 
“architecture,”214 that determines how these modules inter-
act.215 The programmer also defines the “data structures” that 
store the information on which the program operates.216 The 
baseball card program would have data structures for storing 
 
 210. See ARON, supra note 196, at 104-05. 
 211. See id. at 105. 
 212. See Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 72.; TURNER, supra note 197, at 60, 
64-66 (describing the hierarchical nature of “structured design”). “This natural ‘divide 
and conquer’ process allows the designer to deal with a small number of subfunctions 
at one time and to push down or ignore details of implementation not relevant at that 
level . . . in the . . . hierarchy.” Id. at 65. 
 213. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 58-59. A “module” is “[t]he lowest level of 
program structure consisting of a group of statements that performs one function or a 
small number of related functions. [It is] [e]quivalent to a subroutine or subprogram.” 
Id. at 3. Turner provides sample module descriptions in Figures 4-3 and 4-4 of his book. 
See id. at 33-34. 
 214. See Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 75 (“The architectural design must 
describe the arrangement (or structure) of the component parts (called modules) that 
communicate (through interfaces) in proper sequence (control structure) to solve the 
user’s problem.”). 
 215. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 30; BRUCE & PEDERSON, supra note 194, at 
71-72. 
 216. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 31-32 fig. 4-2 (“Typical Data Structure Defi-
nition”). The Functional Design Document must “[i]dentify and name the levels of data 
base hierarchy (e.g., data base, file, record, array), down to the individual parameter 
level. For each level of data base hierarchy, the Functional Design Document identifies 
the name, contents (description and units), and size of the data base components.” See 
BRUCE & PEDERSON, supra note 194, at 75. “Some interaction between data structure 
definition and program structure will naturally occur.” TURNER, supra note 197, at 23. 
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numerical information, such as the year each card was ac-
quired and the price paid; strings of letters, such as the names 
of teams and players; and pictures, such as the scanned images 
of individual cards. The programmer would define data struc-
tures with characteristics suited to each kind of information. 
Coding takes place only after the program structure and design 
have been determined. In a sense, the text of the program is 
the final and most specific description of the program’s struc-
ture as well as the means for causing the computer to execute 
the programmed instructions. 
Programming is not always the formal process that the 
foregoing suggests, particularly when it is done by an individ-
ual rather than by an organized group. However, the hierarchi-
cal methodology of moving from idea to code is generally the 
same. Software designer Charles Simonyi describes program-
ming as follows: 
If we’re talking strictly about programming, then let’s assume 
I already know what I want to do. If I don’t then there is some 
aspect of the process that is common to all problem solving: 
What am I trying to do? What is the goal? 
 For example, I want a text editor to be menu driven, fast, 
have a spelling checker, and so on. I need to know the end 
product before the true programming begins. . . . 
. . . . 
 The first step in programming is imagining. Just making it 
crystal clear in my mind what is going to happen. In this ini-
tial stage, I use paper and pencil. I just doodle, I don’t write 
code. I might draw a few boxes or a few arrows, but it’s just 
mostly doodles, because the real picture is in my mind. I like 
to imagine the structures that are being maintained, the 
structures that represent the reality I want to code. 
 Once I have the structure fairly firm and clear in my mind, 
then I write the code. I sit down at my terminal—or with a 
piece of paper in the old days—and write it. . . . The code for 
the most part writes itself, but it’s the data structures I main-
tain are the key. They come first and I keep them in my mind 
throughout the entire process.217 
 
 217. Interview with Charles Simonyi, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, at 14-15; see 
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Moving from the concept, even the detailed concept embod-
ied in the functional specification, to a specific program archi-
tecture requires considerable skill. It is not a mechanical proc-
ess that always results in the same program, or even a 
program of equivalent value: “Ten programmers given a func-
tional definition of a program and using ad hoc design tech-
niques would produce ten different high-level designs for that 
program. Each would presumably be a correct design but some 
would be better designs than others.”218 Better designs result in 
programs that are faster, that require less memory, and that 
are more intelligible and, hence, more easily modified and de-
bugged.219 
Is programming an “industrial technology” or “useful art?” 
It is not an art the Framers knew, and in one respect it differs 
from any art they could have imagined. Programmers do not 
work with physical materials—the stuff of “Franklin stoves, 
horse collars, and buggy whips.”220 Although the execution of a 
program depends upon physical hardware and the flow of elec-
trons, these are not the essence of the program itself. As W. 
Daniel Hillis demonstrated by building a tic-tac-toe-playing 
computer entirely out of Tinker Toys and string,221 the hard-
ware is incidental. The essence of a program is logic. In the 
eighteenth century, abstract logic was not the province of arti-
sans; it was the province of mathematicians and philoso-
 
also Interview with programmer Gary Kildall, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, at 58. 
It goes back to the fundamentals of programming: simplifying the problem. Part of 
the programming process is general problem solving. How do you solve a problem 
that’s complex, whether it’s designing a computer program or constructing a build-
ing? You start at the point where you think it’s too hard to solve, and then you 
break it down into smaller pieces. 
Id. 
 218. TURNER, supra note 197, at 77; see also ARON, supra note 196, at 89 (“An-
other truism is that any problem can be programmed in many ways. The wide varia-
tion in programmer productivity that is so evident in classroom situations where all 
the students are given the same problem demonstrates the [truth of this] statement.”). 
 219. See ARON, supra note 196, at 89-94; TURNER, supra note 197, at 77 (“The 
quality of a design directly affects the cost to implement and maintain it.”); EDWARD 
YOURDON, TECHNIQUES OF PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND DESIGN 6-7 (1975) (discussing 
the attributes of a “good” program). 
 220. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
 221. See W. DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE 16-18 (1998). In theory, 
the electronic transistors now found in computers could be replaced with hydraulic 
valves, chemical reactions, or Tinker Toy switches, and the programs would still run. 
See id. at 10. 
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phers.222 If programming is a branch of engineering, as it is 
now often regarded, it is still engineering of a singularly intan-
gible kind.223 Whereas Coulter characterizes “technology” in 
terms of “controlling the forces and materials of nature,”224 
 [w]hat especially characterizes the programmer is his 
withdrawal from nature into the private intellectual world of 
the program he is writing. Normally, he thinks neither of the 
keyboard at which he is typing nor of the electrons that are 
performing the calculations. He concentrates his full attention 
on the abstract problem, its representations in the program-
ming language, and the logical design of the machine he is us-
ing. In this respect, he resembles the mathematician, the phi-
losopher, the theologian, or indeed the chess master, all of 
whom live more or less completely in intellectual worlds of 
their own making.225 
On the other hand, significant parallels can be drawn be-
tween the design of a computer program and the design of a 
steam engine or a clock or any of the kinds of physical tools 
that were familiar to the Framers. In the words of software de-
signer Gary Kildall, “[A] lot of programming is invention and 
engineering. It’s much like a carpenter who has a mental pic-
ture of a cabinet he’s trying to build. He has to wrestle with the 
design and construction to get it into a physical form. That’s 
very much what I do in programming.”226 Like the cabinet 
builder, the programmer turns an idea into a useful product. 
The builder’s task is to transform physical materials into useful 
objects within the constraints imposed by nature; “[t]he pro-
 
 222. See BOLTER, supra note 2, at 167-68 (“Philosophers and mathematicians have 
been with us since before Greek times; their abstract labor is familiar. The computer 
programmer is remarkable because he is the first technological man whose work is di-
vorced from nature in this way.”). 
 223.  
  There is one outstanding difference between software engineering and all 
other branches of engineering. Engineers usually deal with material (visible and 
tangible) objects. . . . Electrical engineering is the most abstract of the classical en-
gineering fields since electricity is not material, but, through the use of appropri-
ate tools, electricity exhibits characteristics that are both visible and tangible. 
Electricity can thus be dealt with as though it were a physical object. Software, 
however, is nonmaterial in every sense. 
Randall W. Jensen & Charles C. Tonies, Introduction to SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, su-
pra note 200, at 10. 
 224. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
 225. BOLTER, supra note 2, at 167. 
 226. Kildall, supra note 217, at 65. 
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grammer’s task is to set logic to work in the world, and to do so 
he must mediate between the problem to be solved and the rig-
orous and curiously unnatural brand of logic by which the com-
puter operates.”227 The programmer and the builder are each 
highly skilled,228 and each turns out a product that, at least in 
some cases, is practical and valuable. 
Kildall argues that programs are “like mechanical devices; 
the way one piece of code works with another is very similar to 
the way one gear meshes with another gear. Building code is a 
little like building a transmission.”229 In fact, logical structures 
can often substitute for physical structures and vice versa. 
Computer users are familiar with “virtual” substitutes for a 
wide variety of useful things—clocks, calendars, notepads, 
typewriters, artist’s pallets, and film editors among them. Con-
versely, Hillis built the logic necessary to play tic-tac-toe out of 
Tinker Toys and string. Designers of computerized systems of-
ten have a choice as to whether certain functions should be 
embodied in a program or “hard wired” as electronic cir-
cuitry.230 Consequently, any “useful arts” distinction based on 
 
 227. BOLTER, supra note 2, at 168. Programming also seems to provide some of the 
aesthetic satisfaction produced by fine craftsmanship; “[a] programmer may polish his 
program just as a watchmaker polishes and ornaments his work for display.” Id. at 
173. See also FREDERICK P. BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH 7-8 (1979). 
The programmer, like the poet, works only slightly removed from pure thought-
stuff. He builds his castles in the air, from air, creating by exertion of the imagina-
tion. . . . Yet the program construct, unlike the poet’s words, is real in the sense 
that it moves and works, producing visible outputs separate from the construct it-
self. It prints results, draws pictures, produces sounds, moves arms. The magic of 
myth and legend has come true in our time. One types the correct incantation on a 
keyboard, and a display screen comes to life, showing things that never were nor 
could be. 
Id. 
 228.  
Like the engineers who build computers, the programmer has the character of a 
professional technologist and often works as a member of a team. Good technical 
programming for creating new languages, control programs, or programming tools 
may require years of training and a mastery of mathematics, if not solid state 
physics. 
BOLTER, supra note 2, at 166. 
 229. Kildall, supra note 217, at 59. Kildall states that “[d]ata structures, which 
are the foundations of programs, are mechanical by nature.” Id. at 62. 
 230. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Rader, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he line of demarcation between a dedicated circuit and a computer al-
gorithm accomplishing the identical task is frequently blurred and is becoming increas-
ingly so as the technology develops. In this field, a software process is often inter-
changeable with a hardware circuit.”). 
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physicality is disturbingly superficial.231 
Some programmers view programming as a “science”; oth-
ers view it as an “art” or a “craft.”232 Most seem to view pro-
gramming as a subset of engineering—a discipline that in-
cludes elements of art, science, and craft.233 Like other 
branches of engineering, programming seems intuitively “tech-
nological,” however one may debate the meaning of that term. 
It is commonplace now to refer to the “software industry,” and 
one can imagine that the Framers would have looked with ap-
proval on America’s successes in that industry, both at home 
and abroad. It is also an industry that advances by innovation, 
and, hence, one potentially benefited by the patent system. If 
programming is indeed a branch of engineering and the basis of 
a technological industry, perhaps there should be no question 
that programming is a “useful art.” Indeed, the courts, which 
have become increasingly receptive to software patents,234 seem 
to have accepted this conclusion implicitly. 
But things are not so simple. As we have seen, the pro-
grammer’s task is to reduce a general plan into a specific soft-
ware implementation. Sometimes the general plan is a “techno-
logical” one, such as a plan to refine the analysis of 
seismographic data for use in oil and mineral prospecting. In 
that case, the programmer’s work spans two arguably “techno-
logical” fields—prospecting and programming—and the transi-
tion may be difficult to define. In other words, it may be diffi-
cult to say where the prospector’s art ends and the 
programmer’s begins. Yet because both arts are “technological” 
(conceding for the moment that fashioning program logic is a 
technological activity), no issue of patentability arises. On the 
other hand, sometimes the general plan is not part of a “tech-
nological” or “useful art,” at least according to the conservative 
 
 231. See generally infra Part IV.C. 
 232. See Interview with programmer Jaron Lanier, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, 
at 295 (“I treat programming more as an art than anything else. . . . [Peter Deutsch] 
said programming was a craft. Then there are some people who think of it as mathe-
matics. It just depends on the person.” ). 
 233. See Interview with programmer Bob Frankston, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, 
at 158 (“The term computer science is overused; I’d rather refer to software engineering 
or computational engineering or information engineering.”); Interview with Adobe Sys-
tems founder John Warnock, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, at 55) (“[Programming is 
not science, but] more of an engineering discipline; a very good, fruitful engineering 
discipline.”). Software Engineering is also the title of a textbook, see supra note 200. 
 234. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
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definition proposed in Part I.D, supra. The plan might, for ex-
ample, involve an accounting technique developed for its bene-
ficial tax consequences. Here the transition from accountant’s 
plan to software implementation may be significant. If the plan 
itself is not patentable because it does not lie within the “useful 
arts,” does that mean that the implementation must also be 
unpatentable? Or is a software implementation of any plan in-
herently within the “useful arts”? Or does it depend on how the 
programmer characterizes the “invention”? As computerization 
deepens its incursions into traditionally “non-technological” 
fields, such as business, education, and the fine arts, these 
questions will become increasingly important. 
In Part IV.C, infra, I suggest an approach for dealing with 
these boundary-challenging inventions. First, however, we 
must set the stage by reviewing how courts have dealt with 
software inventions in general and how courts have dealt with 
the patentability of business methods. The latter is important 
because many software patents of the most troubling kind arise 
in the business context. 
II. WRESTLING WITH THE ALGORITHM 
The course of software patent jurisprudence has never run 
straight and true. For a number of years, the Patent Office and 
the courts have struggled with issues of software patentability 
and have reversed directions, with or without admitting it, on a 
number of occasions. Sometimes the issue is whether the 
claimed software invention is too abstract or too much like 
mathematics to be patentable, and sometimes it is whether the 
invention embraces “mental steps.” Always the problems can be 
traced back to a characteristic of software already discussed—
namely, the way in which it straddles the divide between pure 
logic and practical machine. 
A. The “Mental Steps Doctrine” 
The debate over the patenting of “mental steps” began well 
before the invention of the modern computer. As long ago as 
1907, the Commissioner of Patents, in Ex parte Meinhardt, 235 
ruled that a method involving human measurement and calcu-
 
 235. Dec. Comm’r Pat. 237 (1907) (rejecting patent application on a system for 
scaling and spacing free-hand letters within an area of given size). 
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lation could not be patented, apparently because the method 
lacked the physical component of a mechanical or chemical pro-
cess. The Patent Office Board of Appeals picked up this theme 
in the 1940s, in Ex parte Read236 and Ex parte Toth.237 In Read, 
the Board denied a patent to a method of determining the 
speed of an aircraft, or the distance it had traveled, using a 
pair of mechanically-controlled logarithmic scales. Citing 
Meinhardt, the Board held that the method claims failed to de-
fine “a true method” because they did not “define any true ma-
nipulative steps, except the moving of one scale relative to the 
other.”238 The act of reading an instrument is “purely a mental 
act that cannot be regarded as a true manipulative step.”239 The 
Board also rejected a separate claim to the apparatus, but on 
grounds of insufficient novelty.240 Similarly, in Toth the Board 
denied a patent to a claimed method of determining pressure in 
an oil well. The Board held that steps such as “correcting said 
indicated pressure” and “determining the well pressure” were 
“purely mental” and, therefore, not the steps of a patentable 
process.241 
These early “mental steps” cases have nothing explicit to 
say about the constitutional foundations of the patent system. 
They seem to reflect the definition of “process”242 articulated in 
Cochrane v. Deener: 
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to pro-
duce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed 
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a 
different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as pat-
entable as is a piece of machinery. 243 
A mental act does not “transform” any material or reduce it 
 
 236. 123 U.S.P.Q. 446 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1943). 
 237. 63 U.S.P.Q. 131 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1944). 
 238. Read, 123 U.S.P.Q. at 447. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. 63 U.S.P.Q. at 132. 
 242. “Process” was then represented in the statutory list of patentable subject 
matter by the synonymous “art.” See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 243. 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). Robinson’s treatise on patent law similarly defines 
“art” or “process” as “an act or a series of acts performed by some physical agent upon 
some physical object, and producing in such object some change either of character or of 
condition.” ROBINSON, supra note 139, § 159, at 230. “[T]hough an art embraces so wide 
a field of inventive skill, it includes only such operations as are capable of producing 
physical effects.” Id. § 166, at 249. 
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“to a different state or thing;” hence, it is not a patentable “pro-
cess” or “art” as defined in Cochrane.244 More recently, it has 
been argued that the Cochrane language was not intended to 
be definitive or limiting; it was only intended to make clear 
that a new process could be patented, regardless of the use of a 
new machine.245 Nevertheless, the Cochrane formula has had 
continuing relevance in analyzing the patentability of soft-
ware.246 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals endorsed the 
“mental steps” doctrine in In re Heritage,247 where the claimed 
invention concerned the production of coated fiber boards. Al-
though this seems both a physical endeavor and a “useful art,” 
the method involved testing various coating densities to deter-
mine the optimum balance between the thoroughness of coat-
ing and the desired acoustical qualities of the finished board.248 
Because coated fiber boards had been manufactured before, the 
feature relied upon for novelty was the “mental process of mak-
ing a selection of the amount of coating material to be used 
in . . . accordance with a predetermined system.”249 The court 
ruled that “[s]uch purely mental acts [i.e., observation and se-
lection] are not proper subject matter for protection under the 
patent statutes.”250 
The “mental steps doctrine” may have reached its zenith in 
 
 244. See Toth, 63 U.S.P.Q. at 132 (“These acts are purely mental and hence do not 
come within the definition of an ‘art . . . .’ ”). A literalist might argue that even mental 
acts cause chemical or electrical alterations in the human brain. This observation is not 
wholly trivial given the courts’ occasional reliance on the physical or electrical changes 
that occur in a computer executing a particular software program. See infra, notes 335-
36 and accompanying text. On the other hand, it is implausible to regard biochemical 
changes in the brain as within the scope of the “useful arts” contemplated by the 
Framers—unless such changes are accompanied by some kind of action in the material 
world. 
 245. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (C.C.P.A.), superceded, 415 
F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
  This passage has sometimes been misconstrued as a “rule” or “definition” re-
quiring that all processes, to be patentable, must operate physically upon sub-
stances. . . . To deduce such a rule from the statement would be contrary to its in-
tendment which was not to limit process patentability but to point out that a 
process is not limited to the means used in performing it. 
Id. 
 246. See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text. 
 247. 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945). 
 248. See id. at 554-55. 
 249. Id. at 557. 
 250. Id. at 556. 
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In re Abrams.251 The applicant’s invention (like the invention in 
Musgrave252) concerned a method of petroleum prospecting. Pe-
troleum deposits were detected by pumping down the atmos-
pheric pressure in boreholes drilled for the purpose, then 
measuring the time that it took for subsurface gasses to seep 
in.253 The claimed method included steps such as “measuring,” 
“determining,” and “comparing,” as well as decidedly physical 
steps such as “sinking . . . boreholes” and “sealing off . . . said 
boreholes.”254 Because the only novel aspect of the method lay 
in the “mental steps,” the court affirmed the Patent Office’s re-
jection of the claim.255 Regarding the rationale for its holding, 
the court said simply, “Citation of authority in support of the 
principal that claims to mental concepts which constitute the 
very substance of an alleged invention are not patentable is 
unnecessary. It is self-evident that thought is not pat-
entable.”256 
The CCPA eventually curtailed the “mental steps doctrine” 
as expressed in Abrams. Significantly, the court’s retreat oc-
curred in the context of claimed methods capable of being per-
formed either by the human mind or by a machine—in other 
 
 251. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
 252. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 253. See Abrams, 188 F.2d at 165. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 166, 170. The applicant proposed three “rules” for dealing with 
claimed methods involving mental steps: (1) if all of the steps of the method are mental 
steps, then the method is unpatentable; (2) if the method includes both mental steps 
and “positive and physical steps,” but the novelty of the claim lies only in the mental 
steps, then the method is unpatentable; (3) if the method includes both mental steps 
and “positive and physical steps,” and the novelty lies in those physical steps (the men-
tal steps only limiting or defining the process), then the method is patentable. Id. at 
166. The court found that the method claimed in this case fell within Rule 2 and was 
unpatentable. See id. at 170. However, it is unclear whether the court adopted the 
rules as its own, or whether it merely considered them for the sake of argument. Later 
CCPA decisions adopt the latter conclusion. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (C.C.P.A.), superceded, 415 F.2d 
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). These rules, and the debate surrounding them, prefigure the de-
bate over whether a computerized method involving both mathematical operations and 
physical steps, but in which only the former are novel, should be considered invalid as 
unpatentable subject matter or for lack of novelty. See infra Part IV. 
 256. Abrams, 188 F.2d at 168; see also In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 
(C.C.P.A. 1951) (“This court has deemed it to have been thoroughly established by deci-
sions of various courts that purely mental steps do not form a process which falls 
within the scope of patentability as defined by statute.”); Halliburton Oil Well Cement-
ing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1944) (“We think these mental steps, 
even if novel, are not patentable” (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877) (defi-
nition of “art” or “process”))), aff’d, 326 U.S. 969 (1946), modified, 329 U.S. 1 (1946). 
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words, a computer. The most significant of these cases, Prater 
and Musgrave, have already been discussed.257 In Musgrave 
and the first Prater opinion, the court questioned the logical 
and precedential foundations of the “mental steps doctrine” and 
found them wanting.258 The court held that even methods in-
volving “mental steps” satisfy the demands of patentable sub-
ject matter, so long as they fall within the constitutional limits 
of the “useful arts” (defined here as “technological arts,” or, in 
the first Prater opinion, as “industrial technology”).259 
Perhaps the development of the computer compelled a reex-
amination of the “mental steps doctrine.” Actions such as “cal-
culating” and “determining,” which the Abrams court had 
found self-evidently unpatentable, were no longer entirely 
within the domain of human thought.260 When such steps can 
be performed by machines, there is less reason to regard them 
as distinctly different from the physical process steps that have 
always been considered patentable. In the second Prater opin-
ion, the court held that the “mental steps doctrine,” if it were 
justified at all, did not apply to steps that were to be performed 
only by a machine.261 In fact, the court argued that computer 
programs ought to be patentable, even when executed by a pre-
existing general-purpose computer, because a new program, in 
effect, creates a new machine:262 
 No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Consti-
tution, statute, or case law, apparatus and process claims 
broad enough to encompass the operation of a programmed 
general-purpose digital computer are necessarily unpat-
entable. In one sense, a general-purpose computer may be re-
garded as but a storeroom of parts and/or electrical compo-
nents. But once a program has been introduced, the general-
 
 257. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1386-89; Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893. 
 259. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 260. See John Halton, The Anatomy of Computing, in THE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 4 (“Now, information can not only be 
stored, retrieved, communicated, and broadcast in enormous quantities and at phe-
nomenal speeds; but it can also be rearranged, selected, marshalled, and transformed. 
Until recently, these activities were the sole province of the human brain.”). 
 261. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1403; see also In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 745-46 
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Prater held the 
applicant’s Claim 9 indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because it was intended to apply 
only to operations performed by a computer, but in fact it could be read to cover opera-
tions performed by a person with pencil and paper. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404-05. 
 262. See infra notes 337-57 and accompanying text. 
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purpose digital computer becomes a special-purpose digital 
computer (i.e., a specific electrical circuit with or without elec-
tro-mechanical components) which, along with the process by 
which it operates, may be patented subject, of course, to the 
requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Based 
on the present law, we see no other reasonable conclusion.263 
Reading the foregoing in 1969, one might have predicted 
that patenting software would become a matter of routine. 
However, at the same time the “mental steps doctrine” fell 
aside as a significant barrier to software patents, another issue 
arose to take its place. That issue was the patentability of 
“mathematical algorithms,” and this time the Supreme Court 
intervened. 
B. The Supreme Court Trilogy 
The first case in which the Supreme Court took a hard look 
at the patentability of computer software was Gottschalk v. 
Benson.264 The invention in Benson concerned a method of con-
verting Binary Coded Decimal (BCD) numbers into pure bi-
nary,265 a method useful in computer programming and proba-
bly little else.266 The Patent Office rejected the claims as 
describing “mental processes” or “mathematical steps.” 267 The 
CCPA reversed, once again questioning the validity of the 
“mental steps doctrine” and finding, in any case, that the 
claims did not cover a process performed by the human mind.268 
 
 263. Prater, 415 F.2d at 1403 n.29. 
 264. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 265. Binary numbers are numbers expressed in base two, using only the ones and 
zeros that can be processed by a computer. See supra text accompanying notes 194-196. 
Expressed in binary, the decimal sequence “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6” is “0000, 0001, 0010, 
0011, 0100, 0101, 0110.” In Binary Coded Decimal, or BCD, individual digits in a 
multi-digit decimal number are expressed as their binary equivalents. Hence, in BCD 
the number 13 would be represented as 0001 0011—the binary equivalent of 1, fol-
lowed by the binary equivalent of 3. In pure binary, the number 13 would be repre-
sented as 1101. 
 266. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev’d sub nom. 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 267. Id. at 684. 
 268. See id. at 686-87. Claim 8 referred to a step performed by a “reentrant shift 
register,” thereby excluding any possibility that the method, as claimed, could be per-
formed in a human mind. Id. at 687. Claim 13 included no such reference to apparatus, 
but the method still called for some kind of “hardware” implementation—whether a 
digital computer, pencil and paper, or red and blue poker chips. Id. at 687-88.  
Only in the manual performance would it require the operator even to think and 
then only to the extent necessary to assure that he is doing what the claim tells 
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The court sidestepped the “mathematical steps” issue, saying 
only that the digital computer in which the claimed method 
would find its practical application was clearly a “technologi-
cal” device.269 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the claims unpat-
entable, observing that the applicant’s claims “were not limited 
to any particular art or technology,270 to any particular appara-
tus or machinery, or to any particular end use.”271 The claims 
“cover[ed] any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose 
digital computer of any type.”272 The Court characterized the 
claimed method as an “algorithm,” a procedure for solving a 
mathematical problem.273 The algorithm had been optimized for 
a computer by changing the order of steps that a human would 
ordinarily use, but the algorithm could be performed with any 
computer, or even without a computer.274 Such an algorithm, 
the Court held, is akin to an “abstract principle,” a “fundamen-
tal truth,” a “phenomenon of nature,” or an “abstract intellec-
tual concept.”275 Such things are the “basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.”276 A practical application of such a 
 
him to do. In no case is the exercise of judgment required or even the making of a 
decision as between alternatives. 
 Id. at 688. Cf. In re McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q. 456, 457-58 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1959) 
Any method or step in a method which can be manually performed and requires 
the use of the human eyes for detection or determination of any condition, such as 
temperature, pressure, time, etc., and/or the use of the hands for the purpose of 
manipulating, such as turning off or on or regulating a given device in a certain 
manner or at a certain time, etc., to produce a certain result necessarily involves 
the human mind and hence can be classed as a mental step. Such steps, however, 
are not purely mental or interpretive mental steps and are not the kind which are 
prohibited by the decisions relating to purely mental steps. 
Id. 
 269. Benson, 441 F.2d at 688. See also supra text accompanying note 263. 
 270. Except, arguably, the art of digital computers. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. 
 271. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. 
 272. Id. One could argue that a general-purpose digital computer is a “particular 
apparatus or machine.” However, as previously discussed, a general-purpose computer 
can be implemented, at least in theory, with anything from electronic circuitry to 
Tinker Toys. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 273. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65. Strictly speaking, the term “algorithm” can be applied 
to any procedure described as a sequence of steps. All computer programs are, in this 
sense, algorithms. The kind of algorithm to which the court referred is more accurately 
called a “mathematical algorithm.” See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). 
 274. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 63. 
 275. Id. at 67. 
 276. Id. 
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fundamental truth can be patented; the truth itself cannot.277 
What concerned the Court, in part, was the preemptive ef-
fect of patenting something as general as the applicant’s BCD 
conversion algorithm. The method was described in such “ab-
stract and sweeping” terms that it could cover numerous appli-
cations of BCD to binary conversion, both known and yet to be 
discovered.278 In what has become known as its “nutshell” 
summary, the Court explained, 
 It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in 
practical effect that would be the result if the formula for con-
verting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were pat-
ented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here 
has no substantial practical application except in connection 
with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment be-
low is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt the mathe-
matical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on 
the algorithm itself.279 
The Court also alluded to the definition of “process” in-
spired by Cochrane v. Deener:280 “Transformation and reduction 
of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the pat-
entability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.”281 
As the CCPA had observed, the Benson algorithm was an 
unusually “pure” example of abstract mathematics since the 
applicant had not linked the algorithm to any particular tech-
nological application, nor to any particular hardware, other 
 
 277. “He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to 
a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a dis-
covery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.” 
Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 278. Id. at 68. “The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verifica-
tion of drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be per-
formed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any 
apparatus.” Id. 
 279. Id. at 71-72. 
 280. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text. 
 281. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. But a few paragraphs later the Court seems to retract 
this statement: 
  It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine 
or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or 
thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet 
the requirements of our prior precedents. 
Id. at 71. Ambiguities such as this have made the Benson case a source of lively debate. 
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than a general-purpose computer.282 While the Benson case 
seemed to close the door on claims to mathematical algorithms 
per se, there was still the possibility of patenting a specific 
technological application of an algorithm. That was the ques-
tion presented in the second case of the Supreme Court “tril-
ogy,” Parker v. Flook.283 
In Flook, the invention concerned the catalytic conversion of 
hydrocarbons.284 During the conversion process, certain pa-
rameters such as temperature and pressure must be monitored 
to ensure that they do not exceed predetermined “alarm limits” 
indicating potentially dangerous conditions. During certain 
stages of the process, such as start-up, the “alarm limits” need 
to be variable rather than fixed. The applicant claimed a 
method of “updating” the alarm limits, consisting of three 
stages: an initial stage of measuring the current values of the 
relevant parameters (such as temperature), an intermediate 
stage of recalculating the correct “alarm limits” using an algo-
rithm, and a final stage of changing the alarm limits to reflect 
the results of the calculation.285 The only difference between 
the applicant’s method and existing methods lay in the algo-
rithm and the particular formula it used for recalculating the 
alarm limits.286 While the computations could be performed by 
hand, the application “ma[de] it clear that the formula is pri-
marily useful for computerized calculations producing auto-
matic adjustments in alarm settings.”287 The application in-
cluded no detailed discussion of the catalytic conversion 
process, the monitoring of the process parameters, the selection 
of an appropriate margin of safety, or the physical activation of 
an alarm.288 
The claim at issue in Flook differed in important respects 
from the claim at issue in Benson. In Flook, the applicant 
claimed an algorithm as applied in the clearly technological 
field of hydrocarbon processing. The method also involved the 
 
 282. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“The claims in this case 
are directed solely to the art of data-processing itself . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 283. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 284. See id. at 585. 
 285. See id. 
 286. See id. 
 287. Id. at 586. 
 288. See id. 
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gathering of “real world” data. Hence, the Flook claim was 
much less abstract, and arguably less preemptive,289 than the 
claim discussed in Benson. Although the Patent Office rejected 
Flook’s application, the CCPA reversed, reading Benson as ap-
plying only to claims that preempt the use of a mathematical 
formula per se.290 The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining 
that since the mathematical algorithm was the only novel as-
pect of the method and since algorithms are unpatentable, the 
claim as a whole failed to describe a patentable “invention.”291 
The Court also rejected the argument that “post-solution activ-
ity,” in the form of changing the alarm limit, distinguished the 
case from Benson by adding a critical element of practical ap-
plication: 
 The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how con-
ventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance. 
A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-
solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Py-
thagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or par-
tially patentable, because a patent application contained a fi-
nal step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be 
usefully applied to existing survey techniques.292 
The last case in the trilogy, Diamond v. Diehr,293 involved 
facts curiously similar to those in Flook. Diehr’s invention con-
cerned a process for molding and curing rubber.294 In order to 
 
 289.  
  The patent claims cover any use of respondent’s formula for updating the 
value of an alarm limit on any process variable involved in a process comprising 
the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. Since there are numerous proc-
esses of that kind in the petrochemical and oil-refining industries, the claims cover 
a broad range of potential uses of the method. They do not, however, cover every 
conceivable application of the formula. 
Id. 
 290. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 291. See 437 U.S. at 594. Using a somewhat confusing analytical tool, the court 
treated the algorithm “as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” although this 
was not actually the case. “Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at 
the time of the claimed invention, as one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technologi-
cal work,’ it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.” Id. at 591-92 
(citation omitted) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see 437 U.S. 
at 594. 
 292. Id. at 590. 
 293. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 294. See id. at 177. 
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obtain a “perfect cure,” a molding press must be opened at a 
specific time. That time can be calculated using the well-known 
Arrhenius equation, which takes into account factors like tem-
perature and pressure.295 Diehr’s contribution was to provide a 
means for repeatedly measuring the temperature inside of the 
press and, using that data and the Arrhenius equation, to con-
tinually update the time remaining before the press should be 
opened.296 As in Flook, this updating process was performed by 
a computer.297 When the computer determined that the ideal 
cure time had arrived, it signaled a device to open the press 
automatically.298 
In Benson and Flook, the Court reacted cautiously to the 
expansion of patent protection into new areas, at least without 
a specific congressional mandate;299 in Diehr the Court adopted 
a far more liberal attitude, in the spirit of Chakrabarty.300 Pat-
entable subject matter, the Court reminded us, was meant to 
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”301 Rub-
ber curing is a § 101 “process,” even under a definition that re-
quires the “transformation” of a material thing, and rubber cur-
ing is an “industrial process[]” of the kind historically eligible 
for patent protection.302 The inclusion of a mathematical equa-
tion and digital computer as a part of that process does not 
make the process, considered as a whole, unpatentable subject 
matter.303 The problem in Flook, the Court explained, was that 
the claimed invention described only the calculation of a num-
ber; there was no disclosure in the application relating to the 
catalytic conversion process as a whole.304 Here, however, “re-
spondents . . . do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. 
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing syn-
 
 295. See id. at 177-78. 
 296. See id. at 178. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. at 179. 
 299. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 595-96 (1978). 
 300. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 301. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. 
NO. 82-1423, at 6 (1952)). However, not every discovery is patentable subject matter. 
“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas.” Id. at 185. 
 302. Id. at 184. 
 303. See id. at 185. 
 304. See id. at 186. 
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thetic rubber.”305 The claim would not preempt all uses of the 
formula—only use of the formula in a specific industrial con-
text.306 In an apparent contradiction of the analysis adopted in 
Flook, the Court in Diehr held it to be “inappropriate to dissect 
the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the 
presence of the old elements in the analysis.”307 “The ‘novelty’ of 
any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, 
is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of 
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable 
subject matter.”308 Four dissenting justices argued that the “in-
vention” was not a method of curing rubber (a technique al-
ready known), but an unpatentable method of calculating the 
time to open the press.309 
Flook and Diehr are difficult to reconcile.310 Diehr suggests 
that the only fault in Flook’s claim was a failure to include 
more references to the conventional process of catalytic hydro-
carbon conversion. Yet it seemed that far more was at stake in 
Flook than such a minor lapse in the claim-drafter’s art. Given 
the tensions between Benson, Flook, and Diehr and the contra-
dictory statements found even within the same opinion, it is 
not surprising that the post-trilogy handling of software pat-
ents has been less than straightforward. An exhaustive discus-
sion of the “algorithm” question dealt with in the trilogy is be-
yond the scope of this work. However, with respect to the 
“useful arts” question, it is significant that the Supreme 
Court’s acceptance of computer-related inventions depended 
 
 305. Id. at 187. 
 306. See id. However, the Court still said that “[a] mathematical formula as such 
is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be cir-
cumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological 
environment.” Id. at 191 (citation omitted). Moreover, “insignificant postsolution activ-
ity [as seen in Flook] will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process.” Id. at 191-92. 
 307. Id. at 188. 
 308. Id. at 188-89. 
 309. Id. at 205-09. 
What they claim to have discovered, in essence, is a method of updating the origi-
nal estimated curing time by repetitively recalculating that time pursuant to a 
well-known mathematical formula in response to variations in temperature within 
the mold. Their method of updating the curing time calculation is strikingly remi-
niscent of the method of updating alarm limits that Dale Flook sought to patent. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
 310. This is true in spite of the Court’s insistence that “[o]ur reasoning in Flook is 
in no way inconsistent with our reasoning here.” Id. at 192 n.14. 
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upon the association of the computer program “algorithm” with 
an application in a traditional industrial art, such as rubber 
manufacturing. When the program “algorithm” was claimed on 
its own, as in Benson, the Court rejected the claim as too ab-
stract, or too much a mathematical “principle.” The Court did 
not treat the program as the practical application of a mathe-
matical principle in the “useful art” of computer programming. 
Had the Court adopted such an approach, we might have ar-
rived at nearly where we are today on the issue of software 
patentability and by a much less circuitous route. 
C. Software Patents in the Federal Circuit 
After Diehr, the leading voice on the patentability of soft-
ware has been that of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, the successor of the CCPA. The Federal Circuit decisions 
are, in some respects, as difficult to reconcile as those of the 
Supreme Court. A few of the former will be discussed here for 
the light they shed on the “useful arts” inquiry and to illustrate 
how far we have progressed toward the complete acceptance of 
software as patentable subject matter. 
In In re Grams,311 the court reaffirmed the Benson principle 
that a mathematical algorithm, as such, cannot be patented. 
The claimed invention in Grams was rather abstract; it con-
cerned a method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in a pa-
tient by measuring certain parameters through laboratory tests 
and comparing the results to standard values in a way that de-
tects significant deviations.312 The analysis relied on what the 
court termed a “mathematical algorithm,”313 realized through a 
computer program. The “critical question” to be answered by 
the court was “What did [the] applicants invent?”314 The court 
held that what they had invented was just an algorithm—a 
conclusion bolstered by the content of the specification. 
The sole physical process step in Grams’ [sic] claim 1 is . . . 
performing clinical tests on individuals to obtain data. The 
specification does not bulge with disclosure on those tests. To 
 
 311. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 312. See id. at 836-37. 
 313. Id. at 837. The procedure described in the claim did not look “mathematical” 
since it did not include any equations. See id. at 837 n.1. However, the applicants did 
not dispute the presence of a “mathematical algorithm.” Id. at 837. 
 314. Id. at 839. 
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the contrary, it focuses on the algorithm itself . . . . From the 
specification and the claim, it is clear to us that applicants 
are, in essence, claiming the mathematical algorithm, which 
they cannot do under Gottschalk v. Benson.315 
Grams differed from Benson in at least one respect: the 
claim in Grams included the physical step of performing a “plu-
rality of clinical laboratory tests on the individual.”316 Hence, 
one could argue, in light of Diehr, that the invention as a whole 
was really a statutory process (conducting laboratory tests) im-
proved by the addition of a computer-implemented algorithm. 
The court held, however, that merely adding a “data gathering” 
step to an algorithm does not make the latter patentable sub-
ject matter.317 “No mathematical equation can be used, as a 
practical matter, without establishing and substituting values 
for the variables expressed therein.”318 
In another case involving medical diagnosis, Arrhythmia 
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,319 the Federal 
Circuit reached a contrary result. The invention in Arrhythmia 
concerned the analysis of electrocardiographic signals in order 
to predict a potentially dangerous heart condition.320 In the 
claimed method, the signals were digitized and filtered, and 
certain characteristics of the signal were then compared to a 
standard value.321 The computer performing the analysis could 
be a programmed general-purpose computer, a special-purpose 
computer, or “hard wired logic circuitry.”322 While most algo-
rithm patentability cases stem from a Patent Office rejection, 
in this case an accused infringer raised the challenge. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment, finding that the claims 
failed to recite patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 
101.323 
 
 315. Id. at 840. Cf. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (uphold-
ing claim to “a combination of interrelated means” (computer circuitry) configured to 
execute an algorithm). 
 316. Grams, 888 F.2d at 836. 
 317. See id. at 839-40; see also In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 318. Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (quoting In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 
1978)). 
 319. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 320. See id. at 1055. 
 321. See id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See id. at 1054. 
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the history of soft-
ware patentability cases, including the so-called “Freeman-
Walter-Abele test”324 developed by the CCPA in response to the 
holdings of the Supreme Court trilogy. As summarized by the 
court: 
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is 
recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next de-
termined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no 
more than the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is 
directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to or 
limited by physical elements or process steps. Such claims are 
nonstatutory. However, when the mathematical algorithm is 
applied in one or more steps of an otherwise statutory process 
claim, or one or more elements of an otherwise statutory ap-
paratus claim, the requirements of section 101 are met.325 
The court assumed that a mathematical algorithm formed a 
part of the claimed process and proceeded to the second step of 
analysis—whether the process was “otherwise statutory.”326 
The challenger argued that the process merely calculated a 
number, much like the process claimed in Flook,327 but the 
court found the process more analogous to that discussed in 
Diehr.328 The answer to the question “What did the applicant 
invent?” was, in this case, not “an algorithm” but “a method of 
analyzing electrocardiographic signals.”329 The signals were 
“not abstractions” because they “related to the patient’s heart 
function.”330 Similarly, the “output [was] not an abstract num-
ber, but . . . a signal related to the patient’s heart activity.”331 
The claim did not preempt all uses of the algorithm, but only 
its use in connection with a specific diagnostic procedure.332 
The data analyzed by the claimed method was not an ab-
 
 324. Named after In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978), In re Walter, 618 
F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 325. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058. However, the court cautions that the 
Freeman-Walter-Abele test is not the only test of patentability, and, while it apparently 
describes a “safe harbor” for challenged claims, “failure to meet [the] test may not al-
ways defeat the claim.” Id. 
 326. Id. at 1058-59. 
 327. See id. at 1060. 
 328. See id. at 1059. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. 
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straction, but neither was the data analyzed in Flook or Grams. 
Although the algorithm in Arrhythmia could be described as 
only part of a larger process, the same could have been said in 
Flook and, perhaps, in the more abstract context of Grams. The 
different result reached in Arrhythmia may be explained, at 
least in part, by an increased emphasis on the physical aspects 
of data processing. The steps of the algorithm, observed the 
court, are “physical process steps that transform one physical, 
electrical signal into another.”333 The apparatus claims de-
scribed “a combination of interrelated means” for performing 
the steps required by the process, including electronic devices 
like an analog-to-digital converter, a disc memory unit, and a 
programmed computer.334 This hardware “transform[s] a par-
ticular input signal to a different output signal, in accordance 
with the internal structure of the computer as configured by 
electronic instructions. ‘The claimed invention . . . converts one 
physical thing into another physical thing just as any other 
electrical circuitry would do.’ ”335 The mathematical algorithm 
served to define the “electronic structure and operation of [the] 
apparatus.”336 
This focus on the physical aspects of computing continued 
in In re Alappat.337 Alappat had invented a way of smoothing 
the appearance of lines on an oscilloscope display by illuminat-
ing selected picture elements at varying intensities.338 A soft-
ware algorithm determined the best way to display a particular 
line.339 Alappat did not claim the algorithm directly. Instead, 
his Claim 15 refers to a “rasterizer” (a component of certain 
displays) that includes “means” for performing various func-
tions required by the algorithm. Such “means-plus-function” 
claim drafting is permitted by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6),340 and a 
 
 333. Id. Moreover, “[t]he view that ‘there is nothing necessarily physical about 
‘signals’ is incorrect.” Id. 
 334. Id. at 1060 (quoting In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 335. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060 (quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 819 
(C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
 336. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060. 
 337. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 338. See id. at 1537-38. When a display consists of a grid of picture elements in 
rows and columns, curved or diagonal lines appear “jagged.” Alappat’s “anti-aliasing” 
technique adds, in effect, “shades of gray” to produce fuzzier but smoother-looking 
lines. Id. 
 339. See id. 
 340.  
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“means-plus-function” claim is construed to cover any appara-
tus that performs the recited functions using structures identi-
cal or equivalent to the structures described in the patent 
specification.341 The “structures” described in Alappat’s specifi-
cation included conventional computer circuitry, such as an 
“arithmetic logic circuit,” “barrel shifters,” and a ROM (Read 
Only Memory).342 The Patent Office rejected Alappat’s claim as 
essentially an unpatentable process claim,343 observing that 
Claim 15 could be read to cover any general-purpose computer 
(such as the one on which this article was composed), so long as 
it was programmed to carry out Alappat’s procedure.344 All that 
Alappat had invented was a mathematical algorithm.345 
The majority of the Federal Circuit’s en banc panel dis-
agreed, holding that the structures described by Alappat, when 
combined and configured to carry out the steps of the algo-
 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for 
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in 
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding 
structure, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 
35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (1994). This provision relieves the patent applicant of the burden of 
listing each and every structure that might serve as an element of an equivalent com-
bination. 
 341. See  King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 945-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
The patent “specification” includes “a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1994). It must “en-
able any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated 
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.” Id. 
 342. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541. 
 343. See In re Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340, 1344-45 (PTO Bd. Pat. Ap. & Int. 
1992), rev’d, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Patent Office routinely ignored the lim-
iting effect of § 112(6) and treated such claims as covering all structures that perform 
the recited functions, rather than only structures equivalent to those disclosed in the 
specification. The Federal Circuit finally put a stop to this practice. See In re Don-
aldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). But cf., In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 
1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
  Though a claim expressed in ‘means for’ (functional) terms is said to be an 
apparatus claim, the subject matter as a whole of that claim may be indistinguish-
able from that of a method claim drawn to the steps performed by the ‘means.’ . . . 
[I]f allowance of a method claim is proscribed by Benson, it would be anomalous to 
grant a claim to apparatus encompassing any and every ‘means for’ practicing that 
very method. 
Id. 
 344. See 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1345. “The disclosed ALU, ROM and shift registers are 
all common elements of stored program digital computers.” Id. 
 345. See id. at 1346; see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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rithm, formed a patentable “machine.”346 Even though the 
structures could be found in existing general-purpose com-
puters, the programming could not be ignored: “[S]uch pro-
gramming creates a new machine, because a general purpose 
computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it 
is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to in-
structions from program software.”347 Importantly, Alappat’s 
invention was “not a disembodied mathematical concept which 
may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific 
machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result”348—
i.e., an improved oscilloscope display. 
The Alappat case resulted in six additional opinions, in 
which various combinations of judges concurred in, or dis-
sented from, all or a portion of the majority’s opinion. Judge 
Archer, who concurred in part349 and dissented in part, com-
pared Alappat’s “new machine” to a compact disc player play-
ing newly recorded music: 
Music of course is not patentable subject matter; a composer 
cannot obtain exclusive patent rights for the original creation 
of a musical composition. But now suppose the new melody is 
recorded on a compact disc. In such case, the particular musi-
cal composition will define an arrangement of minute pits in 
the surface of the compact disc material, and therefore will 
define its specific structure. . . . 
 Through the expedient of putting his music on known 
structure, can a composer now claim as his invention the 
structure of a compact disc . . . and obtain a patent therefor? 
The answer must be no. The composer admittedly has in-
vented or discovered nothing but music. The discovery of mu-
sic does not become patentable subject matter simply because 
there is an arbitrary claim to some structure.350 
Similarly, Alappat’s superficial claim to “structure” did not 
reflect the nature of his invention, which was nothing more 
 
 346. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541 (“Claim 15 unquestionably recites a machine, or ap-
paratus, made up of a combination of known electronic circuitry elements . . . .”). “Ma-
chine” is one of the categories of patentable subject matter listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
 347. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (emphasis added). 
 348. Id. at 1544. 
 349. The concurrence related to a jurisdictional issue. See id. at 1545 (Archer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 350. Id. at 1553-54 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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than a mathematical procedure for converting one set of data to 
another.351 His computer, argued Judge Archer, was no more a 
“new machine” than a player piano that had switched from 
playing Chopin to Brahms.352 “What is going on here,” he said, 
“is a charade.”353 
Judge Rader agreed that the majority had overemphasized 
the status of the invention as a “machine,” but, unlike Judge 
Archer, he concurred in the result.354 Even if Alappat’s inven-
tion were viewed as a process, it would be a patentable process 
in Judge Rader’s view. The process may have been claimed in 
terms of a mathematical algorithm, but it was still a “useful 
art,” not an abstraction of the kind condemned in Benson and 
Flook.355 
 The limits on patentable subject matter within section 101 
do not depend on whether an invention can be expressed as a 
mathematical relationship or algorithm. Mathematics is sim-
ply a form of expression—a language. . . . 
 . . . [I]nventors may express their inventions in any man-
ner they see fit, including mathematical symbols and algo-
rithms. Whether an inventor calls the invention a machine or 
a process is not nearly as important as the invention itself.356 
Judge Newman also concurred, in an opinion emphasizing 
the importance of robust patent protection in developing fields 
of technology.357 
The Alappat decision, however controversial, marked an 
important milestone in the post-Benson expansion of software 
patent protection. The sharp disagreement among the judges of 
the Federal Circuit shows how little had been settled by the 
 
 351. See id. at 1563-64. “Alappat’s claimed invention . . . is not the invention or 
discovery of a machine. The presence of structure on the face of the claims does not ipso 
facto make the claimed invention or discovery one of statutory subject matter.” Id. at 
1561. “The majority’s simplistic approach of looking only to whether the claim reads on 
structure and ignoring the claimed invention or discovery for which a patent is sought 
will result in the awarding of patents for discoveries well beyond the scope of the pat-
ent law.” Id. at 1554. 
 352. See id. at 1567. 
 353. Id. at 1564. 
 354. See id. at 1581 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 355. See id. at 1583. Citing Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, Judge Rader 
stated that the Patent Office “has no justification within the Patent Act to ignore algo-
rithmic processes or machines as ‘useful Arts’ within the scope of section 101.” Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. See id. at 1570-71 (Newman, J., concurring). 
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Supreme Court trilogy and the cases that followed. Whatever 
its failings, Alappat established a reasonably bright line be-
tween unpatentable algorithms and patentable applications. 
All the applicant must do under Alappat is draft the claims in 
terms of the physical hardware that performs the steps of the 
algorithm, and the result will be a “new machine.” This may 
seem an extreme reading of Alappat, which does include some 
qualifying language,358 but it is born out in at least two subse-
quent cases. In In re Warmerdam,359 the Federal Circuit held 
unpatentable a method claim on constructing a “bubble hierar-
chy” defining the space around an object.360 With respect to the 
apparatus claim, the court held that “[c]laim 5 is for a machine, 
and is clearly patentable subject matter.”361 Yet the apparatus 
claim said merely, “A machine having a memory which con-
tains data representing a bubble hierarchy generated by the 
method of any of [unpatentable] Claims 1 through 4.”362 In In re 
Trovato,363 the Federal Circuit initially rejected an apparatus 
claim consisting of various “means” for computing a “least cost 
path” in an abstract “space” representing certain variables.364 
Because of the lack of disclosure of any physical apparatus, the 
court found the apparatus claim to be merely a “guise” for an 
unpatentable algorithm claim.365 However, the Federal Circuit 
en banc, in a per curiam opinion,366 granted the applicant a re-
 
 358. The majority suggests, obliquely and without explanation, that a claim to a 
structure might be rejected if it were merely a “guise” for an abstract mathematical 
process. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540-41. Judge Archer seized on this suggestion as a 
potential opening for the kind of analysis he favored, but criticized the majority for its 
failure to elaborate. See id. at 1568 n.30 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 359. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Although Warmerdam appears before Alappat 
in the Federal Reporter, it bears a decision date of August 11, 1994, subsequent to 
Alappat’s date of July 29, 1994. The Warmerdam opinion makes explicit reference to 
Alappat. See id. at 1358. 
 360. See id. at 1355-56. “Bubble hierarchies” are used in applications such as 
automatic collision avoidance for industrial robots, but, significantly, the challenged 
claim did not recite any such specific, technological use. See id. at 1355-58. 
 361. Id. at 1360. 
 362. Id. at 1358. 
 363. 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc). 
 364. Trovato, 42 F.3d at 1377-78, 1383. 
 365. See id. at 1382-83. “[A]ll the disclosed means are simply software instruc-
tions; no ‘structure’ appears in the specification as required under § 112, ¶ 6.” Id. at 
1382. 
 366. See Trovato, 60 F.3d at 807. 
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hearing, vacated the earlier opinion, and remanded (sua 
sponte) for further consideration in light of Alappat and the 
Patent Office’s Proposed Examination Guidelines for Computer-
Implemented Inventions367 (hereinafter, the “Guidelines”). This 
procedure was unorthodox since the Guidelines do not have the 
force of law and Alappat had been mentioned and distinguished 
in the prior opinion.368 The purpose seems to have been to pre-
serve the sense of certainty created by Alappat. 
The Patent Office blazed its own new path in the Guide-
lines. For years the Patent Office had taken a relatively hard 
line on the patentability of software inventions, and its rejec-
tions were often reversed by the CCPA or the Federal Cir-
cuit.369 The Guidelines signaled a change in policy, seen most 
dramatically in the treatment of software inventions claimed 
as the physical medium (such as a floppy disk or ROM) on 
which the software is stored.370 In this context, the Guidelines 
distinguish between “functional descriptive material” and “non-
functional descriptive material.” 371 The former “consists of data 
structures and computer programs which impart functionality 
[i.e., which cause a computer to do something] when encoded 
on a computer-readable medium.”372 Such material is “struc-
turally and functionally interrelated to the medium” on which 
it is stored, and it will be considered statutory in most cases.373 
“Non-functional descriptive material” includes “music, literary 
 
 367. Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 
(1996), reprinted in 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 311 (1998) [hereinafter Guidelines]. See 
Trovato, 60 F.3d at 807. 
 368. This was pointed out in a strongly worded dissent by two of the three panel-
ists who took part in the original Trovato decision. See Trovato, 60 F.3d.at 808 (Nies & 
Michel, JJ., dissenting). 
 369. See, e.g., the cases discussed supra at Part II.A-B. 
 370. A floppy disk, as a physical object, may be claimed as a “manufacture” under 
§ 101, and a floppy disk on which a new program has been recorded is, in a minute 
sense, physically different than other floppy disks due to the unique alignment of the 
magnetic particles that store the information. The Federal Circuit missed a chance to 
rule on the patentability of floppy disk/program claims in In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Patent Office Board rejected a floppy disk claim as violative 
of the printed matter doctrine, discussed infra at note 403 and accompanying text, but 
changed its mind before the Federal Circuit could rule. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584 
(“The Commissioner now states ‘that computer programs embodied in a tangible me-
dium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 
101 . . . .’ ”). Since there was no longer a controversy, the case was dismissed. 
 371. Guidelines, supra note 367, § 2106(IV)(B)(1). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
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works and . . . compilation[s] or mere arrangement[s] of data” 
that may be recorded on a medium such a floppy disk, but that 
are not “functional” in the same sense.374 The latter cannot be 
patented.375 These Guidelines take the Alappat “new machine” 
concept even further into the realm of software; this means, in 
effect, that any “functional” software is likely to be treated as 
patentable subject matter if the claim is properly drafted. 
After Benson and Flook, the subject-matter door to software 
patentability seemed firmly shut; now it opens wide. But be-
cause the “mathematical algorithm” issue no longer bars most 
software patents, there must be a renewed focus on any limits 
still imposed by the “useful arts” stricture of the Constitution. 
The analysis of the former issue lends some insights into the 
latter. For example, an emphasis on physical hardware, storage 
media, and “electrical signals” may be as relevant to identifying 
“technology” as to distinguishing between an abstract principle 
and a concrete application. Before undertaking that analysis, 
however, we must add a final piece to the puzzle. Many of the 
newer software patent applications concern innovations in 
business, a field that is not a “useful art” as defined supra in 
Part I.D. Hence, it is worth reviewing briefly the treatment of 
business methods, and tools for doing business, as patentable 
subject matter. 
III. PATENTING BUSINESS 
Courts were considering the patentability of business sys-
tems long before the dawn of the “information age.” Such sys-
tems were often claimed in terms of the printed documents by 
which they were implemented. In Hotel Security Checking Co. 
v. Lorraine Co.,376 the plaintiff’s patent claimed a “method of 
 
 374. Id. Distinguishing between what is “functional” and “nonfunctional” may 
prove difficult. For example, is software that plays a predetermined melody “non-
functional” like a compact disk? What if the software generates its own melodies using 
an algorithm? Moreover, the line between program and data is not always crystal clear. 
One of the characteristics of the standard von Neumann computer architecture is the 
common treatment of instructions and data. See BOLTER, supra note 2, at 39 
The genius of the von Neumann machine is that the program (operating instruc-
tions) and the data are stored in the same binary code and loaded together into the 
memory, and this coding means that the program can be altered as easily as the 
data, indeed, that there is no logical difference between the two. 
Id. 
 375. Guidelines, supra note 367, § 2106(IV)(B)(1). 
 376. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
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and means for” preventing theft by restaurant waiters.377 
Numbered slips kept track of the orders filled by each waiter 
for comparison to the cash receipts at the end of the day; any 
waiter who pocketed a customer’s payment would be discov-
ered.378 The claims referred in a general way to the composition 
of the printed forms and the manner in which they were to be 
used.379 The court observed that the system was “not a ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter”; at best, it was 
an “art.”380 Yet the term “art” did not embrace a “mere abstrac-
tion,” which a “system of transacting business” would be if “dis-
connected from the means for carrying [it] out.”381 The physical 
“means” in this case consisted of printed forms, pen and ink, 
which the court held insufficient to support patentability. 
Apart from the manner of their use, they were not new.382 As to 
their use, the court wrote, “[t]he fundamental principle of the 
system is as old as the art of bookkeeping.”383 Unfortunately, 
the court’s reliance on novelty rendered moot the more interest-
ing subject matter issue: Was the claimed system a patentable 
“means” or an unpatentable “abstraction?”384 
In Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope,385 the invention con-
cerned time-limited transfer tickets for railways and the like. 
The claims described a perforated ticket, a portion of which 
could be torn off if the ticket were issued in the morning. This 
prevented a passenger with a morning ticket from using it to 
 
 377. Id. 
 378. See id. at 467-68. 
 379. See id. at 468-69. 
 380. Id. at 469. On the meaning of “art” as a category of patentable subject matter, 
see supra Part I.B. 
 381. 160 F. at 469. 
 382. See id. 
 383. Id. 
 384.  
  If at the time of Hick’s application, there had been no system of bookkeeping 
of any kind in restaurants, we would be confronted with the question whether a 
new and useful system of cash-registering and account-checking is such an art as 
is patentable under the statute. This question seems never to have been decided by 
a controlling authority and its decision is not necessary now unless we find that 
Hicks has made a contribution to the art which is new and useful. We are decid-
edly of the opinion that he has not . . . . 
Id. at 472. See also United States Credit Sys. Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co., 59 F. 
139 (2d Cir. 1893) (finding nothing novel in printed forms to be used by insurer in clas-
sifying risks, but failing to reach the issue of whether the patentee’s business method 
could be patentable subject matter). 
 385. 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913). 
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transfer in the afternoon.386 The defendant argued that the 
patent claimed only “a method of transacting business, a form 
of contract, a mode of procedure, a rule of conduct, a principle 
or idea, or a permissive function, predicated upon a thing in-
volving no structural law.”387 Although considering it a close 
question, the court disagreed, finding the ticket a “manufac-
ture”388 because of its physical structure.389 Other cases involv-
ing coupon books and similar printed items reached the same 
result. For example, in Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange 
Scrip-Book Co.,390 the patent involved transportation tickets is-
sued in increments of money instead of miles, which allowed 
the same tickets to be conveniently used for different modes of 
transportation.391 The ticket itself consisted of a ribbon or strip 
of perforated paper folded into a book.392 The court rejected the 
argument that the claim was for nothing more than a business 
method: 
The ticket patented is not a method at all, but a physical tan-
gible facility, without which the method would have been im-
practicable, and with which it is practicable. And this is the 
status of thousands of like facilities that, once designed and 
put into use, have become the first of a new business method; 
and patents on such facilities have been sustained.393 
On the other hand, in In re Moeser,394 the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia held that the Patent Office prop-
erly rejected claims to a type of insurance contract involving 
payments for burial. Although the contracts would be printed 
on paper, the court found “no physical construction or combina-
 
 386. See id. at 444-46. 
 387. Id. at 446 (citation omitted). 
 388. “The term ‘manufacture,’ as used in the patent law, has a very comprehensive 
sense, embracing whatever is made by the art or industry of man, not being a machine, 
a composition of matter, or a design.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 389. See id. 
 390. 187 F. 984 (7th Cir. 1911); see also Thompson v. Citizens’ Nat’l Bank, 53 F. 
250, 255 (8th Cir. 1892) (holding bank books with perforated and foldable pages to con-
stitute patentable subject matter); Benjamin Menu Card Co. v. Rand, McNally & Co., 
210 F. 285, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1894) (holding a perforated combination of menu card and 
meal check to be patentable subject matter; “[t]he fact that the structure may be of 
cardboard with printed matter upon it does not exclude the device from patentability.”). 
 391. See 187 F. at 984-85. 
 392. See id. at 986. 
 393. Id. 
 394. 123 U.S. Pat. Off. Official Gazette 655 (D.C. Cir. 1906). 
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tion that can convert it from a mere contract into a tangible de-
vice or manufacture.”395 Moreover, “[t]he form of such contracts 
or proposals for contracts, devised or adopted as a method of 
transacting a particular class of this business, is not patentable 
as an art.”396 
In Guthrie v. Curlett,397 the patent claimed a “consolidated 
tariff index,” which combined tariff information for a number of 
railroads into one convenient source and conveyed the informa-
tion by a system of symbols.398 The court held that the inven-
tion was not a “manufacture” but an “art,” and not the kind of 
art protected under the patent laws.399 Patent law, said the 
court, is “prosaically practical” and allows only protection of the 
means for carrying out an idea.400 One can monopolize a busi-
ness system only by patenting such means.401 
 In this case, however, no means are suggested for making a 
consolidated index, except the employment of symbols. There 
was a time, say that of Cadmus, when the alphabet was pat-
entable; but we decline to see anything now patentable in 
suggesting that a railway be called A or canned goods C. 
 The patentee may and does call what he produces a manu-
facture, to wit, a book of so many leaves and a given amount 
of print thereon; but the question is not what an interested 
party calls it, but what is it, and we consider the only possibly 
novel part of it, what might be called the plot of the work— 
i.e., the story revealed, and that can be copyrighted, but not 
patented.402 
These cases come to different conclusions, but they ask the 
same question: Is the invention an abstract idea about doing 
business, or is it a tangible means, equivalent to a time clock or 
 
 395. Id. at 656. 
 396. Id. The court also held that if the contracts were patentable subject matter, 
the patent could still be denied for lack of novelty. See id. 
 397. 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 398. Id. at 725-26. 
 399. Id. at 726. 
 400. Id. 
 401. See id. 
 402. Id. at 726-27. The court distinguished Cincinnati Traction, see supra text ac-
companying notes 385-89, observing that “a ticket is a form, made once and used any 
time; it may truthfully be called a physical facility, as much so [as] the punch that can-
cels it.” Id. at 727. The index, however, must repeatedly change since the only constant 
is the method of compiling it. See id. 
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a cash register, which is patentable subject matter even if it 
happens to be used in business.403 
The Patent Office Board maintained a similar distinction in 
In re Murray,404 where the applicant claimed an accounting 
method. The steps of the method included “entering” data and 
“sorting,” “correlating,” and “sub-totaling” expenditures,405 giv-
ing it the character of an unpatentable “mathematical algo-
rithm.”406 But the Board also held the claims unpatentable as a 
“method of doing business”: 
Considering the claimed method as a whole, it becomes ap-
parent that appellant is seeking patent protection on a 
method of conducting business, or providing a banking ser-
vice, between a financial institution and its customers . . . . 
 While it may in some situations be problematic to ascer-
tain what falls within the penumbra of the judicially 
pr[o]scribed “method of doing business,” we find no such diffi-
culty in the present case. We are convinced that the claimed 
accounting method . . . is, on its very face, a vivid example of 
the type of “method of doing business” contemplated by our 
review court as outside the protection of the patent stat-
utes.407 
Echoing the method/means distinction, the Board acknowl-
edged that “an apparatus or system408 capable of performing a 
 
 403. Tickets, forms, and indexes also raise issues under the “printed matter” ex-
ception to patentability, which holds that a new writing does not create a new and pat-
entable “manufacture.” See In re McKee, 64 F.2d 379 (C.C.P.A. 1933); In re Russel, 48 
F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931). One could not patent a novel, even though the book is a 
tangible item and “new” (physically and conceptually) because of the author’s text. On 
the other hand, if there is a functional relationship between the printed matter and the 
“substrate,” the combination may be patentable. One such case involved measuring 
cups that were deliberately mislabeled for the convenience of cooks making fractional 
recipes. In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The Patent Office Guidelines draw 
a similar distinction between “functional descriptive material” and “non-functional de-
scriptive material” stored on a computer-readable medium. See supra notes 369-75. 
The printed matter rule may reflect an intuitive understanding of the difference be-
tween the subject matter of copyright and patent law and, perhaps, of the “useful arts” 
limitations of the latter. It may also have some relation to the “mental steps” doctrine, 
discussed supra at Part II.A. 
 404. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. & Int. 1988). 
 405. Id. at 1820. 
 406. Id. at 1821. 
 407. Id. at 1820 (footnote omitted). 
 408. It is not clear what the Board meant by “system.” A “system” can mean an 
abstract method or a physical apparatus. The Board did make specific reference to the 
computer “system” at issue in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. 
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business function may comprise patentable subject matter,” 
even if “a method of doing business generated by the apparatus 
or system is not.”409 
The issue of business system patentability came before the 
CCPA on several occasions, but each time the court relied on 
alternative grounds, leaving the subject matter question for 
another day.410 In dicta, however, the court did lend support to 
the “business methods exception.” 411 Such dicta continued after 
the CCPA became the Federal Circuit. In Grams, for example, 
the court declared that “mathematical algorithms join the list 
of non-patentable subject matter not within the scope of section 
101, including methods of doing business, naturally occurring 
phenomenon, and laws of nature.”412 Judge Rich, one of the 
drafters of the 1952 Patent Act as well as a CCPA and Federal 
Circuit judge of long tenure, remarked in a 1960 article that 
“one of the greatest inventions of our time, the diaper service” 
could not be patented.413 Patent law treatises also support the 
 
Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983), discussed infra at notes 498-511 and accompanying text. 
 409. Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1821. 
 410. See, e.g., In re Fox, 471 F.2d 1405, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“We affirm on 
grounds of obviousness and will not discuss the non-statutory subject matter issue.”); 
In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869, 872 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“Our affirmance . . . [on grounds of 
lacking novelty] makes it unnecessary to consider the issue of whether a method of do-
ing business is inherently unpatentable.”); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1934) 
(“[E]ven conceding, without holding, that some methods of doing business might pre-
sent patentable novelty, we think such novelty is lacking here . . . .”); see also In re 
Wiechers, 347 F.2d 608, 611 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (finding that the Patent Office rejection 
relied on novelty and, therefore, that subject matter issue was not before the court). In 
In re Patton, the court pronounced business systems unpatentable, but only as a prel-
ude to discussing whether the applicant’s structures were novel. See In re Patton, 127 
F.2d 324, 327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942). 
 411. See, e.g., In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“Some inven-
tions, however meritorious, do not constitute patentable subject matter, e.g., . . . meth-
ods of doing business . . . .”); Patton, 127 F.2d at 327 (“[A] system of transacting busi-
ness, apart from the means for carrying out such a system, is not within the purview of 
[patentable subject matter] . . . .”). 
 412. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also In re Alappat, 33 
F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
We further note that Maucorps[, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979),] dealt with a busi-
ness methodology for deciding how salesmen should best handle respective cus-
tomers and Meyer[, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982),] involved a ‘system’ for aiding a 
neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged ‘inventions’ in 
those cases falls within any § 101 category. 
Id. 
 413. Rich, supra note 22, at 393-94. 
  Of course, not every kind of an invention can be patented. Invaluable though 
it may be to individuals, the public, and national defense, the invention of a more 
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business methods exception.414 In section 706.03(a) of the Man-
ual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), the Patent Office 
formalized the rejection of claims to business methods.415 
But the exception has long had its critics. In 1934, patent 
attorney George E. Tew acknowledged the exception as “proba-
bly settled by long practice and many precedents” but de-
nounced “the absence in decided cases of any logical or statu-
tory reason . . . why [methods of doing business] are 
unpatentable.”416 More recently, commentators have criticized 
the exception as logically unsound, inconsistently applied, and 
unsupported by the cited precedent.417 These critics found an 
ally in Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit who, in her dis-
senting opinion in In re Schrader,418 called for the abolition of 
the business methods exception in its entirety. Calling the ex-
ception “fuzzy” and “an unwarranted encumbrance to the defi-
nition of statutory subject matter in section 101,” she proposed 
 
effective organization of the materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course 
in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention because it is out-
side of the enumerated categories . . . [in § 101]. Also outside that group is one of 
the greatest inventions of our time, the diaper service.” 
Id. 
 414. See, e.g., CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 45, § 1.03[5] (“The decisions hold 
that business ‘plans’ and ‘systems’ are not patentable . . . .”); ERNEST BAINBRIDGE 
LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 2.17 (3d ed. 1984). 
  As instances of the non-patentability of ideas, mention may be made of the 
various systems of doing business, such as modes of bookkeeping and hotel check-
ing systems. It has been held that a ‘system’ or method of transacting business is 
not an ‘art,’ nor does it come within any other designation of patentable subject 
matter . . . . 
Id. 
 415. “Though seemingly within the category of process or method, a method of do-
ing business can be rejected as not within the statutory classes.” MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (1994). 
 416. Tew, supra note 17, at 607. While conceding, if not approving, the existence of 
the rule, Tew suggests a 
distinction . . . between a method of doing business and a method used in doing 
business, because many patentable processes, those found in telegraphy and te-
lephony for example, are used in doing business, and in a larger sense substantial 
portions of the whole field of patentable processes are used in doing business of 
some sort. 
Id. at 608. 
 417. See del Gallo, supra note 17, at 435 (“[T]he ‘business method exception’ . . . 
has always been a chimera. . . . The so-called ‘business method’ cases, without excep-
tion, have been decided on grounds other than subject matter eligibility such as nov-
elty, definiteness or obviousness.”); E. Robert Yoches & Howard G. Pollack, Is the 
“Method of Doing Business” Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 73, 83-84 (1993). 
 418. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The case is discussed in detail infra notes 512-
518 and accompanying text. 
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that it be “discarded as error-prone, redundant, and obso-
lete.”419 She dismissed the cases cited in support of the excep-
tion, finding that they had been decided, or could have been de-
cided, on other statutory grounds such as novelty or 
obviousness.420 At best, those cases “simply reaffirm that the 
patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures, not 
mere ideas.”421 Nothing would be served, she felt, by perpetuat-
ing a rule as “poorly defined, redundant and unnecessary” as 
the business methods exception to patentable subject matter.422 
The Patent Office eventually concurred. In its 1996 Guide-
lines,423 the Patent Office reversed its former position, stating: 
“Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating 
claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should 
not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead, such 
claims should be treated like any other process claims . . . .”424 
The Patent Office deleted its former negative remarks in sec-
tion 706.03(a) of the MPEP.425 In the State Street case,426 dis-
cussed extensively infra at Part IV.B, the Federal Circuit fi-
nally addressed the business methods exception head on. Like 
the commentators, the court found the precedent weak and the 
rationale unconvincing. Business methods, the court held, 
should be judged by the same standards of patentability as any 
other methods.427 Taking its cue from Judge Newman, the court 
seized the “opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to 
rest.”428 
Critics of the business methods exception are right to ex-
pose the weakness of the precedent usually relied upon to sup-
port it. As already discussed, most if not all of the “precedent” 
can be dismissed as dicta. Yet, as with most ideas in patent law 
that have since been declared “obsolete,” there was a kernel of 
 
 419. Id. at 298. 
 420. See id.  
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. See supra notes 369-375 and accompanying text. 
 424. Guidelines, supra note 367, § 2106. 
 425. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 415, § 706.03(a). 
 426. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 427. See id. at 1377. “Whether the claims are directed to subject matter within § 
101 should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter does ‘business’ instead of 
something else.” Id. 
 428. Id. at 1375. 
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truth in the exception, however ill-expressed. Judge Newman 
identified that kernel as the difference between “tangible 
things and procedures” and “mere ideas.”429 Reference to what 
is “tangible” recalls the Cochrane v. Deener definition of “proc-
ess,”430 which seems genuinely outmoded in an age of informa-
tion.431 A better expression of the principle rests on the distinc-
tion between those arts that are technological “useful arts” and 
those that are not. A patent on a non-technological432 method of 
conducting business should be rejected, not because it is “in-
tangible” (some technological arts, such as cryptography, are 
quite “intangible”) or an “abstract idea” (some business plans 
are so detailed and practical that they are hardly “abstract”), 
but because it is not within the “useful arts.” On the other 
hand, an apparatus or method used in a business should be 
patentable if it is the product of a technological “useful art.” An 
improved telephone for executives should be patentable, as 
should a new method of carbonating a profitable beverage. This 
distinction follows the method/means dichotomy expressed, for 
example, in Murray,433 while affording it a firmer logical and 
constitutional basis. Rather than abandon the business meth-
ods exception entirely, it would be better to recast it in terms of 
the “useful arts.” 
It is curious that the author of the opinion “laying to rest” 
the business methods exception was Judge Rich, who years be-
fore commented on the unpatentability of the diaper service.434 
He might have explained what caused him to change his mind, 
or, if he had not changed his mind, what distinguishes the dia-
per service from any other business plan. In State Street, the 
Federal Circuit seized its chance to slay the business methods 
exception, but it lost a chance to address the more fundamental 
“useful arts” issue. Other opponents of the business methods 
exception, in an academic or judicial context, also overlook the 
“useful arts” question. But it is a critical issue. Those who ad-
vocate the abandonment of the business methods exception say 
that it is unprecedented, unsupported by congressional action, 
 
 429. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (1994). 
 430. See supra notes 243-246, 280-281 and accompanying text. 
 431. See infra Part IV.C. 
 432. See supra Part I.C-D. 
 433. See In re Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819, 1821 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. & Int. 1988); 
supra notes 404-409 and accompanying text. 
 434. See Rich, supra note 22, at 393-94; supra note 413 and accompanying text. 
DUR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:27 AM 
1496 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
and contrary to the “anything under the sun that is made by 
man”435 spirit of § 101. Those criticisms, however, have no force 
if the principle behind the business methods exception is of 
constitutional dimensions.436 Even if the exception is erased as 
far as § 101 is concerned, the language of Article I Section 8 
still must be reckoned with. 
The State Street court observed, in a footnote, that “[a]ny 
historical distinctions between a method of ‘doing’ business and 
the means of carrying it out blur in the complexity of modern 
business systems.”437 This is a valid point, particularly if “mod-
ern business systems” refers to computers. Computer software 
is both a plan for doing something and a tool for doing it,438 a 
situation that complicates, not only a method/means distinc-
tion, but also a technological/non-technological distinction, at 
least where the plan itself has no claim to technological status. 
This brings us to the heart of the matter: In an age where com-
puters are becoming a dominant tool even in the non-
technological arts, what kinds of computer-implemented inven-
tions should or should not be patentable under the rubric of 
“useful arts”? 
IV. COMPUTERS AND THE NONTECHNOLOGICAL ARTS 
Patent attorneys often keep a collection of unusual patents 
to amuse themselves and colleagues. Some of these are simply 
strange ideas, like the patent on the cow-shaped pitcher that 
“moos” when the cream is poured.439 But some of the most star-
tling patents in such collections are those that challenge one’s 
conception of the “useful arts.” A notorious example discloses a 
method of lifting a box.440 Another claims a “method of put-
 
 435. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 436. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
 437. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1376 n.13 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The remark is an uncredited quotation of Judge Newman’s Schrader 
dissent. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (1994). 
 438. See supra Part I.E. 
 439. U.S. Patent No. 5,213,234. Many patents in a similar vein can be found in 
RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS, A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL AND INTERESTING 
INVENTIONS FROM THE FILES OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (1994). More are reproduced 
on-line. See, e.g., Michael J. Collins, Wacky Patent of the Month (visited Sept. 28, 1999) 
<http://www.colitz.com/site/wacky.htm>; IBM, Gallery of Obscure Patents (visited Sept. 
28, 1999) <http://www.patents.ibm.com/gallery>. 
 440. U.S. Patent No. 5,498,162. 
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ting.”441 Such patents are “collectable” because they are exceed-
ingly rare and, perhaps, reflect inevitable slips in the Patent 
Office machinery that processes a tremendous volume of patent 
applications. A far more serious challenge to the concept of 
“useful arts” has arisen as applicants claim non-technological 
ideas in terms of the computers used to implement them. At 
first glance, some of these patents seem equally out of place—
for example, U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484, which concerns a plan 
for funding an education through investors who ultimately re-
ceive a share of the student’s future income. Described at this 
level, the invention hardly seems what the Framers had in 
mind. In fact, however, the patent claims a “method and appa-
ratus” for implementing the plan, and the specification bristles 
with impressive technical descriptions of computer hardware 
and software.442 Perhaps such “means” should be patentable 
even if the abstract idea itself would not be. 
Such patents have not been the subject of as rich a juris-
prudence as those raising the specter of the “mathematical al-
gorithm.” For the most part, the relevant cases deal with com-
puter-implemented business schemes, culminating in the 
recent State Street decision of the Federal Circuit. 
A. The Road to State Street 
Computer technology and printed paper technology, remi-
niscent of Hotel Security443 or Guthrie v. Curlett,444 came to-
gether in In re Johnston.445 The invention concerned automated 
record-keeping systems of the kind used by banks. Such sys-
tems employ digital computers, optical character readers, and 
paper checks printed with magnetic, machine-readable codes.446 
The applicant proposed adapting such a system to assist indi-
viduals with their own financial record keeping, tracking ex-
penditures according to category much as personal accounting 
software like Quicken does today. The customer would indicate 
on each check a code number corresponding to an expense 
category—the number either in machine readable form or 
 
 441. U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089. 
 442. U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484. 
 443. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
 444. 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926); see supra notes 397-403 and accompanying text. 
 445. 502 F.2d 765, 771 n.12 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev’d sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 
U.S. 219 (1976) (relying on obviousness rather than unpatentable subject matter). 
 446. See 502 F.2d at 765-66. 
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handwritten and converted by the bank. After processing, the 
expense data would be stored in the bank’s computer and used 
to prepare detailed reports for the customer.447 The application 
included diagrams showing the interrelationship of various 
hardware components, a detailed software flow chart,448 and a 
complete printout of a program to be used with an IBM gen-
eral-purpose computer.449 
The claims described the invention as a “record-keeping 
machine system for financial accounts,” including, among other 
things, input and output devices, a data processor, a control 
system, and a memory.450 The bookkeeping aspects of the in-
vention were incorporated in the claims by reference to the “re-
cords” stored in the memory, the record-handling capabilities of 
the control system, and the organizing and listing capabilities 
of the “output record producing means.”451 The Patent Office 
Board held that the claims were “not directed to improved re-
cord keeping machinery, but rather to a broad system of keep-
ing financial records.”452 The “sweeping” references to automa-
tion were “only . . . a dress for claims that spell out, in effect, 
the relationship of a bank and its customers, not any particular 
configuration of business machinery.”453 The Board rejected the 
claims for obviousness, indefiniteness, and failure to claim pat-
entable subject matter.454 With respect to the last ground, the 
Board declared that computer-related inventions are pat-
entable subject matter only if within the “technological arts.”455 
The Board observed that “the term ‘technological arts’ should 
[not] embrace processes of using machines so as to dominate 
practices in the ‘liberal arts,’ such as social or political sciences, 
humanities, music and art.”456 Claims to such processes “would 
allow the intrusion of the patent system into the social sci-
ences . . . [and] would exceed the constitutional grant of author-
ity to issue patents.”457 Such was the case here, according to the 
 
 447. See id. at 766. 
 448. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. 
 449. Johnston, 502 F.2d at 767. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. at 768. 
 453. Id. 
 454. See id. at 768-69. 
 455. Id. at 769. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
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Board, because the effect of the “machine” claim would be to 
prevent banks from using their own computers to expand into 
the business of customer bookkeeping.458 
In an opinion prefiguring Alappat,459 the CCPA focused on 
the literal language of the claims, which described the inven-
tion as a “machine system.”460 Such a “machine system,” the 
court held, is clearly within the “technological arts.”461 “[W]e 
are not aware of, nor can we locate, any dictionary which would 
define a machine system as within the purview of the ‘liberal 
arts.’ ”462 Contrary to the understanding of the Board, the 
claims covered only an apparatus, not a system of banking or a 
method of bookkeeping, and they would not prevent banks from 
expanding their services except through the use of such an ap-
paratus.463 
Judge Rich dissented, unsatisfied with the majority’s reli-
ance on apparatus claims to distinguish Benson. Whether the 
claims describe an apparatus or a process, 
[t]he point is that the machine or apparatus and process 
claims are really directed to the same invention, of which ap-
pellant’s main brief says: 
. . . this invention is being sold as a computer program to 
banks and to other data processing companies so that 
they can perform these data processing services for de-
positors.” 
What could more clearly reveal the reality that the invention 
is a program—software—and that that is what appellant 
wants to protect by the appealed ‘machine system’ claims? 
 
 458. See id. 
 459. See supra notes 337-357 and accompanying text. 
 460. Johnston, 502 F.2d at 770. Because the claims described an apparatus, the 
court held that the “mathematical algorithm” rule of Benson did not apply. Id. at 771. 
See supra notes 264-282 and accompanying text. 
 461. 502 F.2d at 771. 
 462. Id. Citing Waldbaum, the court reaffirmed that “[t]he phrase ‘technological 
arts,’ . . . is synonymous with the phrase ‘useful arts’ as it appears in Article I, Section 
8 of the Constitution.” Id. at 771 n.12. The court did not agree with the Board that 
banking is a “social science.” Id. at 771 n.13. This does not, however, settle the question 
of whether banking is a “technological art.” 
 463. See id. at 771. Of course, if the apparatus were claimed solely in terms of the 
service it enabled or were limited only to computers performing that service, another 
bank would have no other “apparatus” to which it could possibly turn. 
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Appellant did not invent a machine—i.e., “hardware.”464 
Judge Rich discussed the argument that a new computer 
program makes a “new machine”—the same argument that, 
years later, would figure prominently in his Alappat majority 
opinion. He “[did] not deny[] the validity of this principle,”465 
but “knowing the invention to be a new program,” he could not 
distinguish the case from Benson based only on the superficial 
form of the claim.466 “Benson et al. had a program invention too 
and they could have cast their claims in machine system form 
just as appellant did. Every competent patent draftsman knows 
how to do that.”467 
In In re Deutsch,468 the applicant claimed a method of oper-
ating manufacturing plants by monitoring certain data, such as 
materials and energy cost, and using that data to optimize the 
production and coordination of multiple plants. The method 
could be implemented through a general-purpose computer or, 
possibly, through other means such as a hard-wired, special-
purpose computer.469 Relying on Benson and its prohibition of 
mathematical “algorithms,” the Patent Office Board rejected 
the claims as consisting of unpatentable subject matter.470 The 
CCPA reversed, holding that the applicant’s claimed invention 
was not an algorithm, but a system of operating manufacturing 
plants; “[t]he ‘processing’ programs, if such they are, are inci-
dental to the invention.”471 Whether the claim described a non-
statutory “method of doing business” was discussed at oral ar-
gument.472 The court held that it did not because it did not 
“merely facilitate business dealings.”473 In addition to that puz-
zling remark, the court stated: “That translation of business 
data into mathematical language intelligible to computers is 
employed in carrying . . . out [the claimed invention] does not 
make a method of automatically controlling a system of manu-
 
 464. Id. at 773 (Rich, J., dissenting) (omission in original). 
 465. Id. He did, however, remark cryptically that the “new machine” principle 
“partakes of the nature of a legal fiction when it comes to drafting claims.” Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 469. See id. at 692-93. 
 470. See id. at 691-92. 
 471. Id. at 692. 
 472. Id. at 692 n.5. 
 473. Id. 
DUR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:27 AM 
1419] “USEFUL ARTS” IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1501 
facturing plants a method of ‘doing business.’ ”474 Although the 
system used business data to make, in effect, business deci-
sions, the court treated the claimed invention as a tool used in 
business, rather than as a system of doing business. The court 
held that it was “within the technologically useful art of con-
trolling and optimizing a system of manufacturing plants to a 
particular end use, . . . [and] a statutory ‘process’ within the 
purview of 35 USC 101.”475 
The CCPA reached a contrary conclusion in In re Mau-
corps.476 The patent application in Maucorps, entitled Comput-
ing System for Optimizing Sales Organizations and Activities, 
described a computer-implemented scheme for calculating the 
number of sales representatives that an organization should 
have, how they should be managed, and how frequently they 
should visit their customers.477 The calculations involved com-
plex mathematical formulas, but the claims described the in-
vention as a “computing system” apparatus comprised of 
“means for calculating” the relevant values.478 The application 
included a high-level hardware schematic as well as a com-
puter program printout.479 The program could be implemented 
through a general-purpose computer, or it could be perma-
nently hardwired into a special-purpose machine.480 The exam-
iner and the Patent Office Board rejected the claims as unpat-
entable subject matter, and the CCPA affirmed.481 The court 
did not discuss whether the invention claimed a method of do-
ing business; instead, like the Patent Office Board, the CCPA 
rejected the claims under Benson as having been drawn to an 
unpatentable mathematical “algorithm.” Although the claims 
literally described an apparatus, this time the court did not 
hold the form of the claim dispositive. “Labels,” it said, “are not 
determinative in § 101 inquiries.”482 The form of the claim as a 
process or apparatus is “often an exercise in drafting.”483 The 
 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. at 693 (emphasis added). 
 476. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 477. Id. at 482. 
 478. Id. at 482-83. 
 479. See id. at 483-84. 
 480. See id. at 483. 
 481. See id. at 484-86. 
 482. Id. at 485. 
 483. Id. (quoting In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
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CCPA’s successor would emphasize the role of “means-plus-
function” claiming in defining a patentable apparatus,484 but 
here the court observed that the format “cannot rescue appel-
lant’s claims from the requirements of § 101, because § 112[(6)] 
does not authorize the claiming of apparatus entirely in terms 
of ‘means for’ performing a non-statutory method.”485 By “non-
statutory method” the court probably referred to the method of 
solving a mathematical algorithm, but the same observation 
could apply to a method of doing business, should the latter be 
regarded as a “non-technological art.” 
Of all of the CCPA’s attempts to distinguish between a 
technological means and a non-technological end, In re Toma486 
is one of the most interesting. The applicant claimed a com-
puter-implemented method of translating from one human lan-
guage to another. The method involved the steps of (1) loading 
the text to be translated (the “source text”) into a computer 
memory; (2) “transforming” the text by attaching to each word 
coded information indicating the dictionary meaning of the 
word in the “target language” as well as syntactical clues to the 
intended meaning; and (3) synthesis of the “transformed” 
source text into a grammatical target language translation.487 
In order to make the most efficient use of memory, translation 
codes for common words were stored in the computer’s “core 
memory.”488 Rather than duplicate those codes each time the 
word appeared, the “transformed” text simply referred to the 
location in the core memory where the relevant codes could be 
found.489 
The Patent Office rejected the claims as non-statutory sub-
ject matter, basing its decision, in part, on Benson’s treatment 
of algorithms.490 The examiner also found that claims to a 
method of translation were not within the “technological 
arts.”491 In the examiner’s view, translation was a “liberal art” 
that could not be transformed into a “technological art” merely 
because it was accomplished through a machine; “as far as 
 
 484. See supra notes 337-357 and accompanying text. 
 485. Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 486. 
 486. 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 487. Id. at 874. 
 488. Id. 
 489. See id. (referring to “memory offset address linkages”). 
 490. See id. at 875-76. 
 491. Id. at 877. 
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computer-related inventions are concerned, only those inven-
tions which ‘enhance the internal operation of the digital com-
puter’ are in the ‘technological’ or ‘useful’ arts.”492 The Board’s 
treatment of this issue was, according to the CCPA, too “per-
functory” to indicate approval or disapproval of the examiner’s 
views.493 
The CCPA disagreed with the examiner, holding that the 
claimed method “for enabling a computer to translate . . . lan-
guages” was a “method of operating a machine” and was within 
the “technological arts.”494 The court stressed that what the 
machine did was fundamentally different than what a human 
translator would do. While it was “convenient to describe the 
steps of the program as if they were being performed by a hu-
man translator, in fact, nothing of the kind is happening.”495 In 
reality, “the computer [would be] carrying out a series of un-
thinking, abstract mathematical operations” without regard for 
the meaning of the data.496 The result might be translation, but 
the computer would still be only a calculating machine, and it 
should be treated as such for purposes of the subject matter in-
quiry. 
The “technological” or “useful” arts inquiry must focus on 
whether the claimed subject matter (a method of operating a 
machine to translate) is statutory, not on whether the product 
of the claimed subject matter (a translated text) is statutory, 
not on whether the prior art which the claimed subject matter 
purports to replace (translation by human mind) is statutory, 
and not on whether the claimed subject matter is presently 
perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g., 
whether it “enhances” the operation of a machine.497 
The court appears to say that anything done by a computer 
is inherently “technological.” Even if the computer is writing 
haiku or offering moral advice, it is always a machine. In the 
 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. at 874. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. at 877-78. The “enhancement” concept recalls earlier CCPA cases holding 
that “a process having no practical value other than enhancing the internal operation 
of [digital computers]” are within the “technological arts.” In re McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 
1398 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (citation omitted) (modification in original). Of course, this does 
not mean that only processes “enhancing the internal operation” of a computer are 
statutory. 
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context of the facts presented in Toma, it is difficult to argue. 
The invention was not so much a method of translation as it 
was a method of automating translation, including steps de-
signed for the most effective use of computer memory. Whether 
the invention actually improved on other methods and, in that 
respect, “enhanced” the operation of a machine, the invention 
clearly lay within the sphere of computer science or software 
engineering, not translation. Suppose, however, that an appli-
cant discovered the key to deciphering a previously untranslat-
able ancient language. If the applicant claimed a method of op-
erating a “machine” (i.e., a general-purpose computer), but the 
method were described only in terms of his translating in-
sights, would the claimed invention still be a “technological” 
invention? The rhetoric of Toma suggests that it might, but the 
facts did not put that question squarely before the court. 
A Delaware district court relied substantially on the Toma 
rhetoric in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,498 in which the patented 
invention concerned a “securities brokerage-cash management 
system.”499 The system combined a brokerage securities ac-
count, a money market fund, and a credit card charge account. 
The components were not new, but combining them into a sin-
gle account yielded “synergistic” advantages.500 For example, 
profits generated by the securities account could be reinvested 
automatically in the money market account rather than re-
maining in the securities account as “idle cash.”501 Similarly, 
the credit available on the charge card could be adjusted ac-
cording to the customer’s resources in the other components of 
the account.502 All of the transactions in the combined account 
could be reflected in a single monthly statement.503 
Today, all banking and similar transactions are adminis-
tered by computers, and the claimed system in Paine Webber 
was no exception. The claims referred to a “system for process-
ing and supervising a plurality of composite subscriber ac-
counts,” including various “means” for performing the neces-
 
 498. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983). 
 499. Id. at 1363. 
 500. Id. at 1362. 
 501. Id. 
 502. See id. 
 503. See id. 
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sary functions.504 These included, for example, a “brokerage ac-
count data file means” for storing current information, a “man-
ual entry means” for entering investment orders, a “data re-
ceiving and verifying means,” and a “short term investment 
updating means.”505 The patent specification did not describe 
apparatus corresponding to any of these “means,” but it in-
cluded a flow chart illustrating the steps to be performed by the 
computer.506 
The accused infringer moved for summary judgment under 
§ 101, arguing that the patent claimed a “method of doing 
business.” The patent disclosure, it maintained, “reveal[ed] 
that the invention fits squarely into the business system cate-
gory and has nothing to do with machinery, technology, proc-
ess, manufacture, or composition of matter.”507 The court, how-
ever, declined to focus on what it called the “product” of the 
patent claims—the financial management account. Instead, as 
required by Toma, it focused on “the method by which the . . . 
[system] operates.”508 The patent claims, it held, were similar to 
those discussed in Toma and Johnston.509 
The product of the claims of the ‘442 patent effectuates a 
highly useful business method and would be unpatentable if 
done by hand. The CCPA, however, has made clear that if no 
Benson algorithm exists, the product of a computer program 
is irrelevant, and the focus of analysis should be on the opera-
tion of the program on the computer. The Court finds that the 
‘442 patent claims statutory subject matter because the 
claims allegedly teach a method of operation on a computer to 
effectuate a business activity. Accordingly, the ‘442 patent 
passes the threshold requirement of Section 101.510 
The court could have relied upon the program flow charts 
and any programming insights (as opposed to accounting in-
sights) that they revealed. Such insights could have been con-
sidered a part of the claimed invention by virtue of § 112(6),511 
bringing the invention, as a computer programming technique, 
 
 504. Id. at 1364. 
 505. Id. 
 506. See id. at 1363-64. 
 507. Id. at 1365. 
 508. Id. at 1369. 
 509. See id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. See supra note 340. 
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within the realm of the technological “useful arts.” However, 
the court did not find it necessary to do this. It seemingly in-
terpreted the lesson of Toma in the broadest sense: any inven-
tion claimed as a computer system is inherently “technologi-
cal,” even if the patent discloses nothing about the computer or 
its programming. 
In In re Schrader,512 the Federal Circuit could have con-
veyed its own interpretation of Toma, but it chose another 
path. Schrader claimed an improved system for conducting 
auctions, wherein participants could bid on any item or combi-
nation of items offered for sale. In a real estate auction, one 
buyer might bid on Black Acre, another on White Acre, and a 
third on the combination of Black Acre and White Acre. Using 
the claimed method, the seller could determine which bid or 
combination of bids to accept in order to maximize profits.513 
The claims to this “method of competitively bidding” did not 
make explicit reference to a computer, but it is likely that a 
computer would be used for the necessary data storage, calcu-
lations, and display.514 The court rejected the claims as drawn 
to an unpatentable “mathematical algorithm,” even though the 
references to mathematics were, at best, generalized and indi-
rect.515 The court did not discuss whether the invention was 
“technological” under Toma or whether more explicit references 
to a computer could have made it so. However, in her dissent 
(in which she also advocated the abolition of the “methods of 
doing business” exception relied upon by the Patent Office 
Board516), Judge Newman referred to processes handling data, 
including data representing bids, as “processes . . . employed in 
technologically useful arts.”517 Schrader’s method, she wrote, 
“requires the performance of specified steps and procedures, in-
cluding calculations, to achieve a technologically useful re-
sult.”518 Her intention was to argue that the claims were not 
unpatentably abstract, but it is unclear what she meant by 
“technologically useful.” Is auctioneering a “technological art”? 
Is applied mathematics? Or is “technology” involved because of 
 
 512. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 513. See id. at 291-92. 
 514. Id. at 291. 
 515. See id. at 293-96. 
 516. See supra notes 418-422 and accompanying text. 
 517. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 297 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 518. Id. 
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the assumed use of a computer? These issues would confront 
the Federal Circuit again in the State Street case. 
B. State Street 
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group,519 the patent describes a system for managing a portfo-
lio of mutual funds, using a “Hub and Spoke” configuration. 
The “Spokes” consist of individual mutual funds managed by 
one centralized entity, or “Hub,” organized as a partnership. 
Each “Spoke” owns an interest in the “Hub.”520 This pooling of 
assets allows economies of scale, lowered administrative costs, 
and beneficial tax consequences.521 The system is, however, 
complex to administer.522 All gains and losses of the “Hub” port-
folio are allocated to each “Spoke” on a pro rata basis. More-
over, each “Spoke” mutual fund is also an investment vehicle, 
so that, as their values fluctuate, partnership interests in the 
“Hub” portfolio must be constantly adjusted.523 
As one would expect, the accounting is performed by a com-
puter programmed to store the financial data and perform the 
required calculations.524 This computer, or “data processing 
system,” is the invention described by the claims. The claims, 
however, define that system solely as a collection of “means” for 
performing the functions required. Claim 1 is representative: 
 A data processing system for managing a financial services 
configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, each 
partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising: 
(a) computer processor means for processing data; 
(b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium; 
 
 519. 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass. 1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999). 
 520. See U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 [hereinafter ‘056 Patent] cols. 1:43-2:30, 4:36-
61. 
 521. See id. col. 2:3-66. 
 522. See id.,  col. 2:67-68. 
 523. See id. cols. 2:67-3:30. 
 524. “A new and unique data processing system and method is necessary to enable 
accurate daily allocations to be made among each of the funds in a portfolio.” Id. col. 
3:23-25. “The present invention provides a data processing system and method for 
monitoring and recording the information flow and data, and making all calculations, 
necessary for maintaining a partnership portfolio and partner fund (Hub and Spoke) 
financial services configuration.” Id. col. 4:36-41. 
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(c) first means for initializing the storage medium; 
(d) second means for processing data regarding assets in 
the portfolio and each of the funds from a previous day 
and data regarding increases or decreases in each of 
the funds, [sic] assets and for allocating the percentage 
share that each fund holds in the portfolio; 
(e) third means for processing data regarding daily incre-
mental income, expenses, and net realized gain or loss 
for the portfolio and for allocating such data among 
each fund; 
(f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net 
unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocat-
ing such data among each fund; and 
(g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate 
year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for 
the portfolio and each of the funds.525 
Such “means-plus-function” claim language requires one to 
turn to the patent specification to identify the “structures” that 
perform those functions.526 Yet the descriptions of physical 
structure in this patent consist of no more than cursory refer-
ences to computers, floppy disk storage media, and CRT dis-
plays of the kind that accompany most desktop computers.527 
Most of the patent disclosure relates to a set of flow charts528 
outlining the process of administering a “Hub and Spoke” mu-
tual fund portfolio.529 A key aspect of that process appears to be 
 
 525. Id. col. 13:22-45. 
 526. 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (1994), discussed supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 527. See, e.g., ’056 Patent, supra note 520, col. 6:48-56 (“The portfolio/fund ac-
countant makes use of a personal computer 44 programmed with software 50 . . . . The 
personal computer . . . is capable of producing printed output 46 and storing data on 
data disk 52, which preferably is a floppy disk, although other types of storage media 
may be used.”); col. 7:59-60 (“a main menu is displayed, for example, on the CRT of a 
personal computer”). Figure 4 includes simple cartoon drawings of personal computers, 
and a featureless cylinder representing the “data disk.” 
 528. See id. figs. 5-11. Figure 1 is a block diagram showing the overall organiza-
tion of a “Hub and Spoke” fund portfolio. Figures 2-3 illustrate the administrative cost 
savings that can be realized through the “Hub and Spoke” management structure. Fig-
ure 4 is a high-level organizational chart showing the relationships of the shareholder, 
investment advisor, transfer agent, portfolio/fund accountant, and portfolio administra-
tor, with cartoon representations of a generic computer network. 
 529. As described in the “Summary of the Invention,” 
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a “book capital account” for each fund, which tracks daily 
shareholder purchases and redemptions, the fund’s propor-
tional share of the portfolio’s administrative expenses, and the 
fund’s share of realized and unrealized gain or loss.530 
After licensing negotiations broke down, State Street filed 
suit against patent owner Signature Financial Group, seeking 
declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and nonin-
fringement.531 On State Street’s motion for summary judgment, 
the Massachusetts District Court held the patent invalid under 
§ 101 for failing to claim patentable subject matter. After re-
viewing the Supreme Court trilogy,532 as well as the CCPA and 
Federal Circuit “mathematical algorithm” cases, the court con-
cluded that the patent claimed a non-physical abstract mathe-
matical algorithm of the kind rejected in Schrader533 and Mau-
corps.534 
Like the business-related systems in Schrader and Maucorps, 
the ‘056 Patent claims an invention that essentially performs 
mathematical calculations on data gleaned from pre-solution 
activity and stores and displays the results. As with 
Schrader’s bids, the fact that those numbers represent finan-
cial constructs, such as the Hub and Spoke configuration, 
does not save Signature’s patent. The claims do not recite any 
significant pre- or post-solution activity. Neither does the in-
vention measure physical objects or phenomena as in Ar-
 
The data processing system determines the percentage share (allocation ratio) that 
each fund has in the portfolio, while taking into consideration daily changes both 
in the value of the portfolio’s investment securities (as determined by market 
prices) and in the amount of each fund’s assets (as determined by daily share-
holder purchases and redemptions). The system also allocates to each fund the 
portfolio’s daily income, expenses, and net realized and unrealized gain or loss, 
calculating each fund’s total investments based on the concept of a book capital ac-
count, thus enabling determination of a true asset value of each fund and accurate 
calculation of allocation ratios between the funds. The data processing system also 
tracks all the relevant data, determined on a daily basis for the portfolio and each 
fund, so that aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss can be 
determined for accounting and for tax purposes for the portfolio and for each fund. 
Id. col. 4:44-61. 
 530. See id. col. 3:52-61. 
 531. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group., 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass. 
1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 119 S. Ct. 851 
(1999). 
 532. See supra Part II.B. 
 533. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see supra notes 512-518 and ac-
companying text. 
 534. In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979); see supra notes 476-485 and 
accompanying text. 
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rhythmia535 or Abele536 nor does it physically convert data into 
a different form as in Alappat.537 
The court also found the claims so broad that, in effect, they 
covered the “Hub and Spoke” arrangement itself, rather than 
any particular “data processing system” for implementing such 
an arrangement.538 This, the court held, rendered the claims 
unpatentable as a “method of doing business.”539 
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion written by 
Judge Rich. It held that Signature’s claims describe a “ma-
chine” and illustrated the point by reproducing claim 1 with 
the “structures” of the specification incorporated in brackets: 
 A data processing system for managing a financial services 
configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, each 
partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising: 
(a) computer processor means [a personal computer in-
cluding a CPU] for processing data; 
(b) storage means [a data disk] for storing data on a stor-
age medium; 
(c) first means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to 
prepare the data disk to magnetically store selected 
data] for initializing the storage medium; 
(d) second means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to 
retrieve information from a specific file, calculate in-
cremental increases or decreases based on specific in-
 
 535. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); see supra notes 319-336 and accompanying text. 
 536. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 537. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass. 
1996) (footnotes inserted by author), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In re Alap-
pat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), is discussed supra notes 337-357 and ac-
companying text. 
 538. State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 516. 
  If Signature’s invention were patentable, any financial institution desirous of 
implementing a multi-tiered funding complex modelled on a Hub and Spoke con-
figuration would be required to seek Signature’s permission before embarking on 
such a project. This is so because the ‘056 Patent is claimed sufficiently broadly to 
foreclose virtually any computer-implemented accounting method necessary to 
manage this type of financial structure. 
Id. 
 539. Id. at 516 (“[P]atenting an accounting system necessary to carry on a certain 
type of business is tantamount to a patent on the business itself . . . .”). 
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put, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and 
store the output in a separate file] for processing data 
regarding assets in the portfolio and each of the funds 
from a previous day and data regarding increases or 
decreases in each of the funds, [sic, funds’] assets and 
for allocating the percentage share that each fund 
holds in the portfolio; 
(e) third means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to 
retrieve information from a specific file, calculate in-
cremental increases and decreases based on specific in-
put, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and 
store the output in a separate file] for processing data 
regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net 
realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating 
such data among each fund; 
(f) fourth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to 
retrieve information from a specific file, calculate in-
cremental increases and decreases based on specific in-
put, allocate the results on a percentage basis and 
store the output in a separate file] for processing data 
regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for the port-
folio and for allocating such data among each fund; and 
(g) fifth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to 
retrieve information from specific files, calculate that 
information on an aggregate basis and store the output 
in a separate file] for processing data regarding aggre-
gate year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or 
loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.540 
The court held this data-processing “machine,” consisting of 
the structures recited in the specification or their equivalents, 
to be “proper statutory subject matter under § 101.”541 The 
court did, however, consider the “mathematical algorithm” is-
sue. Such algorithms, the court held, are unpatentable “to the 
extent they are merely abstract ideas”—i.e., if they are not “re-
duced to some type of practical application” producing “a use-
ful, concrete and tangible result.”542 The distinction between a 
 
 540. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1371-72 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original). 
 541. Id. at 1372. 
 542. Id. at 1373 (citation omitted). 
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patentable algorithm and an unpatentable algorithm lies in a 
“useful” application.543 The court found such an application in 
the Signature patent. 
 Today, we hold that the transformation of data, represent-
ing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of 
mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes 
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, 
or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tan-
gible result’—a final share price momentarily fixed for re-
cording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied 
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.544 
As long as the invention has “practical utility,” it is statu-
tory whether categorized as a machine or process, and “even if 
the useful result is expressed in numbers, such as price, profit, 
percentage, cost, or loss.”545 As for the “business methods” doc-
trine, the court “[took] this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived 
exception to rest.”546 
For all of its reliance on the “useful” nature of the claimed 
invention, the court did not discuss whether an accounting 
scheme is a “useful art” in the constitutional sense (i.e., a 
“technological” art) and, if not, whether Signature’s claim to a 
“system” for implementing an accounting scheme is within the 
“useful arts,” given the patent’s disclosure of very little other 
than the scheme itself. Consequently, while State Street ap-
pears to be a landmark case in the development of the law of 
statutory subject matter, particularly as it affects accounting 
methods and methods of doing business, it leaves serious ques-
tions unanswered. 
C. Scylla and Charybdis 
The easiest approaches to the State Street situation are the 
most extreme. One could simply conclude that computer pro-
gramming is not a “useful art,” as the Framers imagined those 
arts, because programming is too abstract and intangible. Pro-
 
 543. Id. See also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] mathematical algorithm may be an integral part of patentable 
subject matter such as a machine or process if the claimed invention as a whole is ap-
plied in a ‘useful’ manner”). However, as previously discussed, it is no simple matter to 
define what is “useful.” See supra text accompanying notes 135-137. 
 544. State Street,  172 F.3d at 1373. 
 545. Id. at 1375. 
 546. Id. at 1375. 
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gramming consists of logic and mathematics, not the material 
goods—the “horse collars” and “buggy whips”547—that the 
Framers intended our patent laws to cover. Hence, any com-
puter-related invention dependent on new software is beyond 
Congress’s power to include within the scope of patentable sub-
ject matter. The only allowable computer patents are those de-
scribing new hardware, such as a new tracking mechanism for 
a mouse, a new transistor design, a new memory card, and so 
forth. This approach has the advantage of simplicity, but, as 
has already been suggested,548 it would not reflect well the 
Framers’ policy in the establishment of the patent authority. 
Programming is an industry comparable to those that the 
Framers sought to promote. It produces useful goods that are 
improved through the process of invention, to the ultimate 
benefit of consumers and the national economy. Sometimes the 
intangible goods produced by the software industry are inter-
changeable with material goods produced by traditional hard-
ware industries. It is unlikely that the Framers would have 
wanted to exclude such an important industry from the patent 
system, and there is no compelling policy reason to do so. 
Nor should software be required to transform a tangible ob-
ject into “a different state or thing” before it is patentable, as 
suggested by the narrow Cochrane v. Deener definition of “pro-
cess.”549 Certainly software inventions that are a part of a 
larger transformative process—such as the rubber curing proc-
ess in Diehr—should be patentable subject matter. But there 
are other software inventions that have little or no physical ef-
fects, yet are equally utilitarian. Techniques of computer cryp-
tography, for example, are unquestionably technological, 
though they operate solely in the realm of mathematics and 
data.550 Users of the Internet are familiar with the benefits of 
search engine algorithms and algorithms for detecting com-
 
 547. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
 548. See supra Part I.A. 
 549. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). 
 550. But cf. Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). Berardini held 
that a “code message” for directing money transfers by telegraph was really a system 
for encoding message and that it was not a patentable “art,” in the sense explained in 
Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908), supra notes 376-
384 and accompanying text. The patented invention was not a means, but only abstract 
“advice[— i]t is for an art only in the sense that one speaks of the art of painting, or the 
art of curving the thrown baseball. Such arts, however ingenious, difficult, or amusing, 
are not patentable within any statute of the United States.” Berardini, 190 F. at 333. 
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puter viruses. Those algorithms are tools for the analysis, ma-
nipulation, and transformation of data; in a sense, they are 
“buggy whips” for the information age. Such things should be 
considered to be at the core of patentable subject matter, with-
out straining to rely on the tangible aspects of the computer 
hardware. The silicon and wire of the computer circuits, the 
electrons that course through those circuits, the mouse and 
keyboard that provide input, and the monitor or paper that 
displays the results are all physical entities. A new computer 
program even produces new physical effects measurable on a 
microscopic scale, such as a new pattern of electrical charge 
stored on a floppy disk. But to consider these things the key to 
patentable subject matter is to confuse the medium with the 
message. When an inventor conceives of a new program algo-
rithm, the essence of the invention rests in the logic, not in the 
incidental physical details of the computing system on which it 
is implemented. As scientists conceive of computers based on 
quantum mechanics, beams of light, or DNA, the irrelevance of 
the hardware becomes increasingly apparent. 
At another extreme, one could argue that anything “useful” 
is the product of a “useful art,” hence an accounting scheme, an 
advertising gimmick, a pedagogical method, a system of medi-
tation, or even a method of presenting a legal argument may be 
patented as a “process,”551 leaving only purely abstract ideas, 
like a mathematical formula applied to no “useful” purpose, as 
unpatentable subject matter. As already discussed,552 the 
Framers most likely did not have in mind such a broad inter-
pretation of the “useful arts,” nor is it clear on policy grounds 
that such a diverse range of human ingenuity should be 
brought within the realm of patent law. It seems increasingly 
the modern viewpoint that anything of value should be re-
garded as property, but this was not necessarily the Framers’ 
view, particularly when “property” means “monopoly.”553 The 
courts have held that “useful arts” includes only what is “tech-
nological,”554 and even the advent of the information age pro-
vides no reason to depart from that conclusion. One may have 
to expand one’s definition of “technology” to embrace the more 
 
 551. This is assuming, of course, that the process meets the other requirements of 
patentability, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 
 552. See supra Part I.A. 
 553. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
 554. See supra Part I.B. 
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intangible tools of computer programming, but, unless one 
abandons the probable intentions of the Framers, “useful arts” 
and “technology” cannot be limitless. 
An intermediate approach might grant that there are non-
technological arts beyond the scope of patentable subject mat-
ter, but the tools (at least the physical tools) used to implement 
those arts are potentially patentable. In many cases, this is 
certainly correct. For example, one should be able to patent a 
new musical instrument, artist’s paint brush, cash register, or 
teacher’s chalkboard, regardless of the ultimately non-
technological application to which those tools are put. The 
manufacture of musical instruments, paint brushes, and so 
forth, are industries of the most traditional, industrial kind; 
there is no doubt that the Framers would have considered 
those industries “useful arts.” Patenting a new physical imple-
ment to be used in a non-technological art does not raise the 
same issues as patenting a new process in those same arts. The 
invention is technological in character because, in a sense, it 
deals with the manufacture of a new implement, and manufac-
turing is at the center of the useful arts, historically and con-
ceptually. The “art” of a patent on a new trumpet is not the art 
of music, but the art of trumpet manufacturing. Similarly, one 
could argue that a computer system, or a computer program, 
should be patentable subject matter because systems and pro-
grams are designed by the practitioners of the technological art 
of computer science, even if these technological tools ultimately 
are employed for non-technological ends. 
This argument is an appealing one, at least as long as the 
inventor claims the technological tool in terms of what it is—
that is, in terms of the specific attributes that are the product 
of its manufacture or design. When a claim describes a tool in 
terms of how it is to be used, as is commonly done under § 
112(6) of the Patent Act,555 the problems with this tool/use dis-
tinction become apparent. Consider the following claim, which 
might have been composed by the first salesman to conceive of 
the idea of telephone marketing:556 
 A communications system for soliciting business from po-
tential customers through person-to-person conversation, 
 
 555. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 556. I first created this example for use in the State Street amicus brief discussed 
supra in the first footnote. 
DUR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:27 AM 
1516 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
comprising: 
 A remote signaling means for alerting a potential customer 
of one’s desire to converse; 
 A remote communications sending means for transmitting 
a voice communication to said customer, for the purpose of so-
liciting said customer’s business; 
 A remote communications receiving means for receiving 
from said customer a response to said solicitation; and 
 A means for terminating communications to and from said 
customer. 
The patent specification, disclosing the “structures” sup-
porting each “means” element, might describe an ordinary tele-
phone system. 
If we assume that the applicant did not invent the tele-
phone, and if we further assume that telephone solicitation is 
not a technological “useful art” (even if it is a profitable busi-
ness technique), should the “communications system” claimed 
by the applicant be considered within the “useful arts” because 
it is a “machine”? The applicant might support that conclusion 
by annotating his claim in the manner found in the State Street 
opinion: 
 A communications system for soliciting business from po-
tential customers through person-to-person conversation, 
comprising: 
 A remote signaling means [a telephone with a ringing 
mechanism] for alerting a potential customer of one’s desire to 
converse; 
 A remote communications sending means [a telephone 
transmitter and telephone wire] for transmitting a voice 
communication to said customer, for the purpose of soliciting 
said customer’s business; 
 A remote communications receiving means [a telephone re-
ceiver and telephone wire] for receiving from said customer a 
response to said solicitation; and 
 A means [a telephone cradle switch] for terminating com-
munications to and from said customer. 
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Something seems amiss, however. What the applicant in-
vented is not an apparatus, but a new method of using it. The 
apparatus and the method are in different arts—the former in 
the technological art of electronics, and the latter in the non-
technological art of business relations. Nevertheless, two prin-
ciples of patent law suggest that the claim does describe a pat-
entable machine. The first holds that the applicant’s claim, not 
the detailed disclosure of the specification, defines the “inven-
tion.”557 Here, the claim literally describes a machine. Second, 
courts often stress that patentable subject matter under § 101 
should not be confused with novelty under § 102 (or the related 
question of non-obviousness under § 103).558 Subject matter and 
novelty have been described as separate “doors” through which 
an applicant must pass to meet the objective of patentability.559 
The door of patentable subject matter cannot be barred because 
the telephone is not new—novelty is a separate question. Simi-
larly, one cannot extract from the claim the “point of novelty”—
the thing that separates the claimed invention from its prede-
cessors—and consider that the applicant’s “actual invention.”560 
The invention is what the claim says it is, and the claim must 
be judged as a whole. 
The claim might be allowed to pass through the § 101 sub-
ject matter “door” because it describes a machine, but stopped 
at the § 102 “door” of novelty on the ground that telephones are 
 
 557. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalik Communications Corp., 55 
F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Yale Lock Mfg. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559 
(1886) (“[T]he language of the claim defines the scope of the patented invention . . . .”). 
 558. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962-63 (C.C.P.A 1979), vacated sub nom. Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), reconsidered, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), 
aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
Falling into a category [of patentable subject matter under § 101] does not involve 
considerations of novelty or nonobviousness and only those two considerations in-
volve comparison with prior art or inquiry as to whether all or any part of the in-
vention is or is not in, or assumed to be in, the prior art or the public domain. Prior 
art is irrelevant to the determination of statutory subject matter under § 101. An 
invention can be statutory subject matter and be 100% old, devoid of any utility, or 
entirely obvious. 
Id.; see In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1243 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Considerations of 
novelty or obviousness are of no effect whatever in determining whether particular 
claims define statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
 559. See, e.g., Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960-62. 
 560. In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1982). “The court in Diehr rejected 
the ‘point of novelty’ analysis saying ‘[t]he “novelty” of any element or steps in a proc-
ess . . . is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls 
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter . . . .’” Id. (quoting 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981)) (alterations in original). 
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already known. This approach presents two problems. First, no 
patent claim element or claim language may be ignored.561 To 
treat the claim as anticipated by prior telephones would be to 
disregard the claim language describing the (for the sake of ar-
gument) new and nonobvious use of the telephone.562 Second, if 
telemarketing as described in the claim really is new, it is per-
verse to rely on novelty as the ground for rejecting the claim. 
The real problem, to borrow a trope attributed to Samuel John-
son, is this: the claimed invention is both new and technologi-
cal, but the part that is new is not technological, and the part 
that is technological is not new. 563 Yet, as long as we insist that 
subject matter and novelty are entirely separate issues, and as 
long as we allow the applicant unfettered freedom to define the 
nature of the invention, it is difficult to articulate a ground for 
rejecting or invalidating such a claim. Either the black letter 
rules of patent law must give a little, or we must resign our-
selves to patents on some essentially non-technological inven-
tions. 
It is, of course, not telephones but computers that present 
the hardest issues. A non-technological insight may be claimed 
 
 561. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) 
(“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of 
the patented invention . . . .”). 
 562. One could hold that prior telephone systems anticipated the claim on the 
ground that such systems and their component parts were always capable of perform-
ing the recited functions even if they were never used in that manner. See In re Scho-
enwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that discovery of a new use for a 
known composition cannot support a claim to the composition itself). Yet patent law 
does allow one to claim, as a process, a newly discovered, non-obvious use for an exist-
ing machine or composition of matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994) (defining “process” 
as including “a new use of a known . . . machine”); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985), 
overruled in part, on unrelated grounds, by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Rather than treat telephones that were 
never used in this manner as anticipating prior art, it would be better, in the absence 
of any new structure, to treat the invention as a new method, rather than as a new 
machine, and to require the method to stand or fall on its own “technological” cre-
dentials. See Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1247 (“Though a claim expressed in ‘means for’ 
(functional) terms is said to be an apparatus claim, the subject matter as a whole of 
that claim may be indistinguishable from that of a method claim drawn to the steps 
performed by the ‘means.’ ”). However, the Federal Circuit has resisted such attempts 
to recharacterize claims. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). 
 563. When asked to review a manuscript, Johnson said, “Your manuscript is both 
good and original, but the part that is good is not original and the part that is original 
is not good.” See THE DAVID & CHARLES BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 326 (Robert I. Fitzhenry 
ed., 1986). 
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via the conventional “computer system” that is essential to im-
plement it. The “means-plus-function” claim format,564 which 
allows the claim to include explicitly only functional limita-
tions, makes this approach particularly convenient for the ap-
plicant. In the case of a computer, one can argue not only that 
the claimed invention is a “machine,” but that it is a “new ma-
chine,” either because of the microscopic physical changes 
wrought by new programming or, more convincingly, because of 
the change in the computer’s functioning when it executes new 
software. The standard digital computer of today is what is 
called a “von Neumann machine,” after computer theorist John 
von Neumann.565 In a von Neumann machine, the computer 
program is stored in the same binary code and located in the 
same memory as the data on which the program operates.566 
Consequently, the von Neumann machine is infinitely malle-
able: changing the function of the machine only requires an 
easy alteration of the code stored in the computer’s memory.567 
In a very real sense, a new program does make a “new ma-
chine”: 
 Each program in effect makes the computer into a different 
machine, one with a new purpose, without any change in the 
wiring. The same physical equipment may serve first to calcu-
late the orbit of a spacecraft, then to alphabetize a list of 
names, then to determine averages and deviations of a statis-
tical sample. Since each of these tasks calls for a logically dif-
ferent Turing machine,568 the physical equipment that can ac-
complish them all is a universal Turing machine. Thus logic 
and electronics meet precisely at this point: the von Neumann 
computer.569 
 
 564. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 565. See generally, WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 76-77 (1992). 
 566. See BOLTER, supra note 2, at 39, 47-49. 
 567. See id. at 39 (“[T]he computer is not a fixed mechanism.”); see also id. at 49. 
In fact, computers are so flexible that they can be programmed to write their own pro-
grams. Bolter writes that “[t]he equivalent process in a steam engine would be to throw 
the gears into the furnace along with the coal and expect the engine to produce by itself 
a design for a new machine.” Id. at 40. 
 568. A “Turing machine” is an idealized computing mechanism named after com-
puter pioneer Alan Turing. See HILLIS, supra note 221, at 62-64. 
 569. BOLTER, supra note 2, at 49 (footnote added by author); see also id. at 39-40. 
A programmer is a designer who has the remarkable advantage of being able to 
test his design as soon as it is specified. For the design is the program, written in a 
suitable language such as PASCAL, and he need only submit the program to the 
computer to find his machine realized. 
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If it is accurate to think of a re-programmed computer as a 
“new machine,” then it is reasonable to regard that new ma-
chine as an addition to a technological art. This can best be 
seen by imagining the program implemented through a special-
purpose physical computer—perhaps made from the Tinker 
Toys and string of Hillis’s computer570 or from mechanical cogs 
and wheels. If the State Street algorithm could be implemented 
in a machine made from cogs and wheels, as theoretically it 
could, and the desired mutual fund management could be ac-
complished at the pull of a lever, why should such a new ma-
chine be denied its status as “technological” any more than a 
new cash register or adding machine? And if the cog-and-wheel 
version is “technological” and the product of a “useful art,” why 
not the electronic version? Yet, one could argue that the State 
Street claims are no more “technological” than the hypothetical 
telemarketing claim. The computer technology is prior art; only 
the non-technological accounting scheme is new. 
One way of dealing with such claims is to “pierce the veil” of 
the claim language to determine what it is the applicant or 
patentee “actually invented.”571 If the “actual invention” repre-
sents an advancement in the technological art of computing, 
then the patent serves the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress 
of . . . [the] useful Arts,” as the Constitution requires.572 On the 
other hand, if the “actual invention” represents an advance-
ment only in a non-technological art, such as accounting, then 
the patent should be rejected as drawn to unpatentable subject 
matter. This idea is a promising one, but it can be applied in 
vastly different ways. The narrowest application would grant 
patents only to advancements that improve the internal opera-
tion of a computer, such as an innovative program structure 
 
Id. 
 570. See HILLIS, supra note 221, at 16-18. 
 571. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
[S]atisfaction of § 101, and eligibility for the patent reward in general, requires a 
judgment that the applicant for the patent has actually invented or discovered 
something in the useful arts and for that reason is deserving of exclusive patent 
rights. To determine whether the applicant has invented or discovered something 
within the patent law, it makes no sense for the sole question to be, “Does the ap-
plicant happen to recite structure in the claims or not?” 
Id.; see In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (stating that the “critical question” is not “What 
does the claim say,” but “What did [the] applicants invent?” (quoting In re Abele, 684 
F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982))). 
 572. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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that permits a computer to operate faster or make better use of 
its memory. Such advancements clearly are advancements in 
the technological art of computing. On the other hand, an algo-
rithm that merely performs a new function would be denied a 
patent if that function did not have independent technological 
credentials.573 For example, a program that implemented an 
entirely new accounting scheme would be unpatentable, even if 
it were the first of its kind, if it did not, in any other sense, 
produce a better computer. 
This, however, is a too narrow a view of programming tech-
nology and, hence, too confining a definition of patentable sub-
ject matter. A designer who exercises his programming talents 
to create new accounting software is engaged in a technological 
endeavor as much as a watchmaker who designs a new watch. 
If the product of the programmer’s endeavor is a different kind 
of program, then the program should be as patentable as the 
watchmaker’s different kind of watch. The program should not 
have to be faster or more efficient than other programs, any 
more than the watch has to keep better time.574 What should be 
required is that the claimed invention reflect the programmer’s 
art rather than the non-technological art in whose service the 
programmer’s art is employed. If the program is one that im-
plements an accounting scheme, the claim, in substance, 
should be about the programming, not about the accounting. If 
the claim formally refers to a “data processing system” or “a 
software programming method,” but the substance of the claim 
refers only to the requirements of the accounting scheme, then 
the claim does not reveal the “nuts and bolts” of the program 
which may legitimately claim technological status. 
As previously discussed, a program can be described at 
various levels of generality, mirroring the typical evolution of a 
software development project.575 At the most general level, a 
program can be described by its overall goal. Or a program can 
 
 573. If the program functioned as a part of a larger technological endeavor, such 
as a method of rubber manufacturing, then the invention would not have to depend on 
the art of computing for its technological status. 
 574. Neither “utility” nor any other concept of patent law requires that a pat-
entable invention be better than other alternatives. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von 
Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “An invention need not 
be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain result, and it need only be useful to 
some extent and in certain applications . . . .” Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 
1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 575. See supra Part I.E. 
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be described in terms of its logical structure, elements of which 
can themselves be described more or less generally. Ultimately, 
a program can be described by its own code, which sets forth, in 
minutest detail, what the computer executing the program is to 
do. Copyright law employs a corresponding “levels of abstrac-
tion” analysis for deciding which aspects of a program are un-
copyrightable “ideas” and which aspects are protectable “ex-
pression.”576 If a program accused of infringing another 
program’s copyright is similar only when described at the most 
general level, the similarity may be too abstract, and may cap-
ture too much of the program’s function to permit copyright law 
to intervene. Such similarities are similarities of idea. On the 
other hand, if the similarities are more detailed, and are not 
dictated by the ultimate functional requirements of the pro-
gram, then such similarities may be considered protectable 
“expression.”577 A similar analysis sheds light on whether a 
claim to a computer-implemented endeavor embodies the tech-
nological aspects of the computer program. A claim so general 
that it describes only non-technological goals fails to capture 
the technological aspects of the program. On the other hand, a 
claim that describes specific aspects of the program logic has 
likely crossed the divide between the non-technological vision 
and the craft of computer programming. In a sense, the tech-
nology is in the details.578 
When a patent claims a software implementation of a non-
technological plan, the validity of the claim under § 101, and 
under the “useful arts” clause of the Constitution, should de-
pend on whether the claim includes enough substantive details 
relating to program logic or data structures that the invention 
is one within the technological art of computer programming. 
Expert testimony, similar to that which helps to identify the 
 
 576. Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 577. See id. at 707-11 (following “levels of abstraction” dissection of copyrighted 
program, program attributes dictated by efficiency, the computing environment, or the 
general “idea” of the program should be “filtered” and discarded before the programs 
are compared for substantial similarity). 
 578. Although the analysis may be similar, the divide between idea and expres-
sion for copyright law purposes will probably differ from the divide between non-
technology and technology for patent law purposes. Program attributes which are spe-
cific enough to be technological may be too functional to count as copyrightable expres-
sion. In fact, it may be that only such functional details have patentable novelty and 
utility. 
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“art” of an invention in the obviousness context,579 may be of 
assistance. If the claim, in substance, speaks in non-
technological language of non-technological concepts, it should 
be considered a claim to a non-technological invention. On the 
other hand, if the claim speaks in the programmer’s language 
of the programmer’s art, then the claim should be considered 
one to a “useful art.” 
Often the line may be difficult to draw. For example, the 
same series of steps might describe the details of the account-
ing scheme and, in a general sense, the structure of the pro-
gram that implements it. If the claim says “add quantity x to 
quantity y and store the result,” one could characterize this as 
a description of steps in an accounting scheme or as a descrip-
tion of program architecture. It is the nature of computer pro-
grams that plan and implementation blend. However, the se-
quence of program design provides some guidance. As 
discussed supra in Part I.E, the first stages of program design 
typically culminate in a “functional specification,” a document 
describing what the program is supposed to do.580 It includes 
some details, but they are, in a sense, external details relating 
to the program’s function—what features it will have, what the 
user interface will be like, what relation the output will bear to 
the input, and so forth. The next phase of software design leads 
to a “design specification.”581 This document describes how the 
goals of the functional specification will be achieved. This 
document records high-level program architecture and infor-
mation on the nature of the data structures. Although it is not 
a precise demarcation, the transition from “functional specifi-
cation” to “design specification” roughly indicates when, from a 
programmer’s perspective, the party who envisions a program’s 
function turns over the development process to the engineer 
who implements it.582 An accountant’s skills would be adequate 
to prepare a functional specification for an accounting program; 
the accountant only has to imagine, in detail, what he would 
like the program to do. A programmer’s skills are necessary for 
 
 579. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
 580. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text. 
 581. See supra notes 206-209 and accompanying text. 
 582. At least figuratively speaking. The functional specification and the design 
specification may be prepared by the same person, if it is a person with the skill and 
knowledge necessary to envision the features of the program and to implement them. 
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a design specification because only a programmer can describe, 
in a programmer’s language, how it will be done. The distinc-
tion between “what” and “how” is not an easy one, but it seems 
the right distinction to make. 
The “how” aspects of a program may be captured in a claim 
by explicit description of program architecture, or by invoking § 
112(6) and relying upon the specification to disclose the “struc-
tures” covered by the claim.583 The latter would likely be more 
practical for applicants, and it would still bind the claim to its 
technological foundations. Another programmer who discov-
ered an alternative, non-equivalent logical structure could de-
sign around the claim, avoiding the patented technology while 
still achieving the same non-technological goals.584 Today soft-
ware inventions are often claimed in terms of the physical 
components of the computer system. The State Street claims, 
with their references to storage “means” and processing 
“means” are of this variety. As long as the physical components 
are new, one cannot object that the invention, as claimed, is not 
technological. Computer hardware is an eminently technologi-
cal field. 
This brings us to the subject of novelty, which the courts 
have insisted is an entirely separate question from that of pat-
entable subject matter.585 That separation cannot be so strictly 
maintained that courts or the Patent Office turn a blind eye to 
 
 583. One could argue that § 112(6) contemplates as “structures” only physical en-
tities, in which case it might be more appropriate to employ the seldom-seen “step-plus-
function” provision, based on the following language of § 112(6): 
[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a . . . step for per-
forming a specified function without the recital of . . . acts in support thereof, and 
such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding . . . acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof. 
35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (1994). One of the reasons the step-plus-function format is so rare 
may be the difficulty of distinguishing between a “step” and an “act.” However, it would 
seem possible to have a claim describing, for example, the “steps” required by a non-
technological accounting method and to construe that claim to cover only the program 
logic “acts” described in the specification and their equivalents. 
 584. That is not to say that such design-around alternatives are necessary in order 
for the claim to be valid. In the mathematical algorithm arena, courts have considered 
the preemptive effect of a claim as a measure of the “abstractness” of the invention. 
Whether it is correct or incorrect in that context, it is a poor measure of technology. 
Some non-technological schemes may be unachievable without a particular technologi-
cal tool, so the effect of the patent on the tool may be to grant broad exclusive rights in 
non-technological fields. But that does not mean that a claim to the tool itself tran-
scends the “useful arts.” 
 585. See supra notes 558-560 and accompanying notes. 
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the character of the applicant’s invention. Specifically, an ap-
plication should not slip past the § 101 “door” by relying on one 
aspect of the claimed invention and the §§ 102-103 “doors” by 
relying on an entirely different aspect. There should be a single 
concept, or a single “invention,” that is in the “useful arts,” new 
and non-obvious. A new plan for using an existing technology is 
not always a technological advancement. A composer who 
imagines a new rhythm to play on the trumpet has imagined 
nothing technological, even though the trumpet itself is techno-
logical. The same is true of the salesman who imagines a new 
marketing technique to be carried out by telephone, or the ac-
countant who imagines a new accounting scheme to be imple-
mented, as such schemes typically are, on existing computer 
systems. A patent claim that, in substance, describes only a 
non-technological advancement should be held beyond the 
scope of the “useful arts,” even if it makes general references to 
existing technology. “Existing technology” includes conven-
tional general-purpose computer systems, as well as media, 
such as floppy disks, on which programs are stored. 
On the other hand, new programming does create a “new 
machine,” and, as long as the claim describes the substance of 
the programming in the language of programming, the claim is 
within the useful arts. Whether the claim should also be con-
sidered novel or nonobvious is a difficult question that can be 
treated only briefly. It has been suggested586 that the obvious-
ness of a program implementing a non-technological plan 
should be judged as if a programmer of ordinary skill were al-
ready aware of that non-technological plan. For example, if a 
program implements a new accounting scheme, one should ask 
whether the program would have been obvious given the needs 
of the new accounting scheme. This seems an unfairly restric-
tive approach to non-obviousness. Even unpatentable, non-
technological insights may lead to new technologies, which 
should be patentable. For example, if the composer’s conception 
of a new rhythm led him to invent a new trumpet on which it 
could be played, nothing should prevent the composer from 
patenting the trumpet. The same would be true if the sales-
man’s marketing innovations led to the invention of a physi-
 
 586. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an 
“Article of Manufacture”: Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89, 172-74 (1998). 
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cally different telephone. To assume that the new rhythm or 
new marketing plan is already known is contrary to fact, and it 
adopts too narrow a view of invention. Inventions are often in-
spired by non-technological aspirations, and, even if the inven-
tor’s leap of imagination is non-technological, one should not 
discount the new and technological result. In the computer 
programming context, one should not assume that the non-
technological plans inspiring a new program were already 
known if, in fact, they were not. 
The most difficult issue of nonobviousness in the program-
ming context is whether program architecture or data struc-
tures (which we shall now assume to be technological in char-
acter) are new if they are structurally or mathematically the 
same as those of prior programs, but the meaning is new. As-
sume, to take a trivial example, that existing programs in-
cluded steps of adding quantity x to quantity y and storing the 
result in memory. Is a program that calls for the same opera-
tions, but in which x and y stand for different entities (e.g., 
share prices instead of shipping weights), a new program? This 
issue may be worthy of an article of its own, and I will not at-
tempt to unravel it here. Whether or not the structure is new, 
however, it is technological. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As we enter a new millennium, it is fitting to contemplate 
how far American industry has progressed since the days of 
“horse collars and buggy whips,” or the kinds of manufactures 
recited by Tech Coxe in 1787. Industrial power and wealth are 
moving increasingly into the “information industries” rather 
than the “smokestack” industries of the past.587 The largest 
 
 587. The shift was apparent even in the mid-1980s. See Vincent E. Giuliano, The 
Mechanization of Office Work, in THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION, supra 
note 2, at 298 (“Information-related activities are becoming ever more important in 
American society and the American economy; the majority of workers are already en-
gaged in such activities, and the proportion of them is increasing.”); Halton, supra note 
260, at 3 (“The world is undergoing a major social and economic change, a Second In-
dustrial Revolution, through the new information-processing technology of communica-
tions and computers.”); Yoneji Masuda, supra note 2, at 620 (forecasting a new “infor-
mation society” in which “the production of information values and not material values 
will be the driving force behind the formation and development of society”). Ellul also 
writes of a “new industrial revolution” based on the computer. See JACQUES ELLUL, 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM 25 (1980). 
[F]or several years now, people have been speaking of a fourth industrial revolu-
tion [after those based on coal, electricity, and atomic energy]: the one launched by 
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corporation in the world, in terms of market capitalization, is 
Microsoft.588 The United States is justifiably proud of its lead-
ership in the “information industries,” and much that is ac-
complished in those industries is richly technological. If we ac-
cept the principle that patent rights encourage the progress of 
technology, as governments around the world have concluded 
for centuries, then we must ensure that the patent system con-
tinues to function, even in areas of technology that the Framers 
would hardly have recognized. On the other hand, we cannot 
allow the patent system to devour realms of human ingenuity 
that are not at all within the confines of the “useful arts.” 
Technology has made inroads into many aspects of life, but, in 
spite of Ellul’s vision, we have not yet reached the point where 
technology is all. The patent system is only a vehicle for pro-
moting technological development. We cannot predict the con-
sequences if, through artful claiming, progress in essentially 
non-technological endeavors is swept within the domain of the 
patent system. 
I have suggested a general approach to the identification of 
a “technological” or “useful arts” invention when a non-
technological vision leads to new programming for a conven-
tional general-purpose computer. The implementation of non-
technological ideas may lead to significant progress in the “use-
ful art” of computer programming, and such progress should be 
promoted, as the Framers would have intended, by the convey-
ance of exclusive rights for limited times. However, the patent 
claim should reflect the art of programming; it should reflect 
the substantive details that belong to the programming art and 
that enable the technological implementation of the non-
technological plan. The claim should deal with the how of the 
invention, not the what. As I have suggested, the distinction 
 
the computer. . . . The dominant factor is no longer a growth of potential or ex-
ploited energy, but rather an apparatus of organization, information, memoriza-
tion, and preparation for decision-making, to replace man in a huge number of in-
tellectual operations. 
Id. 
 588. See Weber et al., Call It the Net Effect, BUS. WK., July 12, 1999, at 50. 
  How much has the Net changed things? Only a decade ago, Japanese banks, 
a Swiss confectioner, and even a Philadelphia utility company were vastly more 
popular with investors than Microsoft Corp. . . . Today, after riding the personal-
computer wave right on into the Internet boom, Microsoft has vaulted to No. 1 in 
our annual rankings. 
Id. at 50. 
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between how and what cannot be a bright one due to the na-
ture of computer programming, and particular cases can be de-
cided only on their own facts. If the courts and the Patent Of-
fice adopt the proposed distinction, at least patent applicants 
will have an increased incentive to emphasize their technologi-
cal programming insights, both in drafting claims and in pre-
paring the detailed disclosures of the specification. This in it-
self will contribute to the progress of “useful arts” in the 
information age. 
 
 
